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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the effectiveness of the Goss Government's program to reform the 
management of the Queensland Public Sector (QPS) and argues that, unlike comparable 
reform programs initiated in other Australian public sectors, the impact of the Goss program 
was limited. To explore this argument, the thesis examines not only the content of the reform 
program and the process by which it was implemented, but also the history of reform in the 
QPS and the demographic profile of staff of the QPS. It concludes that explanation of the 
limited impact of the reform program lies in the combined impact of all of these factors. 
In examining the history of reform in the QPS, the study particularly scrutinises the 
contribution of the 1988 Savage Review, which is generally considered to have been an 
effective and timely review, and argues that it was narrow in focus and limited in its rigour. 
Whilst acknowledging the success of the 1989 Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry in exposing 
and addressing institutional corruption and highlighting areas of concern in relation to public 
sector management, it argues that the Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry did not provide (nor 
intend to provide) a blueprint for public sector management reform. It notes that as a result 
of this history, the reform program of the Goss Government was grafted onto a public sector 
both unaccustomed to change and ill equipped to handle it. 
After determining that available frameworks for evaluating administrative reform are 
inadequate, the study constructs a framework for this purpose. The constructed framework 
enables consideration of both the content of reforni programs and the processes utilized in 
their implementation. The study notes that whilst the content of the Goss Government reforni 
package resembled that of many of the other reform packages introduced in other 
jurisdictions in Australia in the preceding 20 years, it had some significant differences. One 
was the failure to restate and clarify the philosophical basis on which the public service 
operates. Another was the omission of reforms to achieve participative management 
practices. The omission of a strategy to specifically address the existing authoritarian 
management style was also a mistake. The study argues that these omissions distinguish the 
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Goss reform initiatives quite sharply from those that had been implemented in jurisdictions 
elsewhere and as a result the reform program was introduced to a sector in which the way 
management was practised was not itself the subject of specific scrutiny or reform and the 
prevailing traditional authoritarian management style was not directly challenged. 
In its examination of the processes used to introduce the reforms the study contends that the 
reform program failed to reap the available benefits as insufficient account was taken of the 
lack of contemporary management skills on the part of both the managers and union 
representatives, and that these skills were necessary for the successful implementation of 
some of the reforms, including job redesign and workplace restructure. It observes that the 
early experiences of staff participation in workplace decisions ended in union anger and staff 
disaffection. 
Examination of the demographic profile of QPS staff identifies that there are many 
similarities between public sector staff in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and 
Western Australia, but that there are also some significant differences. A notable difference 
between QPS staff in the country and city is identified. Compared to their city counterparts, 
QPS staff in the country are less mobile, are more likely to have no formal qualifications, are 
less likely to have a degree or higher qualification, and are more likely to be older. These 
differences are not present in other state jurisdictions. The study argues that implementation 
of the reform program should ideally have taken account of these differences and that there is 
no evidence that it did. Nonetheless the study concludes that the demographic similarities 
between QPS staff and staff in other jurisdictions are more significant than the demographic 
differences and that demographic differences do not provide an explanation of the different 
reform outcomes of the Goss reforms in the Queensland Public Sector. 
The study concludes by posing questions about the approach of all major political parties to 
systemic public sector reform in Queensland. It suggests areas of further research and 
recommends that a possible way forward is a bi-partisan approach to further public sector 
reform. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Public sector reform has long been a focus of activity of governments in Australia and 
elsewhere. In Australia, Governments at both commonwealth and state level have a history 
of reforming - sometimes in a piecemeal fashion, sometimes more comprehensively - their 
public sectors. Accompanying these reforms and attracting the close attention of both 
governments and oppositions are questions about the nature and extent of reform, its 
frequency and, of course, its effectiveness and efficiency. The responses to these questions 
have been the subject of scrutiny by commentators, the public, public sector staff and various 
watch bodies. 
This focus by Governments on public sector reform is understandable. Public sectors are 
expensive - indeed they are the major budget item for any government - and their 
effectiveness is critical in implementing government policies and delivering government 
programs. Additionally, and importantly, public sector staff represent the face of the 
Government in the local community. A public sector that is perceived to operate effectively 
is likely to be an electoral asset to the Government of the day. Thus the energy devoted to 
shaping such electoral assets appears limitless. 
The 1970s and 1980s saw a spate of Reviews and Inquiries conducted into public sectors in 
Australia. The concentration of reform activity at that time resulted, at least in part, from the 
desire by governments to equip their public sectors to respond to the transformation that had 
occurred in the Australian community following the rapid social change of the 1960s. A 
central theme of most of this review activity was the need for public sectors to better serve 
their communities. Reviews of the New South Wales, Victorian, Tasmanian, South 
Australian and Australian public sectors all noted the changing role of governments in 
fulfilling their responsibility to citizens. Typical of their approaches was a sensitivity to the 
transformation occurring in the communities they served. This sensitivity was typically 
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expressed in the Parliamentary White Paper which was the impetus for review in the West 
Australian public sector. The paper noted: 
The powerful forces of social, economic and political change sweeping through 
Western Australia require a public sector which is more flexible, efficient, and 
responsive (Burke, 1986: 2). 
However this theme of public sector reform aimed at ensuring the public sector better served 
the changing community was not evident in the Queensland experience of public sector 
reform. Indeed the Queensland experience was significantly different. An understanding of 
and sensitivity to the transformation that had occurred in the community was not a feature of 
the limited and belated reform activity undertaken in the Queensland public sector at the end 
of this period of intensive reform elsewhere. In 1987, almost two decades after the 
commencement of major reform activity in other jurisdictions in Australia, the Savage 
Review of the Queensland public sector was commenced. The impetus for the Savage 
Review was fundamentally economic, springing from concern about diminishing revenue 
flowing into the state, and, although its focus was clearly on the performance of the public 
service, its scope was much more limited than reviews in other jurisdictions. It stood alone 
amongst public sector reviews of the time in not considering what was seen elsewhere as the 
central question of the changing role of the public sector in a changing world. 
For decades, therefore, reform activity that was occurring elsewhere had no genuine 
counterpart in Queensland. This lack of activity had serious implications for the state. It 
meant that the overarching and critical issue of the changing nature of the Australian 
community and what ought as a consequence to have been the changed role and agenda of 
the public sector went unconsidered. It was on to this unattended and unreconstructed 
system, only superficially tended by Savage, that the Goss Government's public sector 
reforms were grafted. 
This thesis examines the effectiveness of the Goss Labor Government's program to reform 
the Queensland Public Sector. This reform program commenced in 1989 following the 
election of that Government after more than 32 years of continuous conservative government, 
firstly by the Country/Liberal Party coalition and then by the National Party. 
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PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM FROM WITHIN THE SECTOR; 1990 TO 2000 
The motivation to write this thesis came from my own experience in the Queensland Public 
Sector (QPS) including, significantly, my fascination with the factors that contribute to 
making the experience of working in the QPS at once captivating, unsatisfying and 
frustrating for me and for so many others. 
I, like many others who commenced work in the QPS in the early I990's, was a long term 
bureaucrat who was working in another jurisdiction (in my case the Commonwealth public 
sector) at the time of the change of government in Queensland in 1989. While that change of 
government presented exciting possibilities for many long term state public sector staff keen 
to work in more contemporary ways, it also presented exciting possibilities for bureaucrats 
from other jurisdictions, such as me. The incoming Goss government had a public sector 
reform agenda that appeared to present the opportunity to be involved in the introduction of 
contemporary public sector reforms that could, in my own view and that of many others, 
dramatically change for the better, the face of public administration in Queensland. I initially 
worked on secondment in the QPS in 1990 and was appointed to a posifion at Senior 
Executive level in a central agency in 1991. Fundamental to my role was implementation of 
the Goss public sector management reforms. 
As implementation proceeded I formed the view that the QPS was not responding in the 
predicted way to the introduction of the reform program and was somehow different from 
other jurisdictions in this country. Other states and the Commonwealth had undertaken 
ambitious public sector reform programs with considerable success. The Queensland 
experience stood out as markedly different. Whilst its reform program was, like those in 
other public sectors, also a reasonably ambitious one, it appeared to have limited impact. It 
seemed that: (i) the Goss reforms were not successfully facilitadng a transformafion of the 
QPS, i.e., that the sector was not acquiring the flexibility, creafivity and professional 
approach expected of, and necessary in, contemporary public sectors; and (ii) the standard of 
management practice, i.e., the way management occurred in the sector's workplaces, was 
neither effective nor appropriate for a well functioning contemporary public sector. 
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I was not alone in judging the effectiveness of the Queensland public sector reform program 
as less than optimal. The extent of its effectiveness was a regular topic of discussion at both 
a formal and informal level amongst those involved in the reforms during the early 1990s. 
Accordingly, as part of this research a number of senior executives who were recruited from 
other jurisdictions in this country to assist in implementing the Goss reform agenda were 
interviewed. Their views provide qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of the reforms. 
When these senior executives were interviewed in 1997 their concerns were, among other 
things, that there was a lack of clarity in the sector about the vision and goals of the Goss 
reforms as well as a lack of policy skills and policy frameworks necessary for successful 
implementation. Moreover, because there was no real understanding of how change should 
be implemented nor thoughtful planning of the change process, change was implemented in a 
half-hearted manner. They also identified what they judged to be a confused policy agenda 
with sometimes conflicting policies that lacked adequate direction and integration, a lack of 
management skills, including people management skills, and an inability on the part of senior 
managers to either translate the reforms into required action for their staff or manage the 
political interface. This latter problem resulted, in the view of some of the executives, in the 
politics of government "translating" down the line without any of the proper filters. Some 
saw the environment as very controlling and observed that the "culture of obedience" was not 
tackled and the workforce not empowered to accept greater freedom. Communication, 
including communication with staff and unions, was also seen as an area of deficit. One 
senior executive observed that there was no sense of partnership between management and 
unions in striving to achieve the changes to which both sides had expressed commitment. 
These percepfions - that the reforms were not achieving the desired changes - appear to be 
supported by the more recent research of Bradley & Parker (2000) (Bradley & Parker 2000. 
Bradley & Parker 2006, Parker & Bradley 2000), who examined and compared 
organisafional culture in the Queensland and Victorian public sectors. Their research 
identifies the continued dominance in the Queensland public sector of a culture consistent 
with a traditional authoritarian bureaucracy focused inwardly on rules, rule enforcement, 
policies and stability. By contrast the culture in the Victorian public sector in 2000 is 
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assessed as being more consistent with that of an organisation that takes a more flexible, 
spontaneous, adaptable, outwardly focused approach. 
Queensland public sector organisations are characterised by cultures which appear to 
be in alignment with the traditional theoretical model of bureaucracy and public 
administration that relies on formal rules and procedures as control mechanisms 
(Bradley & Parker, 2000: 7). 
Bradley & Parker write that "...results from the Victorian public sector indicate a different 
profile on average to the Queensland organisations surveyed" (Bradley & Parker, 2000: 9). 
Indeed the dominant culture of the Queensland public sector had not altered. The researchers 
observe that contemporary public sector reform programs, including those introduced in the 
Queensland public sector, have been based on the premise that the introduction of techniques 
"once the reserve of private-profit making organisations in a competitive environment", such 
as corporate planning (with mission statements), emphasis on performance management, 
greater client focus, decentralisation of decision making and adopting an output orientation, 
push public sector culture away from the traditional and towards the more flexible and 
responsive. 
It follows therefore that the extent to which the culture of public sectors has moved to be 
more flexible and responsive can be seen as a measure of the extent to which modem reforms 
have been effective. Clearly, by this measure the Queensland reforms have not been 
effective. Bradley & Parker summarise their findings in relafion to the Queensland and 
Victorian public sectors thus: 
In summary, the greatest difference in the survey results for the two States is ...[i]n 
Queensland the internal process model, which is the typical bureaucratic culture, 
received the highest score. In contrast, in Victoria, the rafional process model, which 
involves a culture that emphasised outcomes such as productivity and efficiency, 
received the highest score (Bradley & Parker, 2000: 10). 
This lends support to the proposition that the Queensland public sector responded differently 
to the standard public sector reform package adopted and implemented in other Australian 
jurisdictions. Bradley and Parker's findings indicate that a change in the dominant 
organisational culture of the QPS had not been achieved by 2000 - ten years after the 
introduction of the Goss reforms, the primary aim of which was to achieve a more flexible 
outwardly focused and adaptable public sector. On the contrary the culture of the QPS 
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remained one that was consistent with that of a traditional bureaucracy. Why the Queensland 
reforms failed is the focus of this thesis. 
CENTRAL ARGUMENT 
The central argument of this study is that the explanafion for the limited impact of the Goss 
Government reforms lies mostly in the combined effect of the history of reform of the QPS 
and two specific factors: the content or products of the Goss reforms (including, significantly, 
their omission of any industrial democracy or people management initiatives) and the 
processes employed to implement the reforms. The demographic profile of Queensland 
public sector staff is also found to have had an influence, though not as significant as the 
other two factors. 
To examine this argument I look first at the history of the reform and modernisation to which 
the QPS has been subjected, particularly the 1988 Savage Review, which I compare with 
reviews and inquiries that were occurring in sectors in other jurisdictions around the same 
time, nofing that it does not compare favourably. Then I approach the first two of my 
specific factors via a necessary preliminary look at available methods of evaluation. The 
thesis considers how the effectiveness of public sector reform programs might be measured 
or evaluated in order to identify a standard against which to test my claim that the reforms 
were not successfully facilitafing a transformation of the QPS. I note that evaluating levels of 
success of reform programs has historically received little attenfion and consider a number of 
existing, but limited, frameworks that can be used for this evaluative purpose, concentrating 
on those of Self (1978), Wilenski (1986) and Halligan & Power (1992). I argue that existing 
frameworks do not enable a comprehensive evaluation of the success of administrative 
reform and construct and propose a framework that is more effective for this purpose. My 
framework enables consideration of not only the "products' or components of reform 
packages (the typical focus of existing frameworks) but also the 'processes' or way in which 
those components or 'products' are implemented. 
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I then examine the 'products' and 'processes' of the Queensland reforms and assess these 
using my framework. The assessment identifies a number of deficiencies in both these areas 
and notes that the shortcomings in each of the areas contributed to failures in the other and, in 
turn, to non-achievement of stated outcomes. 
Next I address the additional influencing factor, the demographic profile of Queensland 
public sector staff, suggesting that differences in reform outcomes identified in the QPS may 
be influenced by the demographic differences between the Queensland public sector staff and 
staff of public sectors in other jurisdicfions. I use Austrahan Bureau of Stafistics 1996 
Census data to compare the level of educational achievement, age and mobility (as measured 
by length of residence at current address) of public sector staff. Initially I examine the 
demographic profile of Queensland public sector staff and compare it with that of 
Commonwealth public sector staff in Queensland. I then do a similar demographic 
comparison between state and commonwealth public sector staff in New South Wales, 
Victoria and Western Australia. Finally I contrast the comparisons in each of the states. My 
purpose in doing this is to counteract the possibility that differences identified between the 
commonwealth and state sectors in Queensland are a result of state based general population 
differences rather than specific public sector differences. I highlight any variations in the 
magnitude of the differences that the contrasts show, attending especially to situations where 
that magnitude defines a jurisdiction as extraordinary. 
Whilst many similarities are idenfified in the jurisdictions' data, a difference between QPS 
staff in the country and city is identified. Compared to their city counterparts, QPS staff in 
the country are less mobile, more likely to have no formal qualifications and less likely to 
have a degree or higher qualification, and more likely to be older. This difference is not 
present in other state jurisdictions. I conclude consideration of these demographic profiles by 
arguing that while the ideal reform implementation strategy for the QPS would have noted 
and taken account of these differences (and there is no evidence that it did), the demographic 
similarities between QPS staff and staff in other jurisdictions are more significant than the 
demographic differences, and that demographic differences alone do not provide an adequate 
explanation of the different reform outcomes of the Goss Government reforms. 
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THE METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED IN UNDERTAKING THIS RESEARCH 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed in complefing this thesis. The 
material examined in undertaking the qualitative assessment includes archival and secondary 
source material on public sector reform as well as interview data obtained from interviews 
with ten individuals who had worked as senior bureaucrats during the period of the Goss 
government. The quantitative method involved analysis of 1996 ABS Census data, which is 
used to examine and compare the demographic profiles of QPS staff with that of their state 
counterparts in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia. 
Literature and Secondary Sources 
Considerable material on public sector reform in Australia was examined. It included all 
Reports of inquiries into the Queensland public sector and the Reports of inquiries into public 
sectors in six other jurisdictions in Australia. It also included all the available literature on 
the Goss government reforms. All editions of the journal of the principal public sector union, 
the Queensland State Service Union (QSSU), The State Service, published during the four 
years 1988 to 1991 (inclusive) were also examined. Material on organisational change from 
well-established Australian researchers was also examined. 
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Interview Data 
Interviews were conducted during November and December 1997, after the elecfion of the 
Borbidge Government, with six women and four men. These ten individuals were typical, I 
believe, of the senior public servants playing key roles in implemenfing the Goss reforms and 
were all asked a standard set of questions (Appendix 1). The central objective of the 
questions was to obtain first hand assessments of the Queensland reforms from those who 
participated in the reforms to supplement the secondary sources that analysed the Queensland 
reform experience from an external vantage point. All of those interviewed were at either 
Senior Executive level or A08 (the level immediately below SES). One was at the fime of 
interview a Chief Executive. Three of the cohort are at time of publication working at CEO 
level in the Queensland public sector. At the time of interview one of the senior executives 
had left the QPS. Eight had been recruited to the Queensland public sector during the first 
two years of the Goss government from senior positions in other public sectors in Australia 
including the Victorian, Tasmanian, New South Wales and Commonwealth public sectors. 
The other two were long term state public sector staff. All of those in the sample had played 
key roles in the introduction of the Goss reforms. The majority of the executives interviewed 
had been in the Queensland Public Sector for a relafively short period of time. This was 
deliberate as 1 was particularly focused on getting an informed perspecfive from those who, 
in effect could provide an outsider's view of the QPS. 
I had met all of the senior executives in the sample prior to the interviews and had interacted 
with them in some way in my own central agency role. The interviews took place over 
approximately twenty hours and were taped but were conducted on the understanding that 
they would be used for research and the identity of the senior executives involved would 
remain confidential. 
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The Demographic Profile Data 
Comparing the demographic profiles of Queensland public sector staff with those of public 
sector staff in other state jurisdictions proved to be the most difficult part of this research. 
Initially, I explored the possibility of obtaining personnel data directly from each of the 
sectors. I contacted a number of the sectors and discovered that current data was not always 
available and that the format in which this data was collected varied to such an extent that 
comparisons would be impossible to make even if current data could be obtained. During 
1997 and 1998 I met several fimes with the Queensland State Government Statistician and 
staff from that Office to assess whether data they held could prove useful in this thesis. The 
State Government Statistician purchases Census data from ABS for use in State planning. 
Following extensive examination of that data it became evident that it was not useful for this 
project. Specifically defined and requested ABS Census data appeared to be the only 
possible source of useful data. 
During 1999 I met with ABS staff to determine whether it would be possible to obtain the 
data I was seeking. An initial difficulty with the Census data proved to be accurately 
defining a public sector employee. A combination of Occupation type and Industry codes 
was ultimately used to define public sector employee. Teachers, police and nurses were 
excluded from the data. This was done because the large number of staff in these categories 
would be likely to have skewed the results. The numbers of teachers, police and nurses in the 
Queensland public sector would be likely to be equal to the total number of other public 
sector staff and the demographic profile of these groups would have been more likely to be 
similar across all jurisdictions. The initial download of tables indicated a problem in 
accurately identifying who should be included in the Commonwealth public sector, i.e., the 
Commonwealth data appeared to include defence personnel, staff in universities, and staff in 
the communications industry (Telstra and Australia Post). Further refining of the industry 
and occupation codes used overcame this problem. 
In March 2000 the Office of the Public Service purchased the ABS Census data used in this 
thesis at a cost of $2950. The purchased data identified staff in the selected occupational 
categories in the Commonwealth, State/Territory and Local Government sectors as well as 
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Staff in private sector. Data was purchased for Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and 
Western Australia. Data included highest qualification achieved, age and place of residence 
both one year and five years prior to the census date. The data was provided from the ABS in 
SuperTable format. This proved difficult to manipulate so ABS also provided it as Excel 
files. 
Queries were run on the data to refine it into more useable format. The tables that resulted 
from the queries are the raw data on which the tables included in this study are based. 
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The research is presented in seven chapters. Chapter 1 has provided an introducfion, set out 
the central argument of the study as well as the methodology used to examine it. It has also 
discussed some recent research into the Queensland Public Sector which provides support to 
the central argument of the study. Chapter 2 examines the history of reform prior to the 
election of the Goss government in 1989. It sets out the context in which the Goss reform 
program was implemented. The existing frameworks to evaluate the effectiveness of public 
sector reform are examined in Chapter 3. The limitations of these frameworks are idenfified 
and an alternative and more comprehensive framework for evaluating public sector reform is 
advanced. Using this new framework. Chapter 4 evaluates the components or "products" of 
the Goss reform program and Chapter 5 evaluates the processes used to implement the 
reforms. This examination concludes that the processes used to implement the reforms were 
likely to have contributed to their limited success. Chapter 6 considers another explanafion 
of why the reforms failed and uses population census data from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics to compare the demographic profile of Queensland public sector staff with that of 
public sector staff in other jurisdictions. The chapter identifies some differences in the 
demographic profile of Queensland public sector staff in country regions that may have 
influenced the effectiveness of reform implementation. The final chapter. Chapter 7, draws 
together the findings and conclusions of this study, poses questions about the approach of all 
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major political parties to systemic public sector reform in Queensland, suggests areas of 
further research and makes recommendations for further public sector reform in Queensland. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY OF REFORM OF QPS BEFORE 1989 - WHAT WAS IT LIKE? 
H o w DID IT COMPARE? 
In October 1986 the then Premier of Queensland (The Hon. Joh Bjelke-Petersen) announced 
that "an independent review will be undertaken of Government efficiency..." (Savage, 1987: 
iii). The review was to focus on the efficiency of the public sector as well as examine the 
performance of Statutory Authorities. The announcement of the review was seen by many as 
long overdue. 
After years of telling us that Queensland has the best public service in Australia, the 
Queensland Government has announced an inquiry aimed at identifying 
"opportunities for improving the productivity of the administrative machinery of the 
Queensland Government (Prasser, 1986: 352). 
In announcing the review, the Premier brought to an end a lengthy period during which there 
had been an absence of external scrutiny of the Queensland public sector. In the Report that 
was generated as a result of the review. Sir Ernest Savage, Chairman of the Review 
Committee, comments that: 
It would appear that prior to the establishment of this Review Committee, the last 
review conducted into the Public Sector of Queensland was the Royal Commission on 
Classificafion of Officers of the Public Service in 1919 (Savage, 1987: iii). 
Also brought to an end, at least temporarily, was the criticism that in failing to review the 
public service, Queensland remained out of step with other Australian jurisdicfions. 
While the period from the 1920s to the 1970s had been one of relafive stability for public 
sectors nafion wide, other jurisdictions in Australia had inifiated review activity 10 to 15 
years earlier than Queensland. Detailed and comprehensive Reviews, Inquiries or Royal 
Commissions, had been conducted into other Australian public sectors at both a state and 
national level during the 1970s and early 1980s. Review acfivity was not restricted to 
Australia. Internationally public sectors at the nafional level (United States, Canada, Great 
Britain, New Zealand and Ireland) had also been reviewed (Coombs, 1976: 3). 
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The Queensland Public Sector however was notable for its lack of outside scrutiny. 
How had Queensland's public sector avoided this scrutiny? Did it indicate that the 
Queensland Public Sector was not in need of outside scrudny; in other words, that it was, in 
significant respects, different from public sectors in other jurisdicfions? Had reform activity 
taken place in the Queensland public sector as part of day to day activity so that it was 
already in line with the public sectors that had been reviewed? Or was it that the outside 
scrufiny just came later and the establishment of the Savage Review brought the Queensland 
Public Sector into line with sectors elsewhere in terms of review and introspection? This 
chapter explores these quesfions. 
WHAT WAS THE OPS LIKE PRE -SAVAGE? 
In 1989 the Goss Labor Government was elected in Queensland following 32 years of 
confinuous conservative government, firstly by the Country/Liberal Party coalition and then, 
between 1983 and 1989, by the Nafional Party . Halligan & Power suggest that the character 
of the public sector was formed by the fact that in the previous seventy years there 
.. .had been essentially only two governments: a Labor government from 1915 to 
1957 (except for 1929-32) and one which was Country (later National) Party 
dominated from 1957 to 1989 (Halligan & Power, 1992: 161). 
They suggest that during this enfire period Queensland had been ruled by ".. .two seemingly 
permanent conservative, rurally-based governments" (Halligan & Power, 1992: 162) and that 
during both of these periods, the public sector came to be an extension of the government and 
experienced ".. .tight polifical control under a strong political leader" (Halligan & Power, 
1992:161). They conclude that: 
By the late 1980s Queensland was the only state that had not experienced a change of 
government in the last thirty years and more importantly there had been little change 
during the modemizafion phase of execufives in other states and the Commonwealth. 
The inevitable result was ossification and resistance to reform - with the tacit or 
explicit approval of the political executive. (Halligan & Power, 1992: 162) 
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Peter Coaldrake, a long-time political commentator on Queensland who was appointed by the 
incoming Goss government as Chair of the newly created Public Sector Management 
Commission, observed that prior to the late 1980s the 
...public service as an insfitufion came to share the 'values' of its polifical masters. It 
thus became polificised, not so much in a directly partisan sense but by way of 
sharing the benefits of office and the threats posed by government defeat at the polls 
(Coaldrake, 1989: 80). 
After assuming his new posifion at the Public Sector Management Commission Coaldrake 
described the Public Sector as being 'professionally unattended' for a long period 
(Coaldrake, 1992: 5). 
The views expressed by many commentators in the 20 years that preceded the election of the 
Goss government support Coaldrake's conclusion that the sector was 'professionally 
unattended'. Wiltshire in 1983 described the Queensland public service as politicised. 
...The single largest track to the top is by means of service as a private secretary to a 
minister, or through one of the central agencies. It is a very political track and 
nobody reaches the top of the Queensland public service without having been subject 
to intense polifical scrutiny (1983: 187). 
Wiltshire paints a picture of a public service that fails to measure up as professional. He 
suggests Cabinet regularly intervened in senior appointments, and notes that appointments to 
a third of the posifions (the most senior third in the hierarchy) were not subject to appeal and 
thus outside scrutiny. He observes that unions were weak and uninterested and that the 
media was apathefic. He suggests that the public service was continually growing in size. 
He argues that the promotion system was "...sfiU probably one of the worst known in public 
service circles" (Wiltshire, 1983: 194), that seniority was prominent and that "seniority lists" 
were still in existence in some parts of the service. Moreover, it was Wiltshire's view that 
the growth of the public service was more a reflection of "the economic development of the 
state rather than of any firm polifical guidance" (Wiltshire, 1983: 186) - that planning in the 
sector was lacking. 
In his analysis of the public service Wiltshire notes particularly the combination of weak 
unions and an uninterested media. He suggests that these did not occur by chance and that 
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the development of weak unions may have been a product of the situafion. He suggests that 
more than just a cosy relationship existed between the unions and the Nafional Party 
government and that the convenience for the unions of compulsory union membership for 
public servants influenced the rapport that the unions enjoyed with the government. He 
suggested that the major clerical union, the State Services Union 
...seems to have been largely satisfied with wages and condifions and has accepted a 
kind of quid pro quo with the government to confine industrial acfion to the rule book 
in return for government's closed shop policy and emphasis on seniority (Wiltshire, 
1983: 189). 
Other commentators agree. Halligan & Power trace the unique posifion of unions in the 
Queensland Public Sector back to the post-federafion Labor government in which the 
government's power base was unions and party members. They suggest that the public 
service became an extension of this power base through the unionisation of public servants 
and the "...infusion of party supporters into the bureaucracy" (Halligan & Power, 1992: 161). 
The picture that emerges of the public sector from the descriptions of Wiltshire is not 
flattering. It is of a haphazardly growing and politicised public service, not subject to outside 
scrutiny. It is of a 'closed shop' public service insulated from outside influences. Indeed, 
public servants who joined the service from other jurisdictions found themselves unable to 
carry over various enfitlements including leave. "Queensland was the only public service in 
the nation not to carry reciprocity on such matters" (Wiltshire, 1983: 186). 
Wiltshire was not alone in arriving at such an assessment of the Queensland public service. 
Other commentators offered similar views. Hughes' account of the Queensland public 
service prior to the Savage review, whilst being somewhat more generous than Wiltshire's, 
notes the 'closed shop' nature of the service and the limited mobility of its staff (Hughes, 
1980: 205). Hughes reports that in a 1975 study more than half the Permanent Heads in 
Queensland had served in only one or two departments (Hughes, 1980). In the main the 
permanent heads were older than those in other sectors (half over 55) and had served in the 
public service for a long fime (more than half for more than 35 years). Hughes points to the 
lack of a divisional structure in the QPS as being different from the public services of NSW, 
Victoria and the Commonwealth. He suggests that as a consequence of this, a reliance 
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developed on the length of time a person had been in a position as a measure - seen as an 
appropriate measure - of her or his remuneration level which in turn laid the foundation for 
the endurance of seniority. Hughes identifies this pre-eminence of seniority as opposed to 
the arguably worse practice of polifical favouritism as the nemesis of the merit principle in 
the QPS. CoUey agrees suggesfing that the merit principle in the QPS has been a "very fluid 
concepf heavily influenced by conditions of the fime (Colley, 2006: 46). Hughes also 
focuses on the unions and describes them as "... 'moderate' (or 'conservative', depending on 
your point of view)...Consequently, industrial pressure on the government is usually 
restrained" (Hughes, 1980: 214). 
Prasser echoes the theme that Wiltshire noted in relation to lack of scrutiny but from another 
angle. Wiltshire was concerned about lack of scrutiny in appointments to senior positions 
whereas Prasser's focus is on service delivery and policy matters. 
Unlike their counterparts in Canberra, Queensland public servants do not have to 
worry about such irksome things as Senate Estimates Committees or even a Public 
Accounts Committee. Queensland has none of these (Prasser, 1986: 352). 
Wiltshire's suggestion that Cabinet regularly intervened in the appointment of senior public 
servants is explained to an extent by Fitzgerald in the report he compiled as a result of his 
Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activifies and Associated Police Misconduct. He highlights the 
systemic problems for Queensland in the formal appointment process for senior public 
servants. Fitzgerald notes the fact that the legal power to make appointments to senior public 
service posifions rests with the Queensland Governor in Council. 
A system which provides the Executive Government with control over the careers of 
public officials adds enormously to the pressures upon those who are even moderately 
ambitious. Merit can be ignored, perceived disloyalty punished and personal and 
poHfical loyalfies rewarded...(Fitzgerald, 1988: 130). 
Whilst there is a consistency in the way in which the public service was perceived by 
commentators, there is not the same consistency in relation to an explanation of why it was 
thus. 
Without doubt the overall political climate and culture that existed in the state was influential 
on the public service (Hede, 1993). This influence would have been both direct and indirect 
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The indirect influence would have been exerted through individual public servants in that 
they themselves were subject to and suscepfible to the same cultural influences as other 
Queenslanders and those cultural influences appear to have been notable in their 
conservatism. Cribb (1984, as cited by Scott, Coaldrake, Head & Reynolds, 1986) discusses 
Queensland cultural influences and depicts rural fundamentalism as central to an 
understanding of Queensland polifics not only during the period of conservafive rule but from 
the beginning of Queensland's history. She highlights two elements of rural fundamentalism 
of relevance to this discussion: 
• Anti-intellectualism which "...appears as a belief that so called 'intellectual' 
matters, including issues and values, rank low on the public agenda and are 
accorded a lowly status on the scale of what is importanf (Scott et al, 1986: 50-
51) and; 
• The nofion that "...old and tradifional beliefs and values are more worthy than 
others, that they should be accorded the greatest respect and therefore that 
quesfioning or dissenfing from them is, by implicafion, wrong" (Scott et al., 1986: 
50-51). 
Consistent with Cribb's analysis, Scott et al. suggest that the result is that the 
...pattern of interest group acfivity is shaped in Queensland, more perhaps than in 
most systems claiming a democratic base, by the desire to appear to reinforce 
established values rather than question them (Scott et al., 1986: 53). 
Public servants as individuals were subject to these influences too, so that in their daily work 
they would have felt more rewarded for behaviour that reinforced rather than challenged 
established Queensland community values. It is likely that this influence would have resulted 
in an environment in which it was more comfortable to reinforce rather than challenge the 
status quo and established values. Such an environment does not support the desirable 
environment for the Westminster system, a cornerstone of which is the provision by public 
servants of frank and fearless advice to their political masters. Indeed the Westminster 
requirement to provide honest - frank and fearless - advice would have created a real and 
perhaps irreconcilable tension for those public servants conscious of the need not to upset the 
status quo. 
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Additional to the indirect influences on Queensland public servants were the direct influences 
of the Queensland polifical situafion, Premier Bjelke-Petersen and his idiosyncrafic style, 
along with the style of the government he led. The Premier personally played a direct role in 
the operation of the public service (Walter & Dickie, 1985). He saw the cultivafion of 
personal and party loyalty as being of overriding importance. Scott et al. suggest that his 
insistence on loyalty amongst his colleagues was a hallmark of the Bjelke-Petersen 
premiership and extended to both the National Party parliamentary wing and his ministry as a 
whole (Scott et al., 1986: 59). It is unlikely that Bjelke-Petersen's expectafions of public 
servants would have been substantially different, particularly given Wiltshire's view that the 
government directly intervened in the appointments of senior public servants. It is likely that 
Premier Bjelke-Petersen would have expected his brand of loyalty from senior public 
servants who would have been well aware that their occupancy of their positions had been 
sanctioned by the Government. The combination of these factors together with a community 
culture that did not value intellectualism but did value the traditional rural values, would have 
combined to create an environment not compatible with a professional public service in the 
Westminster style. 
It is not surprising that commentators were calling for reform. Scott et al. note the lack of 
reform in the Queensland public service. They suggest that the idea of reform had been 
deliberately kept off the political agenda. 
It could be speculated that this is because neither the ministers nor the public servants 
see any benefits flowing from changes associated with a reform process, and public 
opinion has never been much of a force in any reformist inifiatives (Scott et al, 1986: 
58). 
The call for reform was so consistent that commentators had even speculated about what 
should be included in the reform package. Wiltshire suggests in 1983 that if there were an 
inquiry into the Queensland public service, personnel pracfices would have to be one of its 
main focii. 
Queensland sfill has to catch up with the refonns sweeping Australia in areas like 
freedom of informafion, the new administrafive law, equal employment opportunity 
and the fiindamental question of the relafionship of bureaucracy to society (Wiltshire 
1983:195). 
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These were the views of commentators, those on the outside looking in. But what about the 
views of those on the inside of the public service prior to the Savage Review? Were they 
similar? Anecdotal evidence from long term staff and the insights of staff who joined the 
state government since Savage reported in 1987 generally support the views of the 
commentators. The QPS prior to the Savage Review is consistently reported by insiders as 
being one in which seniority remained a crifical factor in determining promotion and one in 
which the Westminster practice and tradition of offering frank and fearless advice had not 
been established and was not practised. 
One long-term state public sector staff member observed that: 
...(QPS) doesn't have a history of professionalising the public service. The entry 
level has been lower than that in other states and QPS has a history of promotion on 
seniority and not merit (Interviewee M, 1997). 
He further commented that: 
...it was only recently that you would expect to have someone across the table from 
you who would have professional qualifications, particularly in the administrafive 
wing. (Interviewee M, 1997) 
Despite the widespread belief by staff of the QPS and the observations by commentators that 
seniority was a critical factor in determining promofion, the persistent official line was that 
this was not the case. The official line was that promotion was merit based and did not rely 
on seniority. In an address to the Royal Insfitute of Public Administration in 1958 the then 
State Public Service Commissioner D. W. Fraser says: 
contrary to the general belief, promotions in the Public Service are made on the basis 
of efficiency and not upon seniority. Seniority is taken into account only when two or 
more officers possess equal efficiency for appointment to the posifion concerned 
(Fraser, 1981: 17). 
Perhaps the key to understanding this difference in perception is contained in the words 
"...when two or more officers possess equal efficiency...". While it is not possible to know 
how frequently those charged with the responsibility of determining the most meritorious 
applicant in any selection situation assessed two or more of the applicants as being of 'equal 
efficiency', the persistence of the view that seniority remained current suggests that this 
occurred quite frequently. The culture of the sector would have supported it. Making 
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determinations about the relative efficiency of individuals is always a difficult and often a 
controversial task. Individuals who miss out on being selected can feel aggrieved and voice 
concern. In a sector that did not have a strong tradition of openness, accountability and 
providing frank and independent advice, where action that reinforced rather than challenged 
traditional beliefs and values was more likely to occur, the attractiveness of choosing the 
least controversial option, which did not require those making the decision to account for and 
explain the decision, would have been hard to resist. Being able to resort to an objective and 
traditional measure such as seniority, rather than undertake a more rigorous assessment of 
applicants that may have resulted in the need to explain and justify, must have seemed 
appealing. 
In any case it is clear that a widespread perception that seniority remained a critical and an 
overt determinant of promofion persisted amongst many close observers of the sector at least 
until the public service employing legislation was reviewed as a result of the 
recommendafions of the Savage Review. The Savage Review, written 29 years after the 
address by D. W. Fraser strongly intimates that seniority had continued to be an actively used 
determinant of promotion. 
It was also submitted that seniority is no longer relevant and that the selection process 
should be directed towards and based on a proper assessment of merit (Savage, 1987-
56). 
Recommendafion 60 of the Savage Review picks up this point and declares that "...promotion 
be based solely on merit" (Savage, 1987: 56). 
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HOW DID SAVAGE COMPARE WITH REVIEWS IN OTHER PUBLIC SECTORS OF THE TIME? 
A spate of Reviews and Inquiries into public sectors in other Australian jurisdictions 
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. The relafive prosperity of the 1950s and the rapid social 
change that had occurred during the 1960s had been factors in transforming the Australian 
community. Conscious of this social change, governments endeavoured to equip their public 
sectors to respond to their own rapidly changing demands along with those of the 
communities the public sectors were required to serve. One popular method employed to 
transform public sectors was to conduct a review. 
Those charged with the responsibility of conducting the reviews acknowledged the need for 
public sectors to better serve the community. In preparing the Interim Report of the Review 
of NSW Government Administrafion, Wilenski noted the importance for any administrafion 
of analysing the needs and problems of the community it serves (Wilenski, 1977). Wilenski 
suggested this is necessary in order for the administration to implement the policies of the 
elected government (Wilenski, 1977). 
In a similar vein, in the First Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Victorian Public Service 
1974, Sir Henry Bland noted the changing roles of governments in fulfilling their 
responsibility to protect cifizens and the corresponding need for public sectors to review their 
way of operafing (Bland, 1974). Sir George Cartland reporting on the review he chaired of 
the Tasmanian Public Service noted that the period since the previous review of that public 
service "over seventy years ago..." had been characterised by "enormous change in the 
responsibilities of modem governments..."(Cartland, 1981a: 1). Although in Western 
Australia a Parliamentary White Paper rather than a Review or Inquiry was the impetus for 
reform, there was a similar consciousness of the changing world. Managing Change in the 
Public Sector - A Statement of the Government's Position, presented by the then Premier of 
Western Australia Brian Burke to the Western Australian Parliament in 1986, notes: 
The powerful forces of social, economic and polifical change sweeping through 
Western Australia require a public sector which is more flexible, efficient and 
responsive. This government has shown its commitment to the development of a 
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public sector which reflects these ideals, thus acfing in the wake of Australia-wide 
public sector reform which began more than a decade ago (Burke, 1986: 2). 
Notably, the quesfion of the changing role of the public sector in a changing world is not one 
that the Savage Review appeared to consider. There is no indication in the brief of the 
Savage Review Committee, or in its role as detailed in the report, that the Committee 
concepmalised its role as being one that included considerafion of this overarching policy-
level question (Savage, 1987). This disfinguishes it quite sharply from those of other public 
sectors during the previous decade. 
This distinction may in part be explained by the circumstances in which the Savage Review 
was established. These circumstances influenced the entire orientation of the Review. 
Polifical change had played a central role in the establishment of public service inquiries in 
Australia. The Victorian, NSW, South Australian and Australian public sector reviews were 
established by governments either recently elected or in the process of undergoing internal 
change (Smith & Weller, 1978: 4). 
The Bland inquiry was set up by R. J. Hamer after he had succeeded Sir Henry Bolte 
as Premier and been confirmed in office by an election. ...In South Australia the 
Dunstan Labor government, in office since 1970 was still trying to remould 
administrative structures built up during a generation of Liberal rule. In Canberra 
RCAGA (Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration) was 
appointed by an inexperienced Labor government, recently forced to a "snap' 
election, and divided about what to expect from and how to deal with, a diverse 
federal public service (Smith & Weller, 1978: 4). 
But it was not, Corbett suggests, political change that prompted the establishment of the 
Savage review but rather economic change, indeed economic adversity. He argues that the 
collapse of the coal market in Japan in the early 1980s was the trigger for 
...an otherwise complacent and secure National Party government of Sir Joh Bjelke-
Petersen to turn its attention to the public sector. A review of government regulafion 
of business, headed by Sir Ernest Savage, was soon followed, in 1985, by another 
Savage inquiry this fime into the structure and calibre of the whole public sector and 
its personnel (Corbett, 1988: 3). 
Halligan & Power (1992) also note the genesis of the Savage Review as significant. In 
addifion to the economic situation they suggest that the second Savage Review had as an 
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unofficial objective the abolition of the Public Service Board (Halligan & Power, 1992: 178). 
Clearly the genesis of the Savage Review was different. 
Other features distinguished the Savage Review from Reviews and Inquiries in other 
jurisdictions. One of the most notable differences was its timing. The Savage Review did 
not occur until 10 years after most others (i.e. Victoria, South Australia and NSW). The 
Savage Review also differed in the process that was employed in its conduct, the areas that 
the Committee considered relevant to their Terms of Reference and, not surprisingly given 
these differences, the recommendations contained in the final Report. 
Why the differences? Was it that the passage of the 10 years between the conduct of the 
Savage Review and the earlier reviews meant that the question of the changing role of the 
pubhc sector in a changing world was no longer relevant? It seems unlikely. The pace of 
change outside Queensland at least had not abated during that decade, as noted in the 
Western Australian White Paper. Nevertheless it is possible that there was a belief that 
because the Queensland community, and consequently the public sector, had been insulated 
from the social changes that were occurring elsewhere in the country reform was not 
required. Queensland had not experienced political change in the same way as other 
jurisdictions and this may have supported the conviction held by some that the surface 
stability reflected the reality of Queensland life. Alternatively it may have been true that the 
lack of polifical change had indeed been influential in discouraging and inhibiting social 
change, maintaining not only ostensible but also actual stability in Queensland life. 
Whatever the truth of that, the announcement of the Savage Review potentially represented 
an opportunity for comprehensive scrutiny of the Queensland Public Sector. In the event, 
this did not happen and the Review failed to provide the impetus for introspection and 
prolonged change that reviews in other sectors had done. The absence of any consideration 
by the Review of the role of the public sector and the overarching policy question of the 
place of the public sector in contemporary Queensland society immediately limited its 
impact. It lacked in its considerafion of what Smith & Weller (1978) term 'arguments' 
(Smith & Weller, 1978: 11) and Wilenski (1986) terms 'goals' (Wilenski, 1986: 154). Smith 
& Weller suggest that the contribufion of public sector inquiries is measured by assessing 
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both the 'procedures and arguments' of the inquiry. In other words they suggest that the 
quality of both "...the intellectual and catalyfic effects of such inquiries and the process by 
which they are conducted and their reports implemented" is the measure of success and 
should be the subject of scrutiny (Smith & Weller, 1978: 11). 
The failure by Savage to consider these fundamental questions impacted in turn on the way in 
which the Review was conducted. While Smith & Weller (1978) refer to the way in which 
Reviews are conducted as the 'procedures', Wilenski (1986) refers to it as the 'means'. So 
the extent of the Savage Reviews consideration of 'arguments' or 'goals' influenced its 
'procedures' and 'means' and ultimately the strength of its enduring legacy. 
The Means - Terms of Reference 
Corbett's Committee of Inquiry into the Public Service of South Australia was appointed in 
May 1973, Bland's Board of Inquiry into the Victorian Public Service commenced in 
October 1973 and Coombs' Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration in 
June 1974. In the following five years two other public service reviews were announced. 
The Review of NSW Government Administrafion conducted by Wilenski was commissioned 
in January 1977, while the review of Tasmanian Government Administrafion conducted by 
Cartland commenced in early 1979. 
Terms of Reference for the reviews were generally quite broad and, notably, were interpreted 
quite broadly by those charged with their conduct. His Excellency the Governor of NSW 
commissioned Wilenski: 
to inquire into and report upon improvements in the machinery of Government 
and State Government Administration and to advise on the implementation of 
such improvements as the Government decides upon (Wilenski, 1977). 
Corbett in South Australia was asked: 
to examine and report to the Minister on the role, structure, management and 
staffing of the South Australian Public Service and to recommend any acfion 
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which may be considered necessary to improve the effectiveness, economy and 
efficiency of the Service...(Corbett, 1975: xi). 
Coombs was appointed to: 
inquire into and report upon the administrative organisation and services of the 
Australian Government, and in particular-
(1) the purposes, functions, organisafion and management of Australian 
Government Departments, Statutory corporations and other authorities 
and the principal instruments of co-ordination of Australian 
Government administration and policy: and 
(2) the structure and management of the Australian Public Service, 
and to make recommendations for improving efficiency, economy, 
adaptability and industrial relafions and the dispatch of public 
business;...(Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administrafion [Chaired by H. C. Coombs], 1976: Letters Patent 
unnumbered page). 
The broadness of the Terms of Reference of these reviews together with the all-encompassing 
manner in which the reviewers undertook their respective tasks contrasts with the way the 
Savage Committee chose to conduct its review in 1986. 
Whilst the Terms of Reference of the Savage Committee of Review included an initial broad 
statement: 
The purpose of the Review is to idenfify opportunifies for improving the 
productivity of the administrative machinery of the Queensland Government 
and make recommendations as to the appropriate measures to implement the 
desired changes (Savage, 1987: [ii]). 
they also include four quite specific objecfives. 
The Committee was asked to report on, 
(a) the potential for improving the performance of Statutory Authorities other than 
Local Authorities except to the extent that functions currently carried out by 
Government may more effecfively be carried out by Local Authorities.... 
(b) The eliminafion of the duplicafion or overlap of funcfions or acfivifies amongst 
Departments and Statutory Authorities; 
(c) The introduction of measures designed to provide Permanent Heads with 
increased responsibility for and flexibility in the management of their 
Departments and to ensure a more efficient, more responsive and more 
responsible Public Service; 
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(d) the streamlining of the administrative processes associated with the staffing of the 
Public Service and ensuring that the most appropriate personnel are attracted to 
and promoted within the Public Service (Savage, 1987: [ii]). 
The first two specific objecfives related to Statutory Authorities. The remaining two 
objectives specifically targeted particular areas of Government Administration, the 
responsibility and flexibility of Permanent Heads for the management of their Departments 
and the streamlining of the administrative processes associated with staffing matters. 
The initial broad statement within the Terms of Reference, "The purpose of the Review is to 
identify opportunities for improving the productivity of the administrative machinery of the 
Queensland Government and make recommendations...", does appear to provide the 
opportunity for a broad interpretafion of the task of the Review Committee. Importantly, 
however. Savage's brief does not include a request to examine the role, structure or 
management of the Public Service as was included in the terms of reference of other reviews; 
rather it refers only to producfivity. Thus the Terms of Reference do not specifically give 
sanction to an investigation of the areas of role, structure and management of the Public 
Service. Nevertheless the inifial broad statement in Savage's Terms of Reference is not 
dissimilar to the brief given to Wilenski in his review of NSW Government Administrafion 
which resulted in his comprehensive review in that jurisdicfion. The specific objectives in 
Savage's Terms of Reference however, do suggest a more restricted brief than the inifial 
statement. Indeed (c) takes the unusual step of specifying an outcome of the Review -
increased powers for Permanent Heads in the management of their Departments. A proviso 
that this should result in a more "efficient, more responsive and more responsible Public 
Service" is included, however there is no contextual informafion that provides some 
understanding of why this specific objective has been included. The specificity of these 
objecfives gives support to Halligan & Power's suggestion that an unofficial objecfive was 
the abolifion of the Public Service Board (1992: 178). 
The Means - Political Climate 
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Why did Savage choose to take the narrower perspecfive? His Terms of Reference alone do 
not appear to provide adequate explanafion. The Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal 
Acfivifies chaired by Tony Fitzgerald which commenced in Queensland in the year the 
Savage Review delivered its report, considered a range of matters relating to the efficient 
operafion of the public sector in the State. These included the role of the Parliament and the 
Execufive; Politicisafion; Appointments, Promotions, Appeals and Discipline; Contract 
Employment; Special Appointments and Ethical Considerafions. And if the findings of the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry were accurate, these matters clearly inhibited "...the producfivity of the 
administrative machinery of the Queensland Govemmenf (Savage, 1987: ii). The Terms of 
Reference of the Savage Review were certainly broad enough to have considered at least a 
proportion of this material so why did this not happen? 
The political situation and climate appear to provide more insight into the path chosen by 
Savage. Savage appears ambivalent about the scope of the Review. In his Report he notes 
that, because the Terms of Reference of his Review are much wider than the previous one 
undertaken in the Queensland Public Sector in 1919, his "is ... the only significant 
independent Review undertaken into the administrative machinery of the Queensland 
Government this century" (Savage, 1987: iii). 
However, in the following paragraph of his Report he notes that: 
Because of the time factor set by the Government, it was impracticable to 
enquire in detail into individual Departments and Statutory Authorities, nor 
does the Committee believe Cabinet intended it should do so (Savage, 1987: 
iii) 
So despite the broad terms of reference Savage acknowledges that the way the Review was 
conducted was influenced, in fact curtailed, by the time constraints set by the Government. 
This acknowledgement appears to contradict his earlier assertion that his Review was an 
'independent Review'. Other reviews had taken place over periods of between 18 and 24 
months, whereas the Savage Review reported 8 months after the Cabinet decision 
establishing it and 10 months after it was announced that a review would be conducted. 
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Wilenski's view is that commissions of review must choose how to proceed. He sees the 
choice as being between conducting their review at arm's length from the government, 
concentrating on the terms of reference and producing a report in the shortest possible time 
or, working closely with the government, being prepared to be diverted by ad hoc activities 
of immediate interest to polifical leaders in the interests of "...maintaining political interest 
and goodwill" (Wilenski, 1986: 177). He suggests that in the Australian experience choosing 
the second way of proceeding enables an assessment of the political climate to be made 
which in turn allows judgements to be made about the likelihood of successful 
implementation of various reforms. The Savage Committee clearly choose to work at arm's 
length from the Govemment rather than working collaboratively with government with an 
eye to implementation. 
Indeed, Savage and his Committee appear to have been more influenced by the stated 
requirements of Govemment ("...Cabinet intended...") than other Review Committees. Their 
approach sits in contrast to the approach taken by Cartland in his Review of Tasmanian 
Govemment Administration eight years earlier. 
After I had submitted my (inifial) Report to the Premier's Office in 1979,1 
discussed this view with the Premier and he indicated to me that the 
Govemment wished me to examine the problems facing the Administrafion in 
some depth...I offer this as an explanation, both of the time taken to conduct 
this study and of the fact that I may in some respects appear to have ventured 
into some areas which could be said to be beyond a narrow interpretafion of my 
immediate terms of reference (Cartland, 1981 First Instalment: 1). 
It is possible that the Queensland Govemment clearly indicated to the Review Committee 
that it was not interested in comprehensive review. After all the Govemment had not seen 
the need ten or fifteen years earlier, at the fime when Govemments in other jurisdicfions had 
seen the need, to initiate a review, so it may well have been that the role as seen by the 
Govemment at this time was a limited one. 
In addifion to any direct input from Govemment, the Savage Committee would also have 
been influenced by the polifical climate that existed in the state at the time. The Fitzgerald 
Review described the climate as one that discouraged crificism and dissent (Fitzgerald, 1989-
142). To stray from a literal interpretafion of the Terms of Reference or perceived intenfion 
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of the Govemment would therefore have been to step outside the prevailing culture, an 
unlikely occurrence given the circumstances. 
The Means - Composition of the Committee & Approach to Implementing Change 
The composition of the Savage Review Committee differed from the composifion of reviews 
elsewhere and may also have influenced the approach taken. Three of the four members of 
the Savage Committee were drawn from private enterprise, with the other member from the 
public sector. No independent expert or academic was included. Other reviews had relied 
heavily on the input and perspective of those who could be regarded as well informed and 
independent, most notably, academics with expertise in the area. Wilenski, Coombs, Bland 
and Corbett were all either academics with expertise in the area, or in the case of Coombs, a 
well respected bureaucrat who deliberately sought out the input of independent academic 
experts in the broader community. In the case of the South Australian Inquiry the committee 
was chaired by: 
Professor D. C. Corbett, an authority on public administrafion, 'seconded' on a half-
time basis from Flinders University; the members were D. M. Martin, director of D&J 
Fowler Ltd. from the industrial sector, and a representative from one of the core 
policy-making areas of the South Australian govemment - R. D. Bakewell, the 
director of the Premier's department (Jaensch, 1978: 70). 
Smith & Weller acknowledge that the composition of Inquiries needs to be considered with 
the specific case in mind but suggest that "some balance between experts and interests, [is 
necessary] and [there should be] a preference for members with well-articulated views on the 
subject..." (Smith & Weller, 1978: 6). The Savage Review was chaired by Sir Emest, a 
Chartered Accountant and Retired Company Director. Its members were Mr. John Andrews, 
B. Econ, FIE Aust., Company Director and Chairman of The Sugar Board, Mr. Gordon 
Douglas REIQ, Company Director and Mr. Russ Roberts, Commissioner of the Public 
Service Board from a union background. The composition of the Review panel does not 
appear to contain the balance between experts and interests Smith & Weller suggest is 
necessary. In addition it conforms with, rather than challenges, Cribbs notion that 'anti-
intellectualism' was/is a feature of the Queensland culture. 
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The omission of an independent expert is likely to have contributed to the narrowing of the 
perspective from which the Committee undertook its work. Whereas in other reviews the 
combined critical perspective of the reviewers was one in which it was likely that a balance 
between the value of the private and public sector models of management and success could 
be stmck, the composifion of the Savage Review made it unlikely that this balance could be 
achieved. It is more likely that the background of the Committee members resulted in their 
more readily recognising the value of a private rather than a public sector model, without 
consideration of the subtle differences between them. 
The approach the Savage Review Committee took in considering how its recommendafions 
might be implemented also contrasts with the approach taken by reviews elsewhere. Other 
reviews endeavoured to include stakeholders such as public sector staff, the community and, 
as Wilenski highlights, Ministers and the Govemment in the review process (Wilenski, 
1986). The inclusion of public sector staff in the implementafion of recommendafions was 
elsewhere considered critical. Wilenski commented that to succeed reformers have 
...to work closely with govemment, form alliances in the bureaucracy, proceed 
wherever possible by legislation and leave behind institutions and people with a 
vested interest in reform (Wilenski, 1981 as cited in Cartland ,1981:119). 
Building the commitment of employees to the recommendations and, importantly, involving 
them in determining the underlying direcfion of the reform process was an important 
consideration of all of the other reviews/inquiries (Royal Commission on Australian 
Govemment Administration [Chaired by H. C. Coombs], 1976: 409-412; Bland, 1974: 162-
164; Cartland, 1981: 119-122). The concem of the Westem Australian govemment in 
relation to the changes foreshadowed in the White Paper are typical. "The 
Govemment...wishes to reassure employees...and give them an understanding of what is 
happening. Success [in implementation] can arise only out of mutual respect and co-
operafion" (Burke, 1986: 2). 
Savage does not appear to have embraced this approach. Apart from an invitation to public 
sector staff to provide submissions, the Savage Review Committee gives no indication of an 
appreciation of the impact that their report might make on the working lives of public sector 
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Staff and/or the need to keep this group informed and involved. Indeed their approach to 
implementation of recommendations specifically excludes public sector staff, one major 
group of stakeholders, from the process. More than that, it appears to take quite a 
disrespectful posture towards this group. Their report implies that this group may seek to 
sabotage implementation and recommends that private sector consultants be engaged to 
"direct and monitor implementation" (1987: 77). 
In one of the rare instances in which the Review appears to be conscious of the experiences 
of reviews elsewhere, it suggests that: "A number of other Reports of similar Review 
Committees make the point that the implementation process should not be entmsted to those 
officers or agencies being reviewed" (Savage, 1987: 77). It goes on to quote from Wilenski 
writing about reform: 
...Officials may seek to recover lost ground by discrediting reform proposals but 
simultaneously advancing changes of their own which may well have been considered 
but rejected by the review commission (Wilenski as cited in Savage, 1987: 77). 
Whilst a number of the reviews/inquiries (Cartland and Bland) discuss the issue of resistance 
to change, it is in the context of discussing the human condifion, which is assumed to be 
instinctively resistant to change, and the discussions are carefully presented so as not to 
represent a criticism of the public sector staff under review. It is hard to find in the other 
reports/inquiries support for Savage's assertion that other Review Committees have made the 
point that "...the implementation process should not be entmsted to those officers or agencies 
being reviewed". A number of the other reports do discuss the importance of ensuring 
continuing support at the most senior level if implementation is to proceed, but 1 found no 
direct reference to not entmsting implementation to those officers or agencies being 
reviewed. Perhaps one might take a generous view and conclude that it is to the need for 
continuing support that Savage is referring - support at that most senior level so that public 
sector staff are not alone required to implement recommendations. 
What is also significant is that Wilenski did not include in his Report of the Review of NSW 
Administrafion any discussion of his suggesfion that "...Officials may seek to undermine 
reform." Wilenski's Report and Savage's Report served a similar purpose in that public 
sector staff under review were the primary audience for the documents. The quote from 
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Wilenski that Savage uses appears in an academic publication in which Wilenski undertakes 
an analysis of reform generally. What is also of significance is that the quote that Savage has 
chosen to use is part of a much broader discussion of prerequisites for reform. The particular 
prerequisite that Wilenski is discussing when he writes the words Savage quotes is 
""continuing institutional support". His proposition is that resources for reform need to be 
forthcoming and some of those resources need to be organised into 
...continuing institutional support, that is, the creation of a govemment agency whose 
primary purpose is to try to gain political acceptance for an inquiry's 
recommendations and to pursue those recommendations as they are put into place by 
the public service.(Wilenski, 1986: 177). 
Wilenski further comments that what is needed to counteract the possibility that "...Officials 
may seek to recover lost ground..., is a standing organisation with access to the intemal 
deliberafions of govemment" (Wilenski, 1986: 177&178). This is hardly a description of 
outside consultants, although he suggests that there may be a role for consultants in the 
reform process. When taken in its totality, Wilenski's argument does not provide support for 
Savage's recommendation that outside consultants be engaged to implement the 
recommendafions of his Report. In fact, Wilenski is suggesfing just the opposite, that an 
intemal agency with ready access to govemment be established to oversight implementation. 
Savage appears to have completely misunderstood or ignored Wilenski's point, including the 
logic supporting his suggesfions. 
In the case of other reviews, far from being deliberately excluded from the process, public 
sector staff were purposely included as part of the process of reform. For example in New 
South Wales the Govemment deliberately established a Review and not an Inquiry because it 
believed this would be the best way to avoid simply getting a Report when what it wanted 
was a "confinuing process of planned change in the public sector."(Wilenski, 1977: 3) The 
Review was stmctured so that the initial report (Interim Report) would idenfify problem areas 
and propose directions for change as a way of sfimulating debate and discussion. 
The process of involving public sector staff and achieving successftil implementafion was 
central to considerafions of how reviews in other jurisdictions were conducted as well. The 
South Australian Committee of Inquiry welcomed the fact that during the course of its 
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Inquiry (22 months) some of its recommendations were implemented. The Report went on to 
say: 
We think our contribution is best made not by writing a Report containing new 
ideas but by engendering a process of thought and acfion on the part of public 
servants in which our own ideas are anticipated and developed further than we 
could do ourselves (Committee of Inquiry into the Public Service[Chaired by 
Professor D. C. Corbett, 1975: xii). 
The Coombs Commission, during the conduct of the Review of Australian Govemment 
Administration, endeavoured to keep the govemment, members of the administration and the 
community informed about its activifies. It considered it desirable that its inquiries should 
take place "at the centre of widespread public debate and discussion of the issues involved 
and that its work should be informed by that debate." (Royal Commission on Australian 
Govemment Administrafion [Chaired by H. C. Coombs], 1976: 3). In an attempt to involve a 
broad cross secfion of public sector staff, the Coombs Commission conducted public hearings 
and arranged a series of workplace visits all over the country (Royal Commission on 
Australian Govemment Administrafion [Chaired by H. C. Coombs], 1976: 5). 
Those involved in the Tasmanian Review were conscious that the process of achieving 
change as a result of their work was vital and idenfified reluctance on the part of the 
Tasmanian public sector to implement change as an issue. To this end it could note by the 
end of its period of operafion that the process of the Review and the discussion and debate it 
had created had produced "...some change in this atmosphere and in the attitude to change 
between 1979 and 1981" (Cartland, 1981a:3). 
In these jurisdictions the reviews themselves were seen as an opportunity to encourage 
further change. At one level they were a exemplar process by which the management style 
and the change practices that were considered desirable by the review committees were 
modelled. This is particularly noticeable in other jurisdicfions in the areas of consultation, 
acknowledgment and recognition. Savage did not take the opportunity that the Review 
process provided to model these more contemporary and desirable management practices to 
public sector staff in Queensland. Other reviews, by contrast, even in their Reports 
Page 34 
The Queensland Public Sector: Assessing the Goss Government Reforms 
promulgate a sense that effective change management requires careful and thoughtful 
planning and sensifive implementation. 
The fact that the Savage Review took an approach that did not rest on collaboration and/or 
consultation raises questions about the expectations of the key players involved. To what 
extent was the conduct of each of the Reviews influenced by the existing culture of the public 
sector into which it inquired? Did the processes used by the reviews merely reflect the norms 
of the various jurisdicfions? Were other jurisdictions accustomed to collaborafion and 
consultation? Were they integral parts of the culture that existed in other sectors? 
It is possible that they were integral parts of the culture of other sectors and not integral parts 
of the predominant culture of the Queensland Public Sector. There are some other indicators 
that support this proposition including the omission of a number of topics from the Report of 
the Savage Review Committee and the politicised nature of the public service. 
WHAT THE SAVAGE REVIEW CONSIDERED AND WHAT THEY RECOMMENDED 
The omission from the Savage Review of any consideration and discussion of the 
overarching policy quesfion of the role and responsibilities of the administrative arm of 
govemment is one of the most striking differences between it and other Reviews. When in 
1975 Professor Corbett completed the Inquiry into the South Australian public service, the 
report that he and his Committee of Inquiry produced contained a lengthy discussion of the 
philosophical underpinnings of the South Australian Public Service (Committee of Inquiry 
into the Public Service [Chaired by Professor D. C. Corbett], 1975: Chapter 1). It includes 
discussion of the history, purpose, role and future of the public service. Other Reports of the 
time included similar discussions which provide a context in which the review and its 
recommendafions could be considered. 
The role of the Administration in relation to Govemment, Ministers, Parliament and the 
Community are all the subject of discussion in the Coombs Commission report (Royal 
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Commission on Australian Govemment Administration [Chaired by H. C. Coombs], 1976). 
Wilenski in Directions for Change, the Interim Report of the Review of New South Wales 
Govemment Administrafion (Wilenski, 1977), discusses the policy quesfions and context that 
relate to the Administration, Ministers and Public Servants as well as the Administration and 
the Public. 
These discussions informed the Reviews' and Inquiries' recommendations. By including 
discussion of the role and responsibilifies of public sector agencies (and, by extension, staff) 
review and inquiry reports were able to logically build an argument for their 
recommendafions while at the same fime provide background to and jusfificafion for those 
recommendafions. Public sector staff were thus provided with a succinct account of their 
place in the broader operation of govemment and an understanding of their own roles as 
public servants. 
The reviews of the 1970s and early 1980s were, in the main, conducted at a time when 
strategic planning was not well established in the various public sectors so that discussion of 
these fundamental issues in the resulting Reports also informed the development and/or 
refinement of strategic planning processes in those jurisdicfions. 
Despite the 10 year gap that separated the spate of public service reviews of other 
jurisdictions from the Savage Review of the Queensland Public Sector, the Queensland 
public sector on which Savage and his Committee of Review were reporting was not one in 
which strategic planning processes were well established. It was only after the Savage 
Review had reported and as a result of the production of its report, that strategic planning was 
undertaken in any serious way across the whole of the public sector. The Savage Report thus 
was the impetus for the widespread introduction of strategic planning in the Queensland 
Public Sector. 
The Report, however, contains no discussion of, or reference to, the changing role and 
responsibilifies of the public sector. As a consequence, it does not contain a logically argued 
trail that takes the reader from the role and responsibilifies of the public sector to the 
recommendations it contains, including those relating to increased planning and 
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accountability. Neither does it provide a context into which the reader can place its 
recommendations. Unlike reports in other jurisdictions, the Savage Report is not a document 
that would have provided much guidance to public sector agencies stmggling with the initial 
introduction of strategic planning. 
A number of major policy areas that were the subject of consideration by other reviews, were 
not considered by the Savage Review. There is no discussion for example of the process of 
managing the public sector, employee participatory processes, industrial democracy or 
managing collaboratively. There is no discussion of processes for community consultation or 
of the employment of women or other employment disadvantaged groups. Considerafion of 
these policy areas formed significant components of reviews elsewhere. Such content issues 
are what Smith & Weller (1978) described as 'arguments' of a review and what Wilenski 
(1986) described as the "goals' of reviews. Their consideration during the review process 
frequently resulted in recommendations for change. 
The Goals - Employee Participatory Processes 
The Corbett review of the South Australian Public Service gave lengthy considerafion to job 
safisfaction and staff participafion, reflecting their view that these issues are integral to the 
examinafion of the "management ...and improve[d] effecfiveness, economy and efficiency of 
the Service..." (Committee of Inquiry into the Public Service [Chaired by Professor D. C. 
Corbett], 1975: xi [Terms of Reference]). Their recommendations include that both formal 
and informal consultation processes with staff be adopted (Committee of Inquiry into the 
Public Service [Chaired by Professor D. C. Corbett], 1975: Chapter 4). Discussion of these 
issues begins with the comment that 
The public is entitled to good, efficient service, but if Public Servants' morale 
is low, their work will fall short of the public's legitimate expectations 
(Committee of Inquiry into the Public Service [Chaired by Professor D. C 
Corbett], 1975:61). 
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A presumption of the report is that the contribufion of workers is valuable and should be 
encouraged. Its recommendation on how work methods in an area should be reviewed 
includes that it should ""...begin with consultation among the work group affected" 
(Committee of Inquiry into the Public Service [Chaired by Professor D. C. Corbett], 1975: 
71). 
The Review of New South Wales Govemment Administrafion also assessed the issue of 
worker safisfaction as relevant to their considerations. The Report acknowledges that the link 
between bureaucracy in the Weberian sense and worker dissatisfaction and alienafion is well 
established (Wilenski, 1977: 151). Wilenski's Report further notes that 
...management by direction and control... is inadequate to mofivate because the 
human needs on which this approach relies are today unimportant mofivators of 
behaviour" (Crombie, as cited in Wilenski, 1977: 151). 
The major discussion in this Report relates to the form that increased worker involvement 
should take. That it should be increased is clearly accepted. 
The Victorian Inquiry chaired by Bland also considered employee participafion. In the 
recommendafions that related to Promotions Appeals Board, Disciplinary Appeals Board and 
Review and Classification Committees, the Inquiry recommended formal employee 
participation by the inclusion of an employee representative (Bland, 1974: 123). The Inquiry 
also made suggestions about how to include employees in the processes of achieving change. 
In particular it made suggestions about how this might occur with its own recommendations. 
The omission of any consideration of employee participation from the Savage Review would 
not be significant if the Queensland public sector had introduced changes in these areas in the 
years that separated the Savage Review from the earlier public sector reviews. However this 
was not the case. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the public sector about which the 
Savage Report was written had not embraced the principles of participatory management and 
had a history of tardiness in this area. Unlike govemments elsewhere, Queensland 
govemments, initially of the Labor Party and then of the Coalifion, had not even been 
prepared to replace the Public Service Commissioner with a Public Service Board that 
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allowed employee participation. This did not happen in Queensland until 1968 - long after it 
had occurred in other jurisdictions (Halligan & Power, 1992). 
The omission of discussion of employee participafion is all the more significant when it is 
considered that the eighties had seen changes in society that had heightened the need to find 
new ways to motivate and reward staff By 1987 the principles of employee participafion 
and/or collaborative management were widely acknowledged as necessary ingredients of 
contemporary effective management in both the public and private sectors throughout the 
country. When Savage's omission is considered in conjunction with the fact that the 
Victorian Inquiry was reporting 13 years earlier and Wilenski, who noted that the old 
methods of management are no longer important motivators of behaviour, was reporting 10 
years earlier in 1977, its impact upon those who hoped for support from Savage to modemise 
the sector can be seen as quite profound. 
The Goals — Merit Selection and Employment Equity 
All of the reviews, including Savage, address in some respect the issue of selection of staff on 
merit. Merit based selection is consistently seen as a "good" thing, as fundamental to an 
impartial, expert public service and any recommendations in the reviews that relate to it 
concem enhancing the process of merit based selection. In this respect the discussion in the 
Savage Report contains similar themes to those contained in other reports. However the 
Savage Review addresses only the most basic aspects of merit based selecfion. Those aspects 
relate to the intersection of merit and seniority and the fact (discussed earlier) that Savage 
considered that seniority should no longer be considered an appropriate fallback when 
selecfion committees are unable to determine superior merit. Prior to the Savage Review 
public service employing legislation established that seniority was only to be considered 
when separation of candidates on merit was not able to be achieved. However, as discussed 
earlier, there is evidence to suggest that, operationally, seniority was still heavily relied upon 
as a primary way of determining who should be promoted. The fact that the recommendation 
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in relation to this is included in the Savage Review suggests that this was still an issue for the 
sector. 
The issues relafing to merit based selection addressed in other Reports are of a more complex 
and subtle nature. In both the Coombs Commission Review of Australian Govemment 
Administration and the Corbett Review of the South Australian public sector, lengthy 
consideration was given to the impact of merit based selecfion techniques, as they were 
practised, in the particular sector, on employment disadvantaged groups. In South Australia 
this discussion centred on women in the public service, while the Coombs Commission gave 
extensive consideration to the impact on 'Aborigines and the Handicapped' as well (Royal 
Commission on Australian Govemment Administration [Chaired by H. C. Coombs], 1976: 
184-194). 
The Coombs Commission recommends the establishment of an Office of Equality in 
Employment to address the issues identified. The Corbett Review made a large number of 
recommendations aimed at increasing the proportion of women in that sector. These 
recommendafions when taken together formed the basis of an affirmative action program 
(Committee of Inquiry into the Public Service [Chaired by Professor D. C. Corbett], 1975: 
195-196). The Savage Review gave no consideration to any issues relating to employment 
equity. This area was apparently not considered significant in the efficient operation of the 
QPS. However this was not the case in other jurisdictions. By 1987 most public sector 
jurisdicfions and all private sector organisations of more than 100 staff were the subject of 
legislation in the area. 
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CONCLUSION 
In both its process or the way in which it was undertaken (the means) and its content or 
recommendations (the goals), the Savage Review failed to provide the Queensland Public 
Sector with the insight or tools to bring it into line with modernising public sectors in other 
Australian jurisdicfions. The Review did not provide the opportunity for professional 
maturing within the sector. The massive change program that was introduced by the new 
Goss govemment, coming to power on the crest of the Fitzgerald Inquiry and its reform 
recommendations, was therefore to be an intervention of unprecedented proportions for the 
Queensland Public Sector. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING REFORM 
A considered assessment of the Goss Govemment reforms requires a robust framework 
against which the reforms can be assessed. In this chapter I examine a number of 
frameworks which form the basis for developing a comprehensive framework by which to 
evaluate the Goss reforms. 
EXISTING FRAMEWORKS 
There has been a tendency when reviewing public sector reform programs to comment on and 
describe rather than critically assess the effectiveness of the program (Self in Smith & 
Weller, 1978; Halligan & Power, 1992). Nevertheless frameworks that have been used to 
analyse public sector reform have been offered by Self (1978), Wilenski (1986) and Halligan 
& Power (1992). Whilst these frameworks are different, there are similarifies and overlaps in 
the way in which they conceptualise the evaluative systems. The most striking similarity 
between these frameworks is that each of them concentrates on evaluafion at a theorefical 
level, primarily describing the inputs to the reform program rather than critically assessing 
the effectiveness of the outcomes at the practical level. Moreover, two of these focus 
principally on the content of reform, rather than the process. 
Self proposes that administrative change can be seen 
as the product of interaction between three overlapping arenas of behaviour and 
beliefs: the social, political and bureaucratic... (Self, 1978: 313). 
He refines these arenas of behaviour and beliefs into possible agendas of administrafive 
change. In Selfs framework the social agenda concems the interaction between the 
bureaucracy and society. This agenda. Self argues, includes service delivery, and the 
responsiveness and openness of govemment to the wants and grievances of client groups and 
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of the public. The polifical agenda. Self argues, concems the relationship between the 
bureaucracy and the political insfitufions - between ministers and their chief officials and 
between elements within the bureaucracy itself It also concems the responsiveness of the 
bureaucracy to the political leaders. Selfs bureaucrafic arena (which he calls the managerial 
agenda) concems what is regarded as the traditional arena of administrative reform: 
.. .the effective and efficient organisation of the machinery of govemment, techniques 
of decision-making and execution and the stmcture and competence of the public 
service (Self, 1978:314). 
Wilenski's (1986) framework moves slightly beyond Selfs, and reflects the issues of the 
time. However Wilenski's framework recognises the parallels between his categorisation of 
administrative change and Selfs three agendas. Wilenski argues that although the context of 
administrative change has varied, it is possible to "...isolate three categories of change which 
have persistently occupied the minds of reformers..." (Wilenski, 1986: 167). He identifies 
these categories of administrative change as ".. .the search for more efficient administration, 
for more democratic administration and for more equitable administration" (Wilenski, 1986: 
167). 
Wilenski argues that an efficient administration is: 
an administration which is capable of effectively and creatively meeting the tasks of 
modem govemments with as little waste and misuse as possible of resources, both 
human and financial (Wilenski, 1986: 167). 
He notes that this is the traditional and major concem of administrative reform which aims 
both to reduce costs and improve results. What Wilenski has categorised as the reformer's 
quest for an efficient administration parallels loosely with Selfs managerial agenda of 
reformers. 
Wilenski sees the objecfives of what he has classified as the changes designed to achieve a 
more democratic administration as being two-fold. On the one hand, Wilenski argues, they 
aim to ensure that major policy decisions including the allocation of resources, are made by 
ministers as the democrafically elected representafives of the people. On the other hand, he 
suggests that, "...since ministers cannot take or supervise all decisions...", they seek to 
ensure that the bureaucracy is more diverse and representative and that its decisions are more 
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open to public influence, scmtiny and appeal (Wilenski, 1986:169). This issue of the 
administration reflecting and promoting democratic processes in order to respond to their 
political masters would, in Selfs framework be considered as a component of the polifical 
agenda. 
According to Wilenski (1986), the aim of equitable administration is to achieve an 
administration that is regarded as 'just and fair'. He argues that such an administration aims 
to be just and fair in dealing with its own employees, in dealing with applicants for 
employment and in dealing with the clients of govemment or consumers of govemment 
services - that is those who rely on the services that govemment provides (Wilenski, 1986: 
169). Wilenski's search for a more equitable administrafion fits within Selfs framework and 
is a component of the issues Self (1978) classifies as the social agenda of reformers. 
In 1992, fifteen years after Self and nine years after Wilenski formulated their frameworks 
for evaluation, Halligan & Power conceptualise reform in the "executive branch of 
govemmenf, somewhat differently. They contend that reform can be seen as a readjustment 
of the balance between three dimensions of policy in the Execufive Branch. They conceive 
these dimensions to be the administrative system, the management system and the political 
system and, they argue, the political system determines the balance that is stmck between the 
other two systems (1992: 10). Whilst the components of the Halligan & Power systems 
cover some similar areas to those of Self s (1978) agenda for change and Wilenski's (1986) 
categories of change, their framework differs in two ways from those of the other 
commentators. The Halligan & Power (1992) framework is interactive in that one system -
the political - determines the balance between the other two systems. Addifionally, their 
systems incorporate information about not only what is the subject of change, but also the 
additional element of how the change occurs. Thus their model offers a more comprehensive 
means of understanding public sector reform. 
In Halligan & Power's (1992) framework the administrative system is concemed with 
traditional public sector values i.e. the maintenance of stmctures, mles and principles which 
constrain the way that resources (both human and financial) are disposed of but which also 
focus attenfion on the values of impartiality, continuity and procedural correctness (Halligan 
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& Power, 1992). Various aspects of the administrafive system are also the focus of Self s 
managerial agenda and Wilenski's more efficient administration, however the focus that 
Halligan & Power (1992) have placed on the system itself and its function -the how - rather 
than on individual components of the system results in their model being slightly different in 
nature. 
Halligan & Power's (1992) second dimension is the management system. This dimension is 
concemed with undertaking acfivifies within the executive branch and focuses extensively on 
how achievements are made. It involves managers directing acfivifies and processing 
resources with a focus on outputs rather than a focus on inputs as is the case in the 
administrative system. When this system is dominant managers perform a more dynamic 
role, "best expressed...in the injuncfion 'let the managers manage'" (Halligan & Power's, 
1992: 12), and bureaucrafic constraints are minimised. When the management system is 
dominant, argue Halligan & Power (1992), the public sector manager "aspires to emulate 
his/her peer in the private sector" (Halligan & Power's, 1992: 12). The how processes 
considered in this system are not specifically recognised in the Self and Wilenski models, 
although those commentators may argue that aspects of the how processes impinge across a 
number of different dimensions in their models. Nonetheless Halligan & Power's framework 
focuses consideration on the how (or on the processes) in a way that distinguishes it from the 
other two frameworks. 
The third dimension of Halligan & Power's 1992 framework - the political system - gives 
their model dynamism. They argue that this dimension is concemed with the "patteming of 
authority" or the steering of arrangements in the execufive in ways that modify the balance 
between the other two systems - the management and the administrative systems. They 
conceive the management and administrative systems as competing for dominance, as being 
at either end of a continuum, and the polifical system as determining the appropriate balance 
between them. They see the polifical system as having a keen interest in the outputs, that is 
the quality and distribufion of the facilities and services of the Execufive branch, but as being 
'removed from these outputs' and as having a role to: 
Develop and maintain appropriate pattems of authority to support and regulate the 
performance of this mediating role (1992: 13). 
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There are parallels between Selfs (1978) political agenda, Wilenski's (1986) democratic 
change agenda and Halligan & Power's (1992) polifical system as they are all concemed with 
the relationships between the bureaucracy and the political insfitufions; however the explicit 
moderating role of the polifical system in the Halligan & Power (1992) model together with 
its greater focus on how change is achieved distinguishes it from the others. 
Halligan & Power (1992) argue that at various historical moments the balance between the 
management and administrative systems has been different. They contend that currently 
'polifical management' or the favouring by the political system of the management system, is 
the dominant paradigm in execufive branches in this country. The result of this dominance, 
they argue, is that the influence of the polifical system reaches down into the public sector in 
a way that distinguishes the current practice from systems that have operated more in 
accordance with tradifional Westminster principles. They argue that within the political 
management paradigm which currently has dominance there js consideration of the 
tradifional values of economy and efficiency but significantly also of the effectiveness of the 
impact of reforms achieved by adopting what have been regarded as private sector methods. 
Autonomy in management is favoured at both an organisational level, with the movement to 
public corporations, and at the individual level, with the application of business methods and 
principles in an endeavour to make organisations more like businesses or make "them 
perform some activities in a style similar to that of business" (Halligan & Power, 1992: 26). 
A consequence of this dominance is a corresponding diminution of emphasis on the 
administrative dimension. 
The most striking change associated with the rise of the new policy paradigm has 
been the ambitious expansiveness of the management system at the expense of the 
administrafive system (Halligan & Power, 1992: 31). 
Halligan & Power (1992) argue that this new paradigm is not associated with one side of 
politics or another but is universally embraced by both 'new Labor' and 'new Liberal'. The 
trend towards the dominance of the political manageralist paradigm and its advancement and 
adoption as the preferred approach by both sides of the political divide appears to have 
emerged since both Self (1978) and Wilenski (1986) formulated their conceptual frameworks 
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a decade or so earlier. The intervening period appears to have brought this trend into sharp 
focus for Halligan & Power (1992) and their framework reflects this focus. 
Notably, the Halligan & Power's (1992) model acknowledges the significance of how change 
is introduced. Additionally, these commentators extend the idea of how change occurs and 
specifically discuss, albeit briefly, the notion that both Xht products (or content) of reform 
and i\iQ process of reform are significant in assessing the effectiveness of that reform. 
Despite this recognition by Halligan & Power (1992), their model provides for only limited 
consideration of both of these aspects of change. In the following section I discuss these 
concepts further. 
ARE THE EXISTING FRAMEWORKS ADEQUATE? 
Frameworks assist in making sense of phenomena, including organisational reform programs. 
They help to identify and codify key features, linkages and pattems within the phenomena 
and in so doing facilitate a more effective understanding of it. However as helpful as 
frameworks can be, they must successfully capture the details of a phenomenon to facilitate 
an honest, full and accurate assessment. All the available frameworks for assessing public 
sector reforms have limited capacity to assess the effectiveness of reform and therefore have 
limitations in the context of this study. The frameworks focus on the goals or products of 
reform, on what the reforms have tried to achieve. In doing this they omit sufficient 
recognition of the process of getting there. In my view they are not sufficiently helpful in 
making a comprehensive assessment of the long-term change secured by a reform program 
although they are helpful in examining the goals and products of reform programs. 
Assessment of the process of achieving change is, however, a crifical factor in understanding 
the long-term effectiveness of the change. It is the process by which the change is achieved 
which has the most profound impact on those who are involved in the change and whose 
behaviours and atfitudes ultimately shape the success of the change. 
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The limitations of the available frameworks perhaps stem in part from the lack of ready 
access on the part of the designers of the frameworks, generally academics, to the day to day 
operafions of the Executive. In the absence of a ready vantage point from which to observe 
the components ox products of the reform agenda in the process of being translated into a 
changed way of operating, it is understandable their evaluations and evaluative frameworks 
have dwelt on the promise of the products and goals of the reform agenda at the expense of 
the process and at the expense of providing a mark out of ten after the reforms have been 
implemented. 
Assessing the process is also a difficult task. The products are much easier to assess; they 
have generally been recorded and publicised in some readily accessible document. The 
process on the other hand is rarely directly addressed in publications about the reform. 
Additionally the process is likely to vary from one workplace to another and is influenced by 
a myriad of other workplace interactions. However the lack of scmtiny of the process as a 
factor in determining the eventual success of reform is acknowledged. Halligan & Power 
(1992) observe that in Australia there is not much sophistication in the analysis of reform. 
Joumal articles have tended to provide commentary on reforms (proposed or actual), 
but not to offer a sustained and systemafic analysis of either the process or the 
products of the review (Halligan & Power, 1992: 6). 
A PROPOSED FR/\MEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE QUEENSLAND REFORMS 
A framework that can assist in an assessment of both the products and process of reform 
could be considerably more helpful than the existing frameworks. Such a framework needs 
to introduce another equally important dimension or filter through which an assessment can 
be made. That is, it needs to bring together an assessment of the products of the reform 
agenda on the one hand (an assessment that itself must be sensifive to the interrelatedness or 
combined effect of the products) with an assessment of the process used in implementing the 
products on the other. The frameworks of Self (1978) and Wilenski (1986), while 
acknowledging the interrelatedness of their factors, focus primarily on the goals and products 
of the reform agenda and are essenfially one dimensional. Halligan & Power's (1992) 
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framework introduces an additional dimension, albeit in a limited way, with the introduction 
of two new ideas. Firstly, it acknowledges the complex and interconnected nature of the 
achievement of overall change through their conception of the political system moderating, or 
striking a balance between, the management and administrative systems. Secondly, it 
introduces consideration of the process by which the reform is undertaken - the how - as 
being of significance in the overall assessment of the effectiveness of the implementation of 
the reforms. However their framework does not incorporate a comprehensive assessment of 
processes adopted in all aspects of implementation at a micro level, but considers processes 
at a more theoretical or macro level. 
A framework that assesses the overall change achieved by consideration of both the products 
of the reform agenda (one dimension) and the effectiveness of the processes utilised (a 
second dimension) in implementing all those products, should provide a more comprehensive 
assessment. 
Extending the work of Self, Wilenski and Halligan & Power it is possible to constmct a two 
dimensional framework to examine the effectiveness of reform in effecfing long term change. 
The first dimension of this framework focuses primarily on the products or content of the 
reforms in three arenas, the political/institutional arena, the social/responsiveness arena and 
the efficient/administrative arena. These arenas loosely parallel those identified by the 
commentators and discussed earlier. On this dimension an assessment of the reform agenda 
compared with an ideal or expected reform agenda can be made. The second dimension of 
this framework, which can be considered in conjunction with the first, focuses on the 
processes used to implement the reforms in each of the arenas in dimension one. These 
management practices (or processes) can be assessed against a set of expected or ideal 
processes. Assessment on this second dimension therefore overlays assessment in the first 
dimension and the combined effect of these assessments enables a comprehensive evaluation 
of the achievement of long term change to be more readily and more accurately made. This 
second dimension echoes Halligan & Powers' (1992) concept of a moderating factor but in 
this case one that influences the ultimate change by goveming the way each arena of 
dimension one is implemented. It thus elevates the importance of Halligan & Powers' (1992) 
concept of the process of reform to a superior level of importance within the framework 
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Table 1 presents a summary of the content/products dimension. The Political/Institutional 
arena concems the establishment of the desired and proper relationships between polifical 
institutions, politicians, the public sector and public sector staff It incorporates Selfs 
polifical arena and that part of Wilenski's (1986) democratic administration dimension 
concemed with establishing proper roles for govemment and the public sector and ensuring 
that major policy decisions remain the province of govemments. It parallels components of 
Halligan & Powers (1992) polifical and management systems. The Social/Responsiveness 
arena is focused on the relafionship between bureaucracy and the public as the users of public 
services, clients of govemment and/or consumers of govemment services. This arena is 
concemed with the extent to which the public sector recognises, is sensifive to and can reflect 
back to govemment, the sentiment and mood of the users of govemment services. It is also 
concemed with the tradifional Westminster nofion of the public interest and incorporates that 
aspect of Wilenski's (1986) democratic administrafion dimension that is concemed with open 
and transparent decision making and that aspect of his equitable administrafion dimension 
that is concemed with a just and fair relationship with clients. This arena also incorporates 
Selfs social agenda and parallels those components of Halligan & Power's (1992) political 
and management systems not reflected in the political/Institutional arena. The 
Efficient/Administrative arena is the traditional arena in which administrative reform has 
occurred and the one most often focused upon by reformers. It is concemed with: the 
efficient and effective organisation of decision making; the efficient and effective execufion 
of decisions; the stmcture of the public sector and the competence of public sector staff; and 
the organisation of machinery of govemment. This arena includes a focus on the reduction of 
costs and improvement of results. It incorporates Selfs (1978) managerial arena and 
Wilenski's (1986) efficient administrafion and parallels Halligan & Power's (1992) 
administrative system. 
Table 1: Alternative Framework for Evaluating Public Sector Reforni - First Dimension 
First Dimension - Content or Products of Reform Program 
Political/Institutional Arena Social/Responsiveness Arena Efficient/Administrative 
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Concerns the establishment of 
the proper relationships 
between: 
• Political institutions; 
• Politicians; 
• The public sector; and 
• Public sector staff 
Focuses on the relationship 
between bureaucracy and the 
public and the extent to which 
bureaucracy can reflect back to 
govemment the sentiment of 
users of govemment services. 
It is concemed with the public 
interest. 
Arena 
Concemed with; 
• The efficient and 
effective organisation 
of decisions' 
• The effective execution 
of decisions; 
• The structure of the 
public sector; 
• The competency of 
public sector staff; and 
• The organisation of 
machinery of 
govemment. 
Table 2 presents a summary of the processes/management practices dimension. This second 
dimension - Management Practice or the Practice of Management is concemed with 
assessing the effectiveness of the processes used to implement the reform agenda. It is 
concemed with assessing the extent to which there is congmence between the products of the 
reform agenda and the processes adopted in their implementation - congruence which is of 
crifical importance in gaining the support of staff for the reforms. This dimension is also 
concemed with the consistency of existing management practices with the products of the 
reform agenda. It focuses on the extent to which the processes used in implementation of the 
products "walk the talk" of reform and reinforce in a consistent way the vision sketched by 
the package of products. This dimension is also concemed with the extent to which the 
processes adopted in implementing change comply with those recognised as appropriate 
processes for successfully implementing change. Change management theorists have 
idenfified the characteristics of successful (and unsuccessful) change programs and these are 
useful in assessing the effecfiveness of implementation processes. Dunphy and Dick (1981) 
identified the characteristics of successful change and Wilenski (1986) isolated pre-requisites 
for successful change. Their work provides the basis for assessing the effectiveness of the 
processes employed in implementing the Goss reforms in the Queensland public sector. 
Dunphy and Dick's (1981) Characteristics of Successful Change 
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In the early 1980's Dunphy and Dick identified characteristics of successful and unsuccessful 
change programs in this country (Dunphy in collaborafion with Dick, 1981). Their 
characterisfics of successful change included, amongst others, the following: 
• the provision of clear objecfives of the change program; 
• an informed awareness of the need for change and the development of a 
commitment to and agreement about the general direction of change; 
• support from the key power groups including strong support from top 
management and unions together with clear policy guidelines; 
• genuine participation in that the program is introduced and explained in simple 
everyday language to all involved and there is discussion about the impact of 
these changes on individual work situations; and 
• majority support for the change programs. 
The characteristics of unsuccessful change idenfified by Dunphy and Dick (1981) include: 
• Indeterminate objecfives with the objectives of the program being expressed in 
vague, idealistic or grandiose terms; 
• Inadequate information and awareness; that is, where the program is launched 
without adequate information and the attitudes of key groups are not taken into 
account in planning; 
• Authoritarian direction; that is, where managers and supervisors are mshed into 
making changes that they don't fully understand and to which neither they nor 
their subordinates feel fully committed; 
• Lack of support from critical groups, including top management and unions; and, 
• Failure to establish majority support. 
Wilenski's (1986) Pre-Requisites for Successful Change 
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In studying public sector reform, Wilenski (1986) idenfified some features of successful 
reform including four prerequisites for change together with a number of what he called 
levers for change. His analysis idenfifies some similar phenomena to those identified by 
Dunphy and Dick (1981). In Wilenski's (1986) view, failure to recognise and plan to 
neutralise opposition to change is a major reason for the failure of administrative reform. He 
suggests that ".. .opposition, unless deliberately countered, is more than likely to be more 
powerful than the forces promoting reform" (1986: 172). He sees the first prerequisite for 
successful change as the political will to implement the reform. He suggests that there are 
costs of reform at both the financial and political level and that govemments need to be 
prepared to antagonise at least some of their senior officials in the process of reform. 
Wilenski's (1986) second prerequisite for successful reform is the allocation of adequate 
resources including ongoing institutional support. He suggests that what may be needed to 
counteract the opposition of officials to a reform program is a standing organisation that has 
access to the intemal deliberations of govemment. 
Wilenski's (1986) third pre-requisite for change is fime. He suggests that time is a necessary 
prerequisite for successful change. His view is that somefimes it is necessary to find the right 
moment to implement a specific change. He suggests that it is worthwhile for reformers to 
"clear the path" (1986: 178) for reform through extensive consultafion and bargaining in 
order to avoid later sabotage. Finally and most importantly Wilenski says that a prerequisite 
of successftil change is "...the adopfion by those involved of a conscious and considered 
strategy (which) ... will need to have regard for sources of resistance to change as well as the 
other prerequisites..." (1986: 178). This he regards as the fourth pre-requisite for change. 
He argues that in addition to the four prerequisites for change there are a number of levers of 
change that can be useful in the implementafion of refonn. He suggests that: the enactment 
of new legislation is a very important change tool; new institutions can continue to promote 
change; new people can assist; changes in formal processes such as new co-ordinating 
processes and new budgetary processes can assist; and that changes in formal organisafional 
stmctures can also assist. Wilenski (1986) also addresses the importance of training in a 
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change program. Whilst he suggests that training is important, he classifies it as an adjunct to 
change rather than a lever of change. In his view it has very litfie success in its own right. 
Table 2 Alternative Framework for Evaluating Public Sector Reform - Second Dimension 
Second Dimension - Processes or Management Practices used to Implement 
the Reform Program 
Extent of congmence between the products 
of the reform program and the processes 
used in implementation. 
Extent to which the processes utilised in 
implementation comply with best practice 
characteristics of successful change, as defined by 
Dunphy and Dick (1981): 
• Establish clear objectives; 
• Raise awareness, gain commitment and 
agreement; 
• Gain support from key groups (management 
and unions); 
• Utilise genuine participation and majority 
support. 
And pre-requisites for successful change, as defined by 
Wilenski (1986): 
• Political will; 
• Adequate resources; 
• Careful timing; and 
• Conscious strategy 
are present. 
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THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING CHANGE 
In summary, assessment of public sector reform programs have generally only included a 
theoretical evaluation of the intended content or products of the program. Assessments have 
generally not also included a practical assessment of the way in which the program was 
implemented. This has limited the thoroughness and practical usefulness of assessments. 
The success of a reform program can only be effectively measured by considering both the 
content of the reform program and the process by which that program is implemented. My 
framework for evaluating change includes two dimensions against which both of these 
elements can be assessed. These elements are presented below. 
Table 3 Evaluation Framework 
First Dimension - Content or Products of Reform Program 
Political/Institutional Arena 
Concems the establishment of the 
proper relationships between: 
• Political institutions; 
• Politicians; 
• The public sector; and 
• Public sector staff. 
Social/Responsiveness Arena 
Focuses on the relationship between 
bureaucracy and the public and the 
extent to which bureaucracy can reflect 
back to govemment the sentiment of 
users of govemment services. 
it is concemed with the public 
interest. 
Efficient/Administrative Arena 
Concemed with: 
• The efficient and effective 
organisation of decisions; 
• The effective execution of 
decisions; 
• The stmcture of the public 
sector; 
• The competency of public 
sector staff; and 
• The organisation of 
machinery of govemment. 
Second Dimension - Processes or Management Practices used to Implement 
the Reform Program 
Extent of congmence between the products of the 
reform program and the processes used in 
implementation. 
Extent to w hich the processes utilised in implementation comply 
with best practice characteristics of successful change, as defined by 
Dunphy and Dick (1981): 
• Establish clear objectives; 
• Raise awareness, gain commitment and agreement; 
• Gain support from key groups (management and unions); 
• Utilise genuine participation and majority support. 
And pre-requisites for successftil change, as defined by Wilenski 
(1986) pre-requisites for successful change: 
• Political will; 
• Adequate resources; 
• Careful timing; and 
• Conscious strategy 
are present. 
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This framework clearly establishes for reformers that their reform programs will be judged 
through an assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of a combination of both the 
content of the reform program and the process by which it is implemented. This knowledge 
will potentially have an educative effect and focus reformers on not only designing the 
reform program but also, significantly, on carefully planning its implementation to ensure 
desired outcomes. The framework can thus contribute to an enhanced understanding of what 
constitutes effective reform and influence future reform programs. It reinforces that policy 
makers need to be mindfiil of the distinction between policy design on the one hand and 
policy implementation on the other as represented by the two dimensions of the framework. 
In particular, it reinforces for reformers the importance of designing a thoughtful and 
deliberate implementation plan which can deliver the desired content. The framework can 
therefore provide assistance in determining what issues need to be monitored in assessing 
progress in implementing reform programs and in their ulfimate effectiveness. In summary, 
it can fundamentally change the manner in which assessment of reform is undertaken. 
In the following chapters I will examine the reforms of the Goss govemment using this more 
comprehensive framework for evaluation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PRODUCTS OF THE GOSS GOVERNMENT REFORM PROGRAM. 
The incoming Goss govemment promised a package of reforms for the Queensland public 
sector that were very similar to those that had been introduced in public sectors in other 
jurisdictions in Australia. The major elements expected in a modem public sector were 
detailed and had the Queensland public sector been at a similar stage of reformation to other 
sectors, these would have been likely to be effecfive. However the management style 
existing in the QPS had not previously been the subject of reform acfivity and was 
predominantly authoritarian. Missing from the reform package were specific initiatives 
designed to change that management style. Whilst some of the initiatives in the reform 
package gave promise of contributing to reform in this area, the practice of management itself 
was not identified as requiring specific reform. In this chapter I briefly examine the content 
of the Savage and Fitzgerald reforms prior to examining in more detail the Goss reforms and 
assessing them against my framework for evaluation. 1 conclude that the package of reforms 
was not as comprehensive as it could have been. 
THE SAVAGE REVIEW MEASURED AGAINST MY FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION 
While the Savage Review provided the impetus for some substantial change in the 
Queensland public sector (Hede, 1993; Wiltshire, 1992; Halligan & Power, 1992), as 
discussed previously, areas seen as important for reform in other jurisdictions were not 
canvassed, and consequently opportunities to advance refonn were missed. The absence of 
any discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of the public sector, its contribufion to the 
Queensland community and its changing role in a changing world is significant. The Savage 
Review failed to articulate a vision for public sector operation. In the context of my 
proposed framework for evaluafion of reform, discussion of such a vision providing a 
blueprint for reform, could have been expected in the political/institutional arena. Its 
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presence there could have progressed reform in the social/responsiveness arena by bringing 
into focus the role of public sector staff in relation to the users of public services. This in 
turn would have provided a fitting backdrop for reforms in the efficient/administrative 
arena. It could have progressed significantly the achievement of more efficient management 
systems and practices. The articulation of a vision for public sector operation could have 
explained for public sector staff the efficiency requirements of modem govemment - the 
need to effectively and creatively deliver services to consumers. In so doing it could have 
provided a model of operation towards which public sector staff could aspire and against 
which they could measure their performance. Its omission represented a considerable lost 
opportunity, a failure in the content of reform. 
The omission of reforms that encouraged and facilitated employee participation or 
collaborafive decision making together with the absence of any considerafion of employment 
equity initiatives combine to further weaken the impact of the Savage reform agenda at both a 
content and process level. This omission and absence underpins the finding that the Savage 
reforms were found wanting against the criteria of my framework for evaluation. The 
introduction of such inifiafives into the public sector at that stage would have been likely to 
result in public sector staff becoming more familiar with and more skilled in consuUing and 
working collaboratively with different groups. These enhanced skills would have been likely 
to influence posifively the relationship between public sector staff and the public they serve 
and thus would have had a positive impact in the social/responsiveness arena. They could 
also have been likely to have been of direct benefit in achieving enhanced efficiencies and 
thus had a positive impact in the efficient/administrative arena. These areas of 
administrafion were neglected in the Savage reforms. Indeed only one major inifiafive to 
progress the achievement of a more fair and just administration was included in the Savage 
recommendafions. Savage reinforced merit as the sole basis of selection. This inifiafive 
could have been the foundation for extensive reforms in the administrative arena; however it 
stood alone and extended nowhere. 
Wilenski (1986) suggests that reforms designed to achieve greater responsiveness seek, 
amongst other things, to ensure that decisions of the bureaucracy are more open to public 
influence, scmtiny and appeal (1986:169). One of the ways that members of the bureaucracy 
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are equipped to practice more open decision-making is by public sector staff themselves 
experiencing "just and fair" practices. Thus their own experience of just and fair treatment as 
employees directly assists them to ensure that in their own interactions with consumers of 
govemment services, those govemment clients are treated in a just and fair way. My 
framework for evaluafion of reforms found the Savage Review deficient as a result of its 
complete neglect of any initiative designed to encourage and facilitate employee participation 
or collaborative decision making. That neglect is likely to have significantly retarded the 
creation of responsiveness in the public sector and the creafion of a fair and equitable public 
sector, impacting the social/responsiveness as well as the efficient/administrative arenas. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE FITZGERALD INQUIRY 
When the Goss Govemment was elected in December 1989 it was not only the history of 
professional inattention to the public sector by previous Queensland govemments, nor the 
omissions or shortcomings of the Savage Review that were influenfial in the formulafion of 
the public sector reform program. The Fitzgerald Inquiry and subsequent Report (1989) had 
transformed the polifical landscape of Queensland and created an expectation in the 
Queensland community about public sector reform. The issues that demanded the attenfion 
of the newly elected Govemment were issues that had been canvassed in that Inquiry. Their 
prominence during the course of the Fitzgerald Inquiry had propelled them into the public 
arena and consequenfiy they could not escape the attention of the Goss govemment. 
The 'systemafic cormpfion in govemment' together with the political drama in the months 
leading up to the election formed the backdrop for the public sector reform mandate of the 
Goss govemment. The political drama included the deposing of long serving Premier Bjelke-
Petersen by Mike Ahem and subsequently Ahem's replacement by Russell Cooper (Stevens 
& Wanna, 1993:2). Stevens & Wanna (1993) contend that: 
a great deal of the reform expected from the electorate was not related to Labor's 
explicit policies, but to the Fitzgerald agenda. Reform was shaped by both the 
unfolding post-Fitzgerald process and the calculafion of the new polifical 
executive... Labor was elected to govern, although many of the policies it would 
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subsequently be called upon to implement would not be its own but those emanating 
from Fitzgerald and the independent commissions proposed in his report (1993: 2). 
The influence of the Fitzgerald Inquiry on administrative reform in Queensland is not in 
dispute (Stevens & Wanna, 1993; Wiltshire, 1992; Hede, 1992 & 1993; Coaldrake, 1990 & 
1992; Halligan & Power 1992; Nethercote, 1990) however the extent to which reform was, or 
could have been, progressed by the contribution of Fitzgerald is debated. At the time 
Wiltshire suggested that the Fitzgerald Report: 
.. .is probably the only inquiry whose report reads like a textbook in public 
administration and its agenda is now clear in outline and is the driving force for 
reform in this State including many elements of the reform of the bureaucracy (1992: 
262). 
Other commentators, whilst acknowledging the significance and honesty of the Fitzgerald 
Report have a differing view. Some contend that not only did Fitzgerald '".. .seriously 
underestimate the need for a more proactive central personnel agency such as the Public 
Sector Management Commission to facilitate the achievement of managerial and equity 
goals" (Hede, 1993: 89), but also that he missed an opportunity to more effectively progress 
the administrative reform agenda (Halligan & Power, 1992; Nethercote, 1990). In contrast to 
Wiltshire (1992), Nethercote (1990) assesses Fitzgerald's discussions of administrative 
reform in Chapter 3 of the Report as ".. .a batch of jotfings, not always logically connected to 
each other on different aspects" (1990:214). Nethercote also laments as a lost opportunity 
the omission of a broad discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of public 
administration: 
Not at any stage does the Commissioner expound the underlying doctrines of the 
Westminster method of govemment, clarify the meaning of the separafion of powers 
for the initiated as well as the uninitiated, nor explain the various connections 
between the parts of the machinery of govemment - parliament, cabinet, ministers, 
the public service, departments, tribunals, corporations and, of course, the courts 
(Nethercote, 1990:214). 
The Fitzgerald Inquiry was not an Inquiry into public administration in the same way as were 
Savage or other Commissions and Inquiries discussed here. Issues of public administrafion 
were "tangenfial" (Nethercote, 1990:212) to Fitzgerald and in straying into the area the 
Report may well have reached beyond its author's expertise in relation to managerial change 
(Halligan & Power, 1992). The limited understanding of the Commission about 
Page 60 
The Queensland Public Sector: Assessing the Goss Government Reforms 
administrafive reform is evident in its "starry-eyed confidence" (Halligan & Power, 1992: 
179) in the exisfing Public Service Management and Employment Act 1988 (Nethercote, 
1990; Hede, 1993; Wiltshire, 1992). The Commission advanced the view that: 
All the reforms are consistent with modem theories of public administrafion: the 
reducfion of the role of Central agencies such as the Public Service Board, the 
increase in responsibility for efficient administration by chief execufives, the 
employment of people by contract, the creation of redeployment/ redundancy scheme, 
and promofion by merit alone (Fitzgerald, 1989: 131). 
This view was simplistic and the large number of reforms introduced by the Goss 
Govemment were evidence that the 1988 statute goveming public service employment was 
far from consistent with modem theories of public administration. 
Despite the fact that administrative reform was not the primary consideration of the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry, in the context of administrative reform in Queensland that had preceded it 
and was to follow in its wake, the limitafions of the discussion of public administration in 
Chapter 3 of the Fitzgerald Report assume significance. The Fitzgerald Report did not 
contribute, as it might have, to building understanding within the Queensland community or 
the public sector of the overriding issue of how good govemment and an effective public 
sector should operate. Its endorsement of the value of merit selection notwithstanding, the 
Report provides little further background to add to community understanding of it. 
Fitzgerald Measured Against My Framework for Evaluation 
Despite the accepted significant role that the Fitzgerald Inquiry and Report played in setfing 
the stage for reform in Queensland, assessed against my framework for evaluation of 
administrative reform, the Fitzgerald Report can be regarded as making only a limited direct 
contribufion to reform of the Queensland public sector. The Report discussed reform in the 
political/institutional arena but this discussion did not provide a blueprint for reform in 
relafion to the problemafic area of proper relationships between polificians, polifical 
insfitufions, the public sector and public sector staff It therefore provided limited spin-off 
effect in progressing reform in the social/responsiveness arena as progress in this arena 
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focuses on the relationship between bureaucracy and the public and is dependent on well-
established relationships between the arms of govemment. Whilst some of the Fitzgerald 
reforms did provide advances in the efficient/administrative arenas, its recommendations 
were more strategic in nature and were not detailed in this area. 
By the fime the Goss govemment was elected in Queensland a significant and long-standing 
deficit in the administrative reform agenda of the state was emerging. To what extent was the 
Goss Govemment able to address these deficiencies? 
THE GOSS GOVERNMENT REFORMS 
One major thmst of the Goss Govemment reform program addressed the specific issues that 
had attracted criticism of the Queensland public sector for so long. Not surprisingly there 
was some commonality between these issues, the issues raised by the Fitzgerald Inquiry and 
the issues addressed in Labor Party policy. Labor policy in relafion to the public sector was 
speh out in two documents. Making Government Work (Goss 1989a) and Return to 
Westminster (Goss 1989b). These documents incorporated major Fitzgerald 
recommendations and additionally spelt out a reform program designed to address several 
major problems of the public sector. 
An assumption of Return to Westminster is that it was possible through the actions of the 
Goss Govemment for govemment in Queensland to retum to this model of operation. 
However, as one of the building blocks of the Westminster system is an upper house of 
parliament long since abolished in Queensland, the robustness of fundamental assumptions 
that informed the development of Return to Westminster is not immediately established. 
The document sets out three key principles that were to be the foundation of Labor's planned 
reforms in the public service. 
I. The most efficient public servant cannot do their job properly if impeded by a 
fragmented, disorganised machinery of govemment. Coherent and effective 
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administration require rationalisation of the departmental structure which has been 
allowed to grow up in Queensland. 
2. Westminster principles require an independent and impartial public service, which 
can advise the govemment without fear or favour. Consequently, employment 
security for public servants is more a constitutional than an industrial issue if 
Westminster is to be preserved. 
3. A single, unified public service, with a recognised career stmcture and 
opportunities for mobility across departments requires conformity in recmitment, 
assessment and promotion for public servants. The trends to corporatisation and 
privatisation break up the stmctures of govemment, and must be reversed. 
Departmental flexibility is to be balanced against the need for conformity and due 
process across the range of govemment funcfions (Goss, 1989b: 3). 
Whilst these initiafives may have addressed the immediately pressing - perhaps 
overwhelming - problems of the Bjelke-Petersen influenced public sector, they do not 
withstand scmfiny as long-term guiding principles for the operafion of a modem public 
sector, particularly one stmggling with the question of its role and relationship with the 
Parliament and public. Neither do they provide any substantial contribution to increasing the 
community or public sector understanding of the appropriate role and responsibility of the 
public sector. 
The strategy that Return to Westminster spelled out to give effect to these principles and 
guarantee what it described as an honest, impartial and efficient public service included: 
• Rationalisafion of the machinery of govemment... 
• Implementation of the fiill range of Fitzgerald recommendafions for accountability 
measures, freedom of information legislation, codes of parliamentary committees 
for the management of govemment funcfions and funds. As well, 
[as]... comprehensive upgrading of govemment auditing procedures and 
• Introducing the necessary stmctures to ensure good management pracfices, 
security of employment, and guarantees of impartiality for the public service 
(Goss, 1989b: 4). 
Notwithstanding the limitafions of the short-term focus of the underlying reform principles, 
each of these proposed strategies represented a major and progressive reform and, 
implemented as envisaged, would result in enormous change for the Queensland Public 
Sector as well as parliament. Interestingly, however, these changes were not presented as 
major, forward-focused initiafives, as might have been expected. Instead they were presented 
as remedial - retuming to the system that used to exist, that should have existed. Indeed the 
whole tone of Return to Westminster is 'back to the future'. 
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Thus the reform program for the Queensland Public Sector was presented in a way that was 
consistent with, and which did not challenge, the Queensland culture of mral 
fundamentalism. A Goss govemment will "reintroduce Westminster principles" (Goss, 
1989b: 3). It suggests that the solufion to the immediate problems of polificisation and 
decentralisation of decision making which, it suggests, were "destroying the idea of a unified 
public service, [by] replacing it with endless individual fiefdoms" (Goss, 1989b: 3), is a 
retum to a Westminster system. Halligan & Power observe that the language of the Goss 
govemment reforms was ".. .couched in tradifional terms occasionally tempered by a nod 
towards the fashionable" (1992: 181). 
Retuming to Westminster had been a recurring theme in both the Savage Report and the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry. Hede (1987) notes that the Savage Review recommendafions were also 
".. .proffered as fiilfilling the Westminster requiremenf (1987: 88). Savage endorses the 
principles that: ministers assume total responsibility for their departments; that they are 
answerable to parliament; and that they demand full accountability from their permanent 
heads for the implementation of policy (1987: iv). The Fitzgerald Inquiry, reporting after 
Savage and before the issue of Labor policy, had clearly put the separafion of powers and the 
Westminster system on the agenda of the Queensland polifical scene. The fact that Labor 
policy acknowledged the need to revive adherence to the Westminster ideals would, in part, 
have signalled recognition of and a response to the sentiment that had resulted from Savage 
and Fitzgerald. Packaged as it was however, it was also consistent with the overall 
Queensland culture of mral fundamentalism in that it implicitly valued what are regarded as 
the old and traditional values of public administrafion. So, whilst the content of the Goss 
reform was not inconsistent with reforms that were being introduced elsewhere, its 
presentation suggested it was a "back to the future" - traditional rather than progressive -
reform program. 
One of the underlying requirements for success of reforms that are presented as 'back to the 
future' - back to the familiar and the indisputably good - is that a well developed 
understanding of the elements of that indisputably good situation be present. Not only were 
the fundamental stmctures of a Westminster system not present in the Queensland system. 
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but during the course of the Fitzgerald Inquiry it had become evident that a well-developed 
understanding of the principles of a Westminster system did not exist in the Queensland 
community and in particular did not exist within the public sector nor with politicians. But in 
the same way as the Fitzgerald Report had failed to provide a comprehensive discussion of 
the Westminster model of govemment, so too the Return to Westminster document did not 
provide a discussion of the fundamentals. 
The approach of packaging the reforms as remedial contrasts with that taken by incoming 
govemments with a public service reform agenda in other jurisdictions. Other incoming 
govemments had chosen to present their reform agenda as strategic with a forward-looking 
focus. At a national level the Hawke and Howard govemments both implemented substanfial 
public sector reform programs but in each case they were presented as future focused, 
forward looking programs. The stated intention of the Hawke Govemment reforms set out in 
the December 1983 publication Reforming the Australian Public Service was to: 
.. .give Australians a Public Service that is more efficient, more responsive, more 
accountable to the elected representatives of the people and more in harmony with the 
diverse needs of the community it serves (AGPS, 1983: iv). 
The foreword in Reforming the Australian Public Service by the then Prime Minister, The 
Honourable R. J. L. Hawke, makes the point that the reforms proposed therein were not 
remedial. 
The Australian Public Service has served the Govemment well, and the reform 
proposals are in no way intended to reflect adversely on it, but rather to ensure that it 
funcfions at the highest possible level of efficiency (AGPS, 1983: iii). 
The Howard reform program introduced after that govemment was elected in 1996 was also 
focused on the future. The Discussion paper issued by Hon Peter Reith MP, Minister 
assisting the Prime Minister for the Public Service, opens with the words; "Despite 
improvements in performance over the years, the challenge of public service reform sfill 
remains substanfial and urgenf (Reith, 1996 as published in Canberra Bulletin of Public 
Administration No 83, 1997: 1). The tone of these is far different from that of Return to 
Westminster. However, it may have been the case that the Queensland public sector had been 
so "professionally unattended" that fixing up the fundamental problems to achieve a baseline 
of expertise was necessary before any package of reforms could be presented as 
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Strategic/forward looking. This, combined with a desire to reflect community sentiment of 
the time, may have meant that the 'back to the future' focus, although differing from the 
general Australian approach, was the most appropriate approach for Queensland. 
However, harder to dismiss as just the most effecfive way of presenting the reforms is the 
lack of acknowledgement in Return to Westminster of the contribution that Queensland 
Public Sector staff had made to the business of govemment. In both the reform programs at a 
national level discussed above and all the major inquiries discussed earlier, the contribufion 
the public sector had made in undertaking the business of govemment is publicly and 
unequivocally acknowledged. By contrast. Return to Westminster concentrates solely on the 
shortcomings of the sector - polificisafion, lack of merit, lack of accountability, lack of 
responsiveness - without acknowledging the achievements of the sector. All of the 
shortcomings that the Report details were undoubtedly real, but the lack of public recognifion 
that the problems were a result of inadequacies in the system rather than inadequacies in the 
individuals within the system, missed an opportunity to generate goodwill towards any 
incoming Goss Govemment. The failure to generate goodwill towards the incoming 
Govemment, to capture the hearts of public sector employees, contributed to serious 
problems with implementafion of reform as discussed in Chapter 4. Even following its 
election there is no evidence that the Goss govemment publicly acknowledged in any 
convincing manner, the contribution that individual public sector staff members had made to 
Queensland public life. 
The Details of the Goss Reforms 
Hede (1993) suggests that the underlying theme of the Goss reforms was ".. .increased central 
control over govemment acfivifies" (Hede, in Stevens & Wanna, 1993: 87). He further 
suggests the major problems that Labor policy was designed to address were "polificisation 
of the administrafion, fragmentafion of the public service through excessive devolufion, lack 
of ministerial control over functions in statutory authorities, and inadequate cabinet co-
ordination of govemment operafions" (Hede, in Stevens & Wanna, 1993: 87). 
Page 66 
The Queensland Public Sector: Assessing the Goss Government Reforms 
A central plank of the Goss govemment reforms was the creation of the Public Sector 
Management Commission. Return to Westminster suggested that the ".. .full range of 
Fitzgerald reforms will not be sufficient to tum the public sector around" (Goss, 1989b: 5). 
The document contends that the Fitzgerald reforms associated with the Electoral and 
Administrafive Reform Commission (EARC) were essenfially "watchdog" reforms to 
monitor honesty and that they ".. .do not take up the issue of actual management of the public 
sector" (my emphasis) (Goss, 1989b: 5). This was to be the role of the PSMC. The PSMC 
was to ensure that the series of integrated personnel and stmctural reforms were carried 
through the entire public sector. After undertaking a specific review and implementation role 
the PSMC was to offer "...strategic leadership to public administrafion" (Goss, 1989b: 6). 
The PSMC will be a permanent reminder of the importance of professional 
management and integrity as the basis of effecfive govemment... .The objective is not 
to control every personnel transaction, but rather to provide the oversight, leadership 
and direction for the Queensland public sector lacking under the present policy of 
devolution (Goss, 1989b: 6). 
The necessity to create the PSMC was accepted by commentators of widely differing views 
(Nethercote, 1990; Hede, 1993; Wiltshire, 1992). The general view was that Fitzgerald 
underesfimated the need for central guidance of the management reforms which the PSMC 
would undertake. 
Despite the rhetoric of the presentation of the reform program, what emerged in the initial 
stages of the Goss govemment was a fairly convenfional range of manageralist techniques, 
according to Halligan & Power (1992). They included corporate planning, flatter stmctures, 
program budgeting, and an output and performance orientation. Halligan & Power contend 
that the reform agenda of the Goss govemment was within the accepted dominant polifical 
manageralist paradigm and in many respects "the standard Labor prescripfion" (1992:180), 
although they accept that in some respects it did not altogether square with contemporary 
Labor. They conclude that what emerged was a Queensland blend that reflected ".. .both the 
extraordinary condifions in the state and a middle-of the-road Labor party" (1992: 181). 
Key elements of the overall reform strategy foreshadowed in Return to Westminster included: 
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• The re-establishing of proper grievance and appeals mechanisms to eliminate 
nepofism and cronyism; 
• Establishing a Classification and Review Tribunal to overcome the anomalies that 
were said to riddle the posifion classificafion system; 
• The creation of a framework for industrial relations to ensure consistency across the 
service on industrial relations issues. This initiafive was to enable Departments to 
assume responsibility for implementing general policy and resolving individual 
industrial issues while redressing the problem of inequalifies in personnel pracfices as 
a result of devolufion. 
• Investigating ways to increase employee participation in day to day management 
processes and the establishment of formal, regular and constmcfive meetings with 
various public sector unions and associations. 
• The preparation and implementation of a comprehensive EEO strategy although only 
women were menfioned as potenfial EEO target group members. 
• The creation of a Senior Executive Service. 
• The retum of tenure for all public servants below SES and the setting aside of 
contract employment. 
What is clear is that the Goss reforms contained nothing new except the commitment to 
establish a Classificafion and Review Tribunal, which was ultimately not established. They 
were by then the standard set of changes that had been introduced to public sectors in 
jurisdictions across the country in the preceding 15 years. In the case of the employee 
participation and equal employment opportunity initiafives, the commitment was to explore 
strategies rather than implement specific strategies so that these potentially heralded the 
introduction of the standard change initiatives in these areas. 
The Omissions of the Goss Reforms 
The omission from the Savage and Fitzgerald Reports of a philosophical overview of the role 
of the public sector in relation to Govemment was not corrected by Making Government 
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Work and Return to Westminster. They too omitted a discussion of the philosophical 
overview of the role of the three arms of govemment. Indeed, Wiltshire (1992) suggests that 
the Goss reforms in general "...appear to have been conducted without the benefit of any 
vision" (Wiltshire, 1992: 266). He contrasts this with changes introduced in Canada, Britain 
and New Zealand at a similar time where, he suggests, a vision statement which articulated 
the kind of public sector which would exist in the medium-term future guided the changes. 
Wiltshire also suggests that there was no "blueprinf for reform, that there ".. .seems to have 
been no guiding philosophy behind the reform process, in particular regarding the role of the 
Public Service in modem govemment or the role of the public sector in the economy" 
(Wiltshire, 1992: 267). Both Coaldrake (1992 in Hede, Prasser & Neyland) and Hede (1993) 
dismiss Wiltshire's assessment. Coaldrake points to numerous documents produced by the 
PSMC that he argues do provide the vision. Hede points out that the reforms in the Canadian 
and British public sectors were based on vastly different documentation. He notes that the 
Canadian reforms were based on a comprehensive White Paper based on a major review. 
The Brifish reform document, Hede argues, although deficient in "...empirical analysis 
.. .contains an elegantly simple idea that has triggered a revolution in the way that civil 
service is being organised" (Hede, 1993:89). As to the lack of a vision and a blueprint for 
reform, Hede (1993) concurs that the Labor policy was not a blueprint but suggests that it 
offers more than 'broad parameters': 
-indeed, it is quite specific on many details of the proposed reforms though the 
underlying rafionale for most of them is only briefly explicated. As a 'vision 
statement' for public sector reform in Queensland, it compares well with both the 
Savage and Fitzgerald reports in so far as it specifies what changes are needed and 
which principles should guide their implementation (Hede, 1993: 90). 
Both Wiltshire (1992) and Hede (1993) miss important points. Hede overlooks the fact that 
having a vision for reform is only one component of achieving successful change. 
Articulating that vision in a way that all can access and understand is ulfimately of crifical 
importance in communicating the expectations for change to those affected by the change. 
(Dunphy, 1981; Wilenski, 1986). Articulating the vision simply and concisely is therefore 
just as important as having the vision. Hede dismisses too casually the only brief explicafion 
of the underlying rational for the reforms and suggests that a favourable comparison with 
Savage and Fitzgerald is cause for approval. In fact neither Savage nor Fitzgerald set a 
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standard in relafion to articulating the appropriate role and responsibilities of the public 
sector against which it is reasonable to benchmark. The Labor Party policy documents do not 
compare well with the reports of public service inquiries in other Australian jurisdictions 
carried out in the preceding 15 years. They are of a different nature. However they are of a 
similar nature to the policy documents relating to the changes introduced by the Hawke and 
Howard govemments more recently in the Commonwealth sector. They do not however 
compare well with these documents as conveyors of vision for the public sector. 
Both commentators have failed to consider the historical situation of Queensland in their 
assessments. It is not, as suggested by Wiltshire, just the lack of a clearly articulated vision 
for the Goss public sector reforms that is significant in the story of reform in Queensland. 
Rather it is the lack of a clearly articulated vision by successive earlier reform programs that, 
against the backdrop of history, makes its absence in the Goss reform program significant. 
In November 1992 - three years after the election of the Goss govemment and three years 
into the implementation of the ambitious reform program - Managing Queensland's Public 
Sector was published by the PSMC. With a foreword by the Premier this document set out to 
...provide an explanation of the contemporary framework of Queensland govemment 
not only for executives and staff but for the many organisations and citizens who need 
and want to know how the public sector is now managed. It outlines the changes of 
recent years, the philosophies which underlie them, and describes related activities 
whose purpose has been to increase the value of the Queensland tax dollar to the 
Queensland community (PSMC, 1992: ii). 
This document provides a better explanation of the role and responsibilities of a modem 
public sector, albeit from the perspective of public servants, than any other document written 
for or about the Queensland public sector in the preceding 20 years. It combines elements of 
a vision for the future with descripfion of action of the immediate past. But its effectiveness 
is limited by two factors. Firstly, it is limited by the timing of its publicafion. At the fime it 
was published, substantial major reform had already been under way for three years. 
Executives and agents of change across the sector who were unclear about the vision for 
reform had had to proceed to implement change without the understanding that Managing 
Queensland's Public Sector provided. This meant in practice that a legacy of poorly 
informed and sometimes wrongly targeted change was already well established. Secondly, 
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because of the dual purpose of the document - to define the future and explain the past - it is 
more rambling in its style than crisp and concise. A single purpose document concentrafing 
on the vision and clearly spelling out underlying principles of public sector management may 
have provided a more effective guide to those staff who, it was acknowledged (Coaldrake in 
Hede Prasser & Neylan, 1992; Coaldrake, 1992; Coaldrake, 1992; Cork, 1992), were 
stmggling with change. 
The Goss Reforms Measured Against My Framework for Evaluation 
The absence for three cmcial years from the initial Goss reform program of the by now much 
needed clearly articulated vision for reform, together with the absence of any substantial 
inifiatives in relation to participative management, have implications across all three arenas 
(i.e. political/institutional, social/responsiveness and efficient/administrative) of my 
framework for evaluating administrative reform. 
Whilst the reforms that were implemented did make a contribution to improvements across 
all of these arenas, the absences, by their omission, served to simultaneously undermine the 
reform program and diminish its effectiveness. The machinery of govemment changes that 
resulted in the consolidation of twenty-seven departments into eighteen ministerial portfolios 
and the reviews of agencies that were a requirement of the legislafion that established the 
PSMC had a direct impact on the political/institutional arena as well as reaping 
management efficiencies significant in the efficient/administrative arena. They brought into 
focus for the public sector agencies the extent to which their acfivity directly contributed to 
the implementafion of govemment policy and programs. The suite of human resource 
changes that included the newly developed processes to support merit selecfion and EEO also 
had a direct impact on the efficient/administrative arena. So too did the financial 
management refonns, designed as they were to assist the achievement of greater efficiency. 
Many of the HR initiafives focused on enhancing efficiency and effectiveness (e.g. merit 
selecfion, grievance & appeals initiatives and equal employment opportunity) were also 
designed to ensure increased faimess and openness in management processes. These 
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initiatives contributed directly in the efficient/administrative arena but also helped establish 
an environment which both increased sensitivity to whether or not users of govemment 
services are treated fairly, and encouraged open and transparent decision making at that level 
of service delivery. In this way these management initiatives also contributed in the 
social/responsiveness arena. Together with some of the administrative law reforms such as 
freedom of information and the establishment of the Criminal Justice Commission these 
inifiafives actually and potenfially provided extensive reform in the social/responsiveness 
arena. 
Many of the reforms implied that a new way of managing was required. Indeed the 
commitment to investigate ways to increase employee participation in day to day 
management signalled what could have been a significant challenge to the existing way of 
managing. However there is litfie evidence that this commitment was honoured in any 
significant or systematic way. Overall the lack of direct challenge to the authoritarian 
management style evident in the sector undermined the achievement of a new management 
culUire and the achievement of change in the efficient/administrative arena. It was at once 
opfimistic and unrealistic to imagine that a new management style and culture would 
spontaneously take root as a result of the introduction of the reform initiafives. The 
confusion felt by public servants was understandable. They were required to make sense of 
the inherent contradicfion of reform programs focused on achieving more faimess, openness 
and transparency and a more collaborative modem management style being promoted 
through the existing and unchallenged authoritarian stmctures. There is a strong case to 
suggest that the need for cultural change was so fiindamental to the achievement of a new 
order that reform across all three arenas of the framework was weakened by its absence. One 
senior bureaucrat commented that, "Queensland has a lot of organisations that are directed 
towards accountability but does not have a culture that values accountability" (Interviewee 
V). This comment supports the view that the introduction of infrastmcture designed to 
achieve change in an area is not always of itself sufficient to achieve that change. 
The persistence of an authoritarian management style would no doubt have been seen by the 
architects of reform as impeding the achievement of reform across the three arenas. Indeed 
Wilenski (1986) suggests that to achieve change in the social/responsiveness arena the 
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decisions of bureaucracy need to be more open to public influence, scmtiny and appeal and 
administration needs to deal with its employees and clients in a "just and fair" way (1986: 
169). An authoritarian management style does not facilitate this. The contradiction for 
public sector staff of, on the one hand, the introduction of programs aimed at achieving 
jusfice and faimess such as merit selection, grievance and appeals reforms and equal 
employment opportunity and, on the other, the continuation unchallenged of the prevailing 
authoritarian management would have limited the effectiveness of changes in the 
social/responsiveness arena. The early absence of a clearly articulated vision for reform 
underscored these problems. Not only were the traditional ways of decision making and 
achieving an outcome not being challenged by initiafives expected in the 
efficient/administrative arena, but there was also no picture of the desirable end state with 
which public sector staff could engage. Goss govemment inifiafives were clearly not 
adequately addressing change in the three arenas that my framework suggests are necessary 
to achieve change. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PROCESS OF THE GOSS GOVERNMENT REFORMS 
Despite the paucity of available evaluafive frameworks that seek to assess it, the process used 
to implement any reform program is critical to its ultimate success. In this chapter I trace 
implementation of the Goss reforms, compare the processes used in this implementafion with 
those used in implementing recognised successful change programs elsewhere and assess the 
processes used in implemenfing the Goss reforms against my framework for evaluating 
reform. I argue that the processes used to implement the Goss reforms were not ideal and 
that this impacted negafively on the extent of the ulfimate success of the reform program. 
EARLY IMPLEMENTATION 
Early implementafion of the program of public sector reform did not go smoothly for the 
Goss govemment. Conflict with the public sector unions came quickly. The concems of the 
unions extended to a number of areas. Labor Party policy articulated in Making Government 
Work had specified that the Goss govemment would: 
...appoint experts of recognised stature in public sector management to act as the 
three Commissioners (of the PSMC). There should be a judicious mix of former 
senior practitioners, academics in related disciplines and those with experience of 
human resource and industrial issues (Goss, 1989b: 14). 
The initial three appointees all fumed out to be "... well qualified males with academic 
backgrounds but without specialist human resource or industrial relations expertise" (Hede, 
1993: 90). The unions were critical of the appointments and even questioned the probity of 
the selection procedures (Hede, 1993: 90). The PSMC had been given a significant role in 
industrial relafions in both the short and long term (Boreham, 1990). The disquiet of the 
unions with the appointment of the Commissioners arose not only because no trade union 
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representative had been appointed but also because none of the commissioners were drawn 
from an industrial relations background (Boreham, 1990). 
Conroy & Blackmur (1990) suggest that in addition to this early conflict about appointments, 
public sector unions were bitterly disappointed at the way in which implementation of award 
restmcturing had proceeded under the new Goss govemment (1990). The restmcturing was 
linked to a wage rise under the provisions of the stmctural efficiency principle (SEP). The 
groundwork to secure the agreed position between the public sector unions and management 
had occurred prior to the elecfion of the Goss govemment in December 1989. Immediately 
after its elecfion there were delays in the confinuation of discussions between the public 
sector unions and the govemment (including the newly created PSMC) about implementafion 
of the restmctured awards and consequential job redesign. As a result of this, and 
fundamental differences that had arisen between the parties about the agreed position, there 
was eventually a delay in the second component of the wage rise (3%), an integral 
component of SEP, being sanctioned by the Industrial Relafions Commission. This resulted 
in a delay in public sector staff receiving the pay rise (Conroy & Blackmur, 1990) and was a 
major contributing factor to the tension with the unions that eventually resulted in major 
industrial action in Febmary 1991 -just 14 months affer the elecfion of the Goss govemment. 
At the time. The State Service, the joumal of the major union representing public sector staff, 
the Queensland State Services Union (QSSU), identified a number of concems of that union 
including addifional concems to those identified by Conroy & Blackmur (1990). Prior to and 
immediately following the elecfion of the Goss govemment the QSSU was supportive of and 
enthusiasfic about the Labor govemment. The union joumals reflect that union support for 
the National Party govemment had been eroded as a result of changes introduced by the 
Ahem govemment. 
In May 1989 the joumal noted: 
In all, the ALP's policies recognise many of the shortcomings in the current 
govemment's attitude to the Public Sector that this Union has been poinfing out for 
some time {The State Service, May 1989: 5). 
In particular the QSSU was crifical of the new, Ahem-inifiated Public Service and 
Employment Act. In September 1989 the President's column of The State Service reflected 
support of the Labor Party: 
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Labor Party philosophy is more attuned to the needs of Queensland and 
Queenslanders through the public sector. It is apparent that the public sector will 
have a greater role to play and if this is so then all of Queensland will benefit, not just 
the selected few (The State Service, September 1989: 2). 
In the October edifion the forthcoming election was noted and the President suggested that 
".. .Pubic Servants should regard it as pay back time..." (The State Ser\ice, October 1989: 2). 
Immediately following the election of the Goss Govemment in December 1989 the 
President's column celebrated the commencement of a "new era" in industrial relafions and 
"...the dawning brightness of a new age of industrial enlightenmenf {The State Service, 
December 1989: 3). This edifion of the joumal also carried reassurances from the newly 
elected Premier Goss about proper consultation and minimum dismpfion. In the Febmary 
1990 edifion of the joumal the President noted some "relafively minor" concems the union 
had with the new govemment but ".. .emphasise[d] that the Goss Govemment has the 
unquesfioned support of this union in its quest to improve the Queensland public service" 
{The State Service, Febmary 1990: 3). He also moved to dispel the notion that some in the 
union did not support the reforms. He went on to say: "Those that would state publicly that 
the Executive of the union does not warmly welcome these initiatives are being mischievous 
at besf {The State Service, Febmary 1990: 3). 
However by July 1990 a fundamental disquiet with one of the key reforms - merit selecfion -
emerged. 
Merit, like beauty is in the eye of the beholder and until there is a satisfactory mle 
that can be fairly adjudged, that denies human error and allows for equitable 
treatment, then appointments will continue to be made under suspicious 
circumstances. .. .most appointments have been justified; but it is apparent from 
complaints...that there is a better system available than one that relies on human 
judgement to the "nth" degree. Where all things are equal, then a mle of separation 
must be introduced that will prevent any deadlock (President's Column, The State 
Service, My 1990:3). 
These comments reflect a fundamental lack of understanding of and familiarity with merit 
selection and should have sounded alarm bells to the Govemment in relation to the 
implementation of merit selecfion. The suggestion to insfitute a mle of separafion rather than 
use "human judgemenf appears to be hankering for the continued use of seniority as a way 
of determining the person who should be promoted when all other things were equal. Merit 
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selection - a concept generally warmly embraced by unions - was clearly not understood or 
accepted by the major union in July 1990. Twelve months later in July 1991 merit selection 
was still a source of concem to the union with 77?^  State Service reporting a discussion at a 
Union Council meeting about concems with merit selection and publishing letters that were 
exchanged between the General Secretary of the union and the Chair of the PSMC on the 
issue. The introducfion of merit selection went to the heart of the reforms and was a 
fundamental cornerstone on which many of the other reforms were built. Any disquiet with it 
from key players - one of whom was the union - needed to be tackled directly and swiftly in 
order to neutralise the opposition and generate support. There is no evidence, however, that 
this was attempted or that the support materialised. 
QSSU joumals of the time also reveal that another concem of the union was what it saw as a 
betrayal by the govemment on the issue of privafisation, in particular privafisafion of 
Corrections. They believed that the Goss govemment had made a pre-elecfion promise to not 
privafise any further elements of Corrections. However once the new govemment was in 
office the privafisafion process continued. Custodial correcfions staff rallied and marched to 
show their concem in July 1990 {The State Service, August 1990: 1). 
However it was not only in relafion to the privafisation and merit selection issues that 
concem was being expressed. Lack of consultation on a number of fronts also bothered the 
QSSU. At a theoretical and policy level QSSU embraced the stmctural efficiency principle 
(SEP) as the way ahead '•.. .[I]t is the obvious method to provide a vibrant, effecfive public 
service which would remove all calls for privatisation of public enterprises forever" 
(Presidents' Column, The State Service, September 1990: 3). However at a pracfical level it 
was concemed about the lack of consultation in the implementafion of SEP (Conroy & 
Blackmur, 1990). The QSSU's concem had fumed to complete disillusionment by October 
1990 following the public release of the model of the proposed new classificafion and 
remuneration scheme. The union saw this release undertaken by the PSMC and the 
Department of Employment Vocafional Education, Training and Industrial Relafions 
(DEVETIR) in September 1990 as a low point. Their view was that the govemment had used 
the model developed by the public sector unions as the basis for their proposed model and 
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had failed to acknowledge its origin. Furthermore they felt aggrieved by the press reports 
which in their view used: 
...fime honoured cliches derogatory of the Public Service, enthusiastically applauded 
the govemment's bold inifiafive and deprecated the regressive Public Sector Unions, 
specifically QSSU as having foreshadowed opposifion to what was intended as a 
classificafion and remuneration system which would cure all ills {The State Service, 
October 1990: 1). 
They saw that the PSMC was implicated in this media attack. 
What is resented is the fact that the Public Sector Management Commission has lent 
credence to the statements of the ignorant and has allowed the whole-hearted and 
bona fide efforts of hundreds of well-meaning and hardworking Union members of 
Joint Consultative Committees to be called into quesfion. 
That hurts our members and the Public Sector Management Commission has a deal of 
bridge building to do in order to put the implementation of the Stmchiral Efficiency 
Principle in the Queensland Public Sector back on the rails {The State Service, 
October 1990: 3). 
But the union was not only concemed about the way in which consultafion in relafion to the 
implementation of the Stmctural Efficiency Principle was happening. They were also 
concemed about what they perceived to be a lack of consultafion with the relevant staff about 
the establishment of the Senior Executive Service and about changes to Govemment Owned 
Enterprises. "Contracted officers are enfitled to the benefits of close consultation regarding 
the effects that the institution of the Senior Executive Service would have on their 
employment and any other issues likely to affect tenure" (77;e State Service, November 1990: 
3). And: 
The Queensland State Service Union does not oppose the achievement of greater 
efficiencies in GOE's and we support the achievement of savings and revenues by the 
introducfion of those efficiencies. We are willing to work with the Govemment on a 
consultative basis to achieve those ends. The process has to be consultative and has 
to interface with the Structural Efficiency Principle. The people who drive any 
system must share a sense of ownership of the system and of its developments (77?^  
State Service, December 1990: 3). 
In the last edition of the State Sector for 1990 the President wrote - quite profoundly and 
presciently as it fumed out - that there had been some insensitivities exhibited in 1990 and 
that he hoped these would be recfified in 1991. It was not to be. By Febmary 1991 major 
industrial action was taken, with thousands of public sector staff marching on the Execufive 
Building - a scene not witnessed in this state during the preceding years of conservative 
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govemments. The issue which union joumals suggest prompted the industrial acfion was a 
move by the PSMC to issue a Standard or policy direcfive which the unions perceived would 
limit their recourse to the Industrial Relation Commission and result in public sector staff 
having fewer options to seek redress for unfair practices than other workers. 
The union's loss of confidence in and withholding of support from the govemment 
continued. In March 1991 the union was suggesting that it would like to see the 
implementafion of SEP brought to a conclusion. But by April 1991 it recognised that 
implementation of SEP had been inadequate. It noted that there had been no 
"...disbursement of responsibility for decisions" of any tme importance which would have 
been the case if SEP had been effecfively implemented. The union conceded that major 
delays were still the "mle of the day" {The State Service, April 1991: 3). Again the 
observafion was made that for reform to be ".. .permanent it must be 'owned' by those 
responsible for its implementation. ...decisions must change" {The State Service, April 1991: 
3). 
There is no evidence that Govemment decisions did change or that ownership of the reforms 
by public sector staff was developed. Indeed the Premier - at least - appeared to persist with 
a confronting rather than conciliatory approach to the union - an attitude hardly designed to 
alter the dynamic between union and management. Being interviewed for The State Service 
in September 1991, the Premier stated that he was "...less than impressed with the stunts that 
were pulled by certain members of the union leadership..." although he did say that he hoped 
that this was all in the past now {The State Service, September 1991: 4). 
The critical question is to what extent was the discontent reflected in The State Service a 
function of unreasonable resistance to change on the part of the union members and their 
organisafion and to what extent was it the result of poorly implemented administrafive 
reform. The QSSU had shown a resistance to administrative reform previously by their 
opposifion to the new employing Act introduced by the Ahem govemment. The aspects of 
that Act about which the union was most concemed were the introduction of individual 
contracts for senior staff and the lack of central control over the personnel practices of 
agencies. Both of these aspects of the new legislation were also opposed by the then Goss 
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opposition. Once in govemment the Goss govemment reversed both of these changes in line 
with the union objecfions, suggesfing that the union concems had been responsible. So 
whilst it is reasonable to attribute some of the union discontent to a lack of familiarity with 
change and a resistance to the new agenda, this is unlikely to explain all the discontent. The 
union was clearly capable of sound analysis and proper opposifion and resistance based on 
the analysis. 
Evidence to support the proposifion that the union analysis was fair and reasonable is 
provided in relation to the role of senior staff in the change process. The Premier conceded 
in the September 1991 interview that the Govemment had to take some of the responsibility 
for the concem of public servants. He also suggested that the senior public servants who 
were "...mnning the changes..." had to take some responsibility for lack of communication. 
However some twelve months prior to this, in September 1990 The State Serxnce had 
idenfified a problem with these senior public servants. According to the analysis of The State 
Service the senior public servants who were responsible for implementafion did not share a 
sense of ownership of the reforms (April 1991: 3). If the union analysis of 1990 was correct, 
and the Goss comments suggest that it probably was, remedial action should have been taken 
to engage those senior public servants. There is no evidence that action was taken. 
Stevens & Wanna (1993) suggest that ".. .tensions with the public sector unions could have 
been avoided with better consultation" (1993: 9). This early confiict with the unions resulted 
in considerable distmst between the govemment and this key interest group. Rather than 
engage the union and obtain their co-operafion in the process of reform the Goss govemment 
had the unions "off-side" and distmstful very quickly. This distmst may have been an 
influenfial factor in the eventual poor implementation of govemment policy in relation to 
employee participation. 
PROPOSED EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION INITIATIVES IN CONTEXT 
Return to Westminster had set out that: 
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Good industrial relations.. .rest on fiill and regular consuhation with employees -
directly, and through their representatives. The PSMC will investigate and make 
recommendations on increased employee participation in day to day management 
processes. It will also establish formal, regular and constmcfive meetings with the 
various public sector unions and associations (Goss 1989b: 8). 
The move towards greater involvement of employees in the day to day management of their 
workplaces had commenced in Australia almost 20 years before Return to Westminster was 
written. At the Federal level interest in job enrichment and employee involvement had first 
been shown by a conservative govemment in the early 1970's. The Whifiam Labor 
govemment of 1972-75 argued ".. .in the Green Paper, Policies for Development of 
Manufacturing Industry that... 'Employees should have the opportunity of being genuinely 
involved in the processes of reaching decisions that affect them' " (Davis & Lansbury, 
1986:4). In 1978 the nafional coalition govemment of Malcolm Fraser established the 
tripartite Nafional Employee Participation Steering Committee which undertook the role of 
raising awareness and understanding about employee participation (National Employee 
Participation Steering Committee, 1979). The movement towards increased employee 
participation in all areas of industry included the private and public sectors and recognised 
that "...traditional and long-entrenched attitudes" to issues such as effecfive decision making, 
introduction of modem technology, and a more skilled and adaptable workforce were no 
longer appropriate to the economic environment. These attitudes, said Ralph Wills, "... were 
developed in entirely different circumstances and they now inhibit effective economic 
performance and are socially unjusf (Willis, 1986:1). 
Public Sector Inquiries in jurisdictions elsewhere (Commonwealth, NSW, SA, WA) had 
recognised the value of greater employee participation (RCAGA, 1976; Wilenski, 1977; 
Burke, 1986; Committee of Inquiry into Public Service, 1975) and other jurisdictions were 
implementing programs. Some, like the Commonwealth sector, legislated to enshrine an 
obligafion to incorporate employee participative pracfices into day to day management. This 
served the purpose of changing both management and decision-making processes to those 
that assisted rather than inhibited "effecfive economic performance" (Willis, 1986). As early 
as 1977 the debate at the national level revolved around whether there should be a legislafive 
obligation on employers - private and public sectors alike - to incorporate employee 
participative practices or whether the adopfion of these practices should occur without 
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legislation (Willis, 1986). The value of employee participation was not questioned (National 
Employee Participative Steering Committee, 1979). Unions (ACTU in 1977) and employer 
bodies (Confederation of Australian Industry in 1978) alike had endorsed these policies 
(Willis, 1986). 
So whilst managers, unions and staff in other jurisdictions and the private sector were 
developing skills in participafive management, the lack of endorsement of employee 
participative practices at a policy level in the Queensland public sector meant that managers 
and staff in the QPS were not afforded the same leaming opportunities. 
Given this background, the challenge presented by the award restmcturing that was to occur 
in the sector as part of the Stmctural Efficiency Principle immediately after the Goss 
govemment was elected was enormous. Consultation and employee participation were 
essential in the job redesign exercise that was the central element of award restmcturing. In 
Febmary 1990 agreement was reached about the strategy that would be used (Conroy & 
Blackmur, 1990). Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) on which both unions and 
management would sit were the primary tool of implementation. A sector wide JCC was 
established as well as JCCs within each agency (personal knowledge and Conroy & 
Blackmur, 1990). "Emphasis in all of these organisational proposals was on joint union-
management participation and on a consensual style of decision-making" (personal 
knowledge and Conroy & Blackmur, 1990: 228). The lack of expertise in consensual 
decision making on the part of both management and unions could have been offset by some 
training. However there is no evidence that there was a recognition that these new styles of 
operafing would also require new skills. Neither is there evidence that there was a 
recognition that implementation would need to be carefully planned. There was no carefully 
planned education or training program for those with particular responsibilities in 
implementafion, let alone the workforce in general. Indeed as late as December 1989 the 
union appeared to have only a limited understanding of a broadbanded classification system 
such as the one that was being introduced as part of SEP. The lead story in The State Senice 
in that month stated that "Award restmcturing is intended to achieve improved career paths 
for all workers." The article went on to explain that ".. .this would be achieved through 
annual increments which would result in an eventual rise to the top of the worker's broad-
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hand...'' {The State Service, December 1989: 1). Whilst enhanced career paths is one of the 
benefits of a broadbanded system, this enhancement is generally agreed to be achieved 
through the abolition of unnecessary academic qualifications and the redesign of jobs to 
facilitate multi-skilling of all staff. In a broadbanded system, jobs are redesigned so that 
every job includes a variety of tasks and jobs that limit the occupant to one task such as 
typing or filing are eliminated. Thus the divide between 'clerks' (with matriculation) and 
'assistants' (without matriculation) is eliminated. Enhanced career paths in a broadbanded 
system are not generally seen as achievable by merely progressing through annual increments 
within one band. The union appears to have either not understood this aspect of 
broadbanding or not realised its implications. Either way their understanding of the system, 
whose introduction they were about to negotiate, appears to have been quite limited. 
Not surprisingly major difficulfies emerged with differences between the union and 
management positions in relation to SEP becoming evident during early discussions at the 
sector wide Joint Consultative Committee. There does not appear to have been any 
consciousness on the part of management or of unions that the difficulfies in the process 
could have resulted from a lack of experience and expertise in this new way of operating. By 
the time the unions determined that their course of action should be to take stop work action, 
both sides had posifioned themselves for a tradifional adversarial encounter. 
The paradoxical fact that this first experience for the Queensland Public Sector of using 
consultafive processes was a divisive one may have been an influential factor in the 
disappearance from the agenda of the employee participative initiafives so boldly proclaimed 
in Return to Westminster. 
THE OMISSION OF THE EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION INITIATIVES - So WHAT 
No long-term strategies designed to either increase employee participation in decision 
making or encourage the use of consultative practices were ever implemented by the Goss 
govemment despite the clear proclamations of Return to Westminster. Return to Westminster 
had given responsibility to the PSMC to make recommendations to govemment in relafion to 
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this issue. By the time the document designed to "provide an explanafion of the 
contemporary framework of Queensland govemmenf (PSMC, 1992: ii). Managing 
Queensland's Public Sector, was published in November 1992 all reference to increased 
employee participafion was gone. No "formal, regular and constmcfive meetings with 
various public sector unions and associafions" (Goss, 1989b:8) were menfioned in Managing 
Queensland's Public Sector. Only one ongoing consultative committee - the EEO 
Consultafive Committee - had been established, though various specific purpose short-term 
consultative committees, including those established to advise on specific agency reviews, 
had operated (personal knowledge). No general-purpose sector wide consultative committee 
was established. 
Although Managing Queensland's Public Sector does not contain any reference to increased 
employee participation in decision making or the use of consultative practices it does 
recognise that the public sector needed to modemise its management style. It detailed the 
need for flexibility in service delivery (1992: 13) and the need for managers in the field to 
have sufficient decision making power (1992: 15). However there was no recognition that 
achieving this modemisation objective would require a deliberate and carefully planned 
program. As a result there was no reform program that specifically required public sector 
agencies to adopt more contemporary management methods. This omission distinguishes the 
QPS reform initiatives quite sharply from those that had been implemented or were being 
implemented in jurisdictions elsewhere. 
As a consequence of this omission, the ambitious reform program of the Goss govemment 
was introduced to a sector in which the way management was practised - the management 
style of the sector - was not itself the subject of specific scmfiny or reform. The prevailing 
traditional authoritarian management style was not directly challenged. It is therefore likely 
that the way management was practised, the on the ground relationship between managers, 
staff and their clients, remained fundamentally unchanged from that authoritarian style which 
had existed over time. Certainly this is the view of some of the senior bureaucrats, newly 
recmited to the sector after the election of the Goss govemment, who were interviewed as 
part of this research. These senior bureaucrats were in many cases charged with the 
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responsibility for implementafion of the reform initiafives on the ground. Many saw 
problems with the approach used. One commented that: 
The reform process has been undertaken in a very controlling environment. .. .the 
QPS was not geared to reform, was not used to change and many of the initiatives 
were seen as a threat and not an opportunity. The reform process should have tackled 
the 'culture of obedience' and empowered the workforce to accept freedom 
(Interviewee V). 
Another talked of the lack of management skills and the lack of a proper understanding of the 
need to address this. This bureaucrat's view was that there was a lack of understanding of 
how addressing the lack of management skills might be done. He spoke of people with 
"limited management capacity and limited understanding of the practice of managemenf' 
(Interviewee S) commonly in senior positions. Another newly recmited, experienced and 
senior bureaucrat commented that the issues of change management were not understood. 
There was a lack of expertise in change management and the processes used by the 
Central Agencies including the PSMC did not model good practice including the 
establishment of tmst - they didn't engage the people in the process. They were not 
inclusive and didn't have or see as important the people management. Collaborative 
management was never understood (Interviewee T). 
It was not only those intemal to the QPS who had reservations about the way in which the 
reforms were being implemented. Wiltshire was not convinced of the appropriateness of the 
way in which reforms were implemented. Writing two years after the elecfion of the Goss 
govemment he observed that: 
At the end of the day the stark fact is that morale has rarely been as low in the 
Queensland public sector as it has been in the past two years. Fear and resentment 
seem to be mixed with uncertainty and a feeling that the human dimension has been 
overlooked, and the years of dedication and loyalty are summarily dismissed 
(Wiltshire, 1992: 273). 
He suggests that a commonly heard statement from public sector staff at the time was, "I 
don't object to the content of the refonn agenda; it is their manner of going about i f 
(Wiltshire, 1992: 273). Although Wiltshire's commentary on the process of administrative 
reform describes its negafive consequences, it does not provide any substantial analysis of the 
causes of those negative consequences other than to suggest that overall planning was 
inadequate. Nevertheless, Wiltshire's observations about the human factors are not 
inconsistent with the outcomes that could reasonably be expected to result from the situation 
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described by the senior bureaucrats on the inside. A reform program that did not "tackle the 
culture of obedience and empower the workforce to accept freedom" (Interviewee V), that 
did not address the lack of management skills, that was implemented by many who lacked 
expertise in change management and in which the Central Agencies did not model good 
practice was clearly desfined for a less than opfimal outcome. 
The inclusion of employee participation inifiatives within the reform package would have 
resulted in a direct challenge to the prevailing management style within the public sector. 
Their absence, together with the absence of any other element of the program to reform the 
way in which management was practised meant that there was an attempt to graft a modem 
agenda onto an old framework not capable of supporting it. 
WHY WAS THERE A FAILURE TO ENGAGE STAFF? 
There seems little disagreement that staff were not fully engaged in the reform process. 
Wiltshire identified it and those central to the reform process recognised and publicly 
acknowledged it. "The last eighteen months have been difficult for the Queensland public 
sector" (Coaldrake, 1991: 1). What is not agreed is the extent to which this was an inevitable 
consequence of the reform process, as suggested by Hede, or a preventable outcome. 
Wiltshire suggests that it was the result of the lack of an overall strategy for implementation. 
Those involved in the implementafion incline towards Hede's analysis. 
The last two years have been exceedingly unsettling for the Queensland public sector. 
.. .while there was a recognition of the (need for change), and to that extent a 
significant reservoir of support for a program of reform, there was and still remains in 
some quarters - a degree of hesitation and concem about where the changes might 
lead. In other words, while at an abstract level there was support for the new 
initiafives, the attitude of individuals to the various elements of the agenda invariably 
became qualified as people personalised the likely impact of the change (Coaldrake, 
1992: 1). 
In reality a number of factors are likely to have contributed to the disengagement of staff 
from the process. 
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The Magnitude of the Changes 
Coaldrake's observation about the size of the change is quite vaHd. The magnitude of the 
reform program together with the immediacy of the demands of govemment may have 
combined to result in a situation for which it was very difficult to plan adequately. 
Alternatively, those central to the process may have been overwhelmed by their task and 
become distracted from adequately planning the implementation of reforms. In addition the 
crisis prompted by the unexpected union discontent would have put management into a 
reactive rather than proactive mode and may have worked to flirther divert attention from 
planning. 
The Expertise of those Involved 
Change of the magnitude required by the Goss package of reforms was certainly beyond the 
experience of both long-term public sector staff and public sector unions. As noted earlier it 
was the observation of a number of experienced bureaucrats entering the QPS at the time that 
the change requirements were beyond the expertise of the long-term staff and unions. 
Additionally the expertise of the three commissioners of the Public Sector Management 
Commission who were described by Hede as "...well qualified males with academic 
backgrounds but without specialist human resource...expertise" (Hede, 1993: 90) was in 
policy rather than in planning and implementation. Yet these three commissioners were to 
play a key role in implementation. Their own limited expertise in human resource 
management, planning and implementafion made the need for good quality advice in this area 
essential. There is no evidence that such advice was received from either newly engaged 
intemal or extemal specialists in the area. One source of such advice would have been the 
PSMC's Director HRM. The initial appointee to this posifion stayed for a short period - less 
than 12 months and the posifion was not permanently filled for some fime following this 
departure. The lack of HRM expertise may have resulted in either a failure to recognise the 
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crifical importance of engagement of staff in the process or a lack of knowledge of how to 
secure this engagement. 
The Failure of Consultation in Relation to SEP 
Of critical importance in the failure of the QPS to engage staff in the process of reform was 
the failure to successfully implement award restmcturing. This failure represented a major 
lost opportunity and generally served as a negative experience of a major administrafive 
change. The responsibility for industrial relations matters in the public sector rested with the 
Department of Employment, Vocational Education, Training and Industrial Relations as well 
as the Public Sector Management Commission. Public sector unions through the Trades and 
Labour Council (TLC) were engaged in negotiating the implementation of the restmctured 
award and consequential work and job redesign exercise with DEVETIR (Conroy & 
Blackmur, 1991) from October 1989; that is, from before the election of the Goss 
govemment. So although initial negotiations in relation to this award restmcturing exercise 
had commenced in an "...environment of suspicion and hostility" (Boreham, 1991: 250) 
under the Bjelke-Petersen govemment, they were completed after the election of the Goss 
govemment. Whilst the Goss govemment endorsed the arrangements for the implementafion 
of SEP, and suggested that they "...mesh[ed] very well with the Govemment's public sector 
reform policy" (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, March 1990: 295,296), implementation 
of the SEP did not prove to be effective. Despite the fact that the award restmcturing 
exercise involved 150 awards and industrial agreements covering almost 90 000 employees 
(Boreham, 1991: 251), no implementation action plan was devised and there appears to have 
been no recognifion that the implementation of such a massive reform program required 
leadership, guidance and direction. Public sector managers had never been required to 
manage in a collaborafive way or negotiate directly with union representafives. Staff had not 
previously been asked to provide input to decisions about their own jobs let alone their 
workplaces. In the absence of strong leadership, guidance and direction it is not surprising 
there is very little evidence that any real job redesign or in fact workplace negotiafion about 
job redesign occurred as a result of SEP. Management and unions alike were in the end 
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content to receive the pay increase without the bother of redesigning workplaces. Neither 
side appeared to comprehend the seriousness of the failure of the process to achieve any real 
workplace reform. Thus the first significant experience of formal participation for the sector 
had resulted in not only conflict but also a failure to achieve the stmctural changes the 
participative process was designed to achieve, i.e. better, more satisfying jobs and work 
redesign at individual workplaces. 
The failure to understand the need to plan and provide leadership for the QPS in this massive 
work redesign exercise set an unfortunate precedent. In other jurisdictions work redesign had 
been one of the vehicles by which workplaces had been introduced to participative practices 
and collaborative processes {Reforming the Australian Public Service, 1983). The very 
limited success of the process of job redesign in the QPS, including the failure to engage staff 
in it, set the precedent for the engagement of staff at a very low height for the sector. 
CHANGE PROCESSES ASSESSED AGAINST THE PROPOSED EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK. 
The second dimension of the proposed framework for evaluafing change uses the work of 
Dunphy and Dick (1981) and Wilenski (1986) to identify the characteristics of successflil 
change programs. 
Dunphy and Dick's (1981) first characteristic of successful change programs is that they 
possess clear objectives. As discussed previously, although there was debate about the 
adequacy of articulation of the refonn objecfives, the program overall can only be assessed as 
failing to measure up in tenns of clearly and simply articulating its objectives. Although 
enjoying early support, commitment and agreement, as called for in the second characteristic 
of successflil change, the full support of staff, their unions and a significant number of 
managers was eroded in the early implementation phase of the Goss govemment reforms. 
This loss of support was not adequately countered as required by the third characteristic of 
successful change. Engaging employees in the change program has been consistently shown 
to be a significant feature of successful change programs. The apparent failure on the part of 
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the Goss govemment to comprehend the need to engage the support of staff in the process of 
reform cannot be explained by a lack of available knowledge in this country about what 
consfitutes successful reform as both private sector and public sector research in this country 
had idenfified the central role this plays in successfully achieving change (Dunphy & Dick, 
1981; Wilenski, 1986 and, Dunphy & Stace 1990). In Wilenski's (1986) view, failure to 
recognise and to plan to neutralise such opposifion to change is a major reason for the failure 
of reform. He suggests that "...opposifion, unless deliberately countered, is more than likely 
to be more powerful than the forces promoting reform" (1986: 172). Had an assessment of 
implementation of the Goss reform program been undertaken at even the most basic level it 
would have been evident that the failure to address the lack of support was likely to be 
problematic. 
Nor was there genuine participation of staff in the reform program - the fourth Dunphy and 
Dick (1981) characterisfic of successful change. As discussed in Chapter 4, the inifiatives 
relafing to staff consultation and participative management pracfices were not progressed. It 
was the view of many public sector staff that the method of implementing the changes was 
authoritarian and that many of those charged with the responsibility to implement the change 
(managers and supervisors) did not understand what was required of them. 
In discussing his first prerequisite for successful change, the polifical will to implement the 
reform, Wilenski (1986) suggests that there are costs of reform at both the financial and 
polifical level and that govemments need to be prepared to antagonise at least some of their 
senior officials in the process of reform. The Goss Govemment appears to have had the 
political will to implement their reforms. Their commitment to refonn is not questioned by 
any commentators. Additionally, there is an acknowledgement amongst those central to the 
changes that some staff would feel alienated by the changes. In 1992 Coaldrake wrote 
"...one acknowledges the view of some that events are proceeding too quickly for the system 
'to cope'" (1992C, 4). He goes on to say that whilst he acknowledges this view, he does not 
share it and the expectations of other public servants and the govemment must also be 
accommodated. Philip Selth a senior executive within the Review area of the PSMC wrote 
that the ".. .radical changes proposed, and the speed with which they began to be 
implemented, has unsetfied many public servants" (Selth, 1991:2). Lack of polifical will and 
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preparedness to antagonise at least some officials does not seem to have been a factor and 
this prerequisite for successful change appears to have been met. 
Wilenski's (1986) second prerequisite for successful reform is the allocafion of adequate 
resources including ongoing instifiitional support. He suggests that what may be needed to 
counteract the opposition of officials to a reform program is a standing organisafion that has 
access to the intemal deliberations of govemment. Again this second prerequisite appears to 
have been met in that lack of resources was never suggested as a problem for implementation 
of the Goss reforms. The establishment of the PSMC in addition to the establishment of the 
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) and Electoral and Administrafive Reform Commission 
(EARC) should have facilitated the provision of ongoing insfitutional support to counter the 
opposition of officials - a step Wilenski suggests may be necessary. 
However the Goss QPS reforms appear to fall short of what Wilenski would regard as 
optimum in relation to his third and fourth prerequisites for change. While many made the 
observafion at the time of the election of the Goss govemment that the time for change was 
right, the govemment itself was not able to carefully pick its moment to implement specific 
changes. The circumstances on its election demanded that the reform program be 
implemented without delay. The findings of the Fitzgerald Commission had generated 
widespread community support for change. This community preparedness to embrace 
change, though more about the general need for good govemance and good administrafion 
than the specifics of any change program, undoubtedly influenced the process adopted for 
implementing change within the sector and may have deflected the refoiTners from 
recognising the need to "consult and bargain" about the details of the changes with those 
most affected by them. The predisposition of the broader community to accept change may 
have meant that the precautions about timing and "clearing the path" for change were 
overlooked or considered unnecessary. But those affected by the changes were concemed. 
The unions were very concemed about the details of the changes as these directly affected 
their members. Hede observed that: 
much of the criticism (of the Goss govemment) has been about the lack of 
consultation and of inadequate timelines for input. According to one union official, 
the PSMC's attitude was: 'We'll tell you what's going on, and then allow you a few 
hours to comment' (Hede 1993: 99). 
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So whilst the Goss govemment was fortunate to be implementing its reform program at a 
time when the mood of the community was right for change, this also had disadvantages. 
The community not only supported change; they demanded change. This generated an 
urgency to the implementation of the reforms that worked against a more reflective and 
deliberative approach. Questioning the speed and/or appropriateness of the reforms ran the 
distinct risk of being interpreted as being unsympathetic to the new order. "Clearing the 
path" for the reforms through consultation and bargaining as Wilenski (1986) suggests is a 
necessary pre-requisite for successful administrative reform could easily have taken on other 
meaning in Queensland at that time. It would have mn the risk of being interpreted as either 
a lack of commitment to the Fitzgerald reforms or as an endeavour to water down the reforms 
or even as a giving in to lobby groups. 
Wilenski's (1986) final and most important prerequisite for change - the development of a 
conscious and considered strategy which has regard to the sources of resistance to change is 
the area that generated most vigorous debate in the Queensland context. Wiltshire suggests 
that ".. .there is no evidence of any particular strategy for the process of reform" (Wiltshire, 
1992: 267). Wiltshire's view about the lack of strategy and process follow on from his 
assertions that the reform process lacked a proper vision. These assertions are soundly 
rejected by Coaldrake (by this time Public Service Commissioner), who identifies a number 
of documents that spell out the vision and strategy for reform; most notably Coaldrake points 
to the ALP policy Making Government Work. In response to Wiltshire's criticism that the 
Goss reforms did not follow the convenfion of other jurisdictions of addressing the macro 
reforms (such as identifying areas for privatisation) firstly and then attending to micro 
reforms such as those of personnel management, Coaldrake says that the plan of the incoming 
Goss govemment was to undertake Agency reviews initially as a way of identifying some of 
the macro issues for action and for planning the reform agenda. 
What of the criticism of lack of vision and strategy? I have already argued that historically 
no reform program, including the Goss reform program, has provided the QPS with an 
adequate vision of good administration. The "back to the future" vision of Making 
Government Work assumes, and relies for its persuasiveness on, a well developed 
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understanding of the traditional Westminster principles of public administration which the 
QPS did not have. The 1992 publication Managing Queensland's Public Sector, although 
providing a vision for the future and the fundamentals of a strategy, came too late in the 
reform process and was not discussed comprehensively in all workplaces. What is clear 
about the Queensland post-Goss public sector is that understanding about the vision for 
reform, and the strategy to achieve that vision, was not widespread in the sector. Coaldrake 
in November 1991 acknowledged that despite the effort that had been expended on 
communication about the changes, there was not broad understanding of them in the sector 
{The State Service, November 1991). This is significant in as much as it indicates that the 
change strategy that was in place - whatever it might have been - was not able to adequately 
respond to and address this lack of understanding and resistance. So in terms of Wilenski's 
(1986) fourth prerequisite for change, the strategy for implementation was clearly inadequate 
as it either was not able to identify or not able to adequately neutralise the resistance to 
change. 
Quite a number of Wilenski's (1986) levers of change were employed by the Goss 
govemment in its pursuit of reform. There was extensive enactment of new legislation, 
including the Public Sector Management Commission Act 1990 (which established the PSMC 
and gave it powers). There was legislation enacted relating to corporatisation. Freedom of 
Information, Equal Employment Opportunity, a Grievance and Appeal System and changes 
to the Public Service Act. The three new institutions of the Criminal Justice Commission, 
Electoral and Administrative Review Tribunal and PSMC acted as levers of change. 
Govemment co-ordinafing and cabinet and budgetary processes were completely overhauled 
and the implementation of the restmctured awards as part of SEP was designed to flatten 
stmctures and did so at a formal level. Training became the focus of attention with the 
establishment of the Queensland Public Sector Training Council in June 1992. Whilst the 
Training Council did tum its attention to how to "percolate" the changes through the system 
(Coaldrake, 1992D: 4), this attention came three years after the commencement of the 
administrative reforms and may have been a more effective adjunct to change if it had 
coincided with the commencement of the reforms. 
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When the Goss govemment reforms for the QPS are evaluated against Wilenski's model for 
successful change they are deficient in that the implementation strategy was not adequately 
responsive to resistance to change and there was inadequate "clearing the path" (Wilenski, 
1986), including consultation with the key stakeholders. 
Hede explains away the lack of consultation by suggesting that it was jusfified given the 
"...polifical, economic and cultural factors involved" (Hede, 1993: 99). He assesses that the 
method of implementation of the Goss govemment reforms was ".. .towards the 
transformative end of the change continuum" (Hede, 1993: 99). Hede goes on to say that "an 
inevitable consequence of a transformative change strategy is that consultation must be 
curtailed" (1993: 99). Notwithstanding any validity such observations might have, there 
clearly was not sufficient consultation, given the union activities. 
Assessment Against Dunphy & Stace's Topology of Change 
The work of Dunphy & Stace (1990) cited by Hede in his discussion of transformational 
change provides another model against which the Goss QPS reforms can be measured. Their 
work does not support Hede's assertion that the curtailment of consultation is the inevitable 
consequence of transformative change. Dunphy & Stace's model or topology of change, 
incorporates strategies for change (incremental through to transformative) and modes of 
change (collaborative/consultative through to directive/coercive) (1990: 90). They argue that 
organisations need to select the appropriate type of change depending on a strategic analysis 
of their own situafion. According to their topology, transformative change can be either 
direcfive/coercive, or collaborative/consultafive (Dunphy & Stace, 1990: 90). They suggest 
that the condifions present in the organisation undergoing the change influence which of 
these will be most successful. Their proposifion is that in ".. .situations where there is little 
time for extensive participation but there is support for radical change within the 
organisafion" (1990: 90), collaborative/consultative modes of implementation are most 
appropriate. In situations where ".. .there is not time for extensive participation and no 
support within the organisation for radical change but radical change is vital" (1990: 90) they 
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suggest that directive/coercive models of change are most appropriate. On the basis of their 
model, the level of support for change from within the organisation is a critical factor in 
determining whether collaborative/consultative modes or directive/coercive modes of 
implementation are more appropriate when pursuing transformative change. 
The general view is that the level of support from public sector staff for the content of the 
refonn program was high (WiUshire, 1992; Prasser, 1986; Hede, 1993; Coaldrake, 1990; 
Selth, 1991), although some observe that support diminished over time. Irrespecfive of this 
erosion of support, the QPS situation could most accurately be described as one in which 
there was little time for extensive participation but in which there was support for radical 
change. In these situations the Dunphy & Stace (1990) work suggests that 
collaborative/consultative modes of implementation are the most effective. By adopting a 
more directive/coercive mode of implementation, the reformers chose the less effective 
method for achieving change in the circumstances. 
Another Reform Program Assessed Against Wilenski's Model 
The administrative reforms introduced in 1984 by the Hawke govemment under the 
stewardship of Dawkins provide a model of an effective implementation process. They 
provide an example of a "conscious and considered strategy" (Wilenski, 1992: 267) and of 
the use of extensive consultation to clear the way for reform. It is informative to compare the 
process used to introduce the Goss Govemment reforms with the process used to introduce 
the Dawkins reforms. 
When the Hawke govemment came to office in March 1983 it did so with a detailed platform 
for reform. That platform was set out in a document 'Labor and the Quality of Govemment' 
which was released by the then Leader of the Opposition and shadow Attomey General in 
February 1983 prior to being elected. The platform was developed in 1982 by the 
Parliamentary Labor Party while in opposition through a task force of members. The 
document enjoyed widespread support within the party. The task force had examined issues 
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itself; it had circulated a discussion paper and sought responses; and, finally, it had held a 
seminar. All of the informafion generated from this process came together in the final 
document. The outcomes of previous public inquiries into Commonwealth administration 
also informed the platform. 
...the report of the Royal Commission on Australian Govemment Administration in 
1976,... the Review of commonwealth Administrafion, the 202"** Report of the Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts and the reports of the Senate Standing Committee on 
Finance and Govemment Operafions on statutory authorifies" (AGPS, 1983:1). 
In contrast to this, the Making Government Work policy documents of the Goss govemment 
had been hasfily compiled prior to the 1989 election with limited consultation and without the 
same input from members of the Parliamentary Labor Party. The Goss led opposition did not 
have the same expectation of winning govemment that the Hawke led opposition in 1982/83 
had. 
Notwithstanding the extensive preparatory work that was undertaken in the preparation of 
"Labor and Quality in Govemmenf, after coming to office, Wilenski suggests, the 
immediate priority of the Hawke govemment became economic recovery and, although the 
platform for administrative refonn was prepared and a task force established, none of the 
prerequisites for reform were present (Wilenski, 1986: 192). However there was, he 
suggests, a "...tumaround in govemment...strategy" (1986: 191) with the deliberate 
appointment of Minister for Finance John Dawkins as the minister with responsibility for 
assisting the Prime Minister on Public Service matters. Dawkins had a particular interest in 
administrafive reform and, Wilenski notes, he was assisted by a personal staff "with a special 
interest and knowledge of these areas" (1986: 192). Dawkins did take the necessary 
"conscious and considered steps" (Wilenski, 1986: 267) to consult about the proposed 
changes and to identify and neutralise opposition. He established a Sub-Committee of 
Cabinet, reconstituted the Task Force and provided it with a small full-time staff of "high 
ability" (Wilenski, 1986:192). In addifion a Govemment policy paper Reforming the 
Australian Public Service was published that outlined the basic reform program and was the 
basis for consultafion (AGPS, 1983; Wilenski, 1986). An intensive program of consultafion 
with unions, with influential individuals, and with the representatives of polifical parties was 
then undertaken by the Minister, his advisers, and the Public Service Board. 
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The aim, apart from improving the proposals, was to gather and gamer support for the 
reforms, and to make those modifications necessary to defuse opposition. Each 
group...who saw losses to themselves from the reforms were also offered other 
changes which provided considerable gains. Genuine changes were made to the 
proposals. The strategy was successflil as the package received the tacit support of 
the trade unions and was passed through Parliament on time and with the support of 
all political parties (Wilenski, 1986: 192-193). 
Had such a process been undertaken in Queensland, the outcome may have been different. 
No Parliamentary Committee with a specific interest in administrative reform was 
established, however, and as a result, at the polifical level, support for the changes was 
limited and often ill informed. No specific consultafion, based on a highly focused policy 
paper, was undertaken. If this had been done the resistance of the unions and other 
influenfial individuals, including Wihshire, may have been overcome. 
The Dawkins reforms met Wilenski's prerequisites for reform in that there was political will, 
resources, time, sustained insfitutional support and the development of a strategy which 
included the building of alliances and the blunting of opposition. Dawkins reforms also made 
use of Wilenski's (1986) levers of change. According to Wilenski "...nearly all the major 
changes have been embodied in one or other of the three Acts of Parliament which constitute 
the reform package" (Wilenski, 1986:199). Wilenski's view was that this legislation placed 
unambiguous responsibilities on public servants as to how they should implement the 
reforms. One new institution, the Merit Protection and Review Agency, was established. Its 
role was to oversee a small proportion of the reforms. Addifionally the Public Service Board 
was refashioned with the appointment of three new commissioners and a major 
organisational restmcture. New people were appointed not only to the positions of 
commissioner in the Public Service Board but also to other key posifions. Wilenski's (1986) 
fourth level of change - the alteration of some of the formal processes to redistribute power-
was also a component of the Dawkins refonns. One of these was the compilation by each 
department of Industrial Democracy Plans, the centrepiece of which had to be the 
establishment of a joint management-union consultative committees. Finally the reform 
package included, in the longer term, a reform of organisational stmctures which saw the 
elimination of levels of supervision, a flattening of stmctures and enhanced organisational 
flexibility and adaptability. 
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Compared with the apparent rigor of the planning for implementation of the Dawkins 
reforms, the planning for implementation of the Goss reforms appears unfocused and naive. 
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SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT OF G O S S REFORMS AGAINST EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
The following table summarises the preceding assessment of the Goss refonns against the 
two dimensions of reform identified in my evaluative framework. Those two dimensions of 
reform are the content of the program and the management practices utilized in its 
implementation. 
First Dimension - Content or Products of Reform Program 
Arena Assessment of Goss Reforms in relation to 
these Arenas 
Political/Institutional Arena 
Concems the establishment of the proper 
relationships between: 
• Political insdtutions; 
• Politicians; 
• The public sector; and 
• Public sector staff. 
Social/Responsiveness Arena 
Focuses on the relationship between bureaucracy 
and the public. 
It is concerned with the public interest. 
Efficient/Administrative Arena 
Concemed with: 
The efficient and effective organisation of 
decisions; 
The effective execution of decisions; 
The stmcture of the public sector; 
The competency of public sector staff; 
and 
The organisation of machinery of 
government 
Establishment of EARC, CJC, Agency Reviews 
all positive contributions 
Not addressed: Reforms contained no 
substantial philosophical overview setting 
out the relationships. 
Policy papers do not convey vision. 
Establishment of CJC plus FOI were positive 
contributions. Also spin-off positive effects 
from HRM reforms (EEO, Merit Selection, 
Appeals etc) 
But No participative management processes 
so that traditional relationships (both 
internal and external) were unchallenged 
Many reforms made positive contribution: 
HRM (Merit Selection, EEO, Program 
budgeting. Appeals) Agency Reviews 
instrumental. 
But absence of participative management or 
consultation reforms resulted in no 
challenge to the existing authoritarian 
management practices. 
Second Dimension - Processes or Management Practices used to Implement 
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the Reform Program 
Characteristics 
Extent to which the processes utilised in 
implementation comply with best practice 
characteristics of successful change, as 
defined by Dunphy and Dick (1981): 
• Establish clear objectives; 
• Raise awareness, gain commitment 
and agreement; 
• Gain support from key groups 
(management and unions); 
• Utilize genuine participation and 
majority support. 
And pre-requisites for successful change, 
as defined by Wilenski (1986): 
• Political will; 
• Adequate resources; 
• Careflil timing; and 
• Conscious strategy are present. 
Assessment of Goss Reforms in relation to these 
Characteristics. 
Goss reforms did not adequately articulate vision. 
Good awareness and commitment initially, later 
eroded. 
Lost support of unions and a number of managers 
Participative practices not genuinely understood 
or implemented. 
Political will was present. 
Resources were adequate. 
Timing was not able to be controlled but roughly 
ok. 
Conscious strategy for implementation apparently 
not developed. 
The process used to implement the Goss govemment reforms was in part a reflection of the 
content of the administrative reform package itself and in part a reflection of the history of 
public administration in Queensland. These processes distinguish the reforms from 
administrative reforms in other jurisdictions in that the authoritarian management style that 
existed in the sector prior to the election of the Goss govemment was not itself the subject of 
reform. That is, the way in which management was practised on the ground was not the 
subject of specific reform activity. Initiatives included in the original reform package that 
would have contributed to reform in this area, including formal employee participative and 
consultative processes, were silently ignored and not implemented. These omissions could 
help explain the lack of substantial progress in achieving a responsive and effective public 
sector in Queensland. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ARE QPS STAFF DIFFERENT FROM OTHER PUBLIC SECTOR STAFF? 
In chapters 4 and 5 I have considered both the content or products of the Goss Reform 
program and the processes or management practices used to implement the reform program 
in order to seek an understanding of what I assess to be the limited impact of the Goss 
reforms. The analysis revealed that there are some areas in which both products and 
processes of the program failed to achieve acceptable standards. This chapter explores the 
demographic profile of QPS staff as another factor that may contribute to or provide 
explanation for the outcomes which the central arguments of this thesis propose to explain, 
i.e., that the QPS, unlike other jurisdicfions in this country, did not respond in a predictable 
way to the Goss reform package in that (i) the Goss reforms did not successfully facilitate a 
transformation of the QPS, that the sector did not acquire the flexibility, creativity and 
professional approach expected of and necessary in contemporary public sectors; and (ii) that 
the standard of management practice, i.e., the way management occurred in the sector's 
workplaces, was neither effecfive nor appropriate for a well fiinctioning contemporary public 
sector. 
If it was the case that Queensland Public Sector staff were less willing, less diligent, less 
creative or less capable than staff in other jurisdictions, it could reasonably be assumed that 
this would influence the overall achievements of the sector. As it was a commonly held view 
within public sector circles that the political situation in Queensland, whereby the 
govemment was seen to exert undue pressure on the bureaucracy, discouraged many career 
bureaucrats from considering the QPS as a career, 1 was keen to explore available 
information to determine if there was any evidence to support the view. If it was the case that 
a considerably different cohort of applicants applied for positions in the Queensland State 
Public sector than the cohort of applicants who applied for positions in other public sectors, 
then the resulting unique set of differing talents, creafivity and abilities of Queensland public 
sector staff could reasonably be assumed to provide some explanafion for different outcomes 
achieved by the Queensland public sector. 
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Comparison of the personal qualities such as diligence, willingness and creativity, of 
applicants for public sector vacancies in different jurisdicfions is very difficult to make. 
However it is possible to compare a more easily measured aspect of these influences - that of 
the personal characterisfics of staff If it was the case for instance that the personal 
characteristics - such as educational level or age - of Queensland public sector staff differed 
in some significant ways from those of their colleagues in other sectors, the difference may 
be responsible for or partly contribute to different outcomes for the sector. By extension, if 
the personal characterisfics as recorded in the demographic profiles of public sector staff in 
Queensland vary significantly from those of their colleagues in other public sectors, 
differences in outcome may simply be a result of differences in input that it could be 
reasonably assumed would accompany a fundamentally different workforce. 
A comparison of the demographic profiles of public sector staff across a range of public 
sectors is only possible if similar personal information about those public sector staff is 
available. My research determined that while personnel records are available from most 
public sectors, the information that is recorded and the manner in which it is recorded varies 
significantly from sector to sector and agency to agency. There is such variation in this in-
house personnel data that meaningful comparison of it for this study proved to be impossible. 
ABS Census data, however, is comparable and has proved to be an effective data source for 
this sfiidy. Census data includes data relating to personal characteristics and it has been 
possible to isolate from the Census data not only those cifizens who are staff of the public 
sector but also the level of govemment they serve. Census data has thus been able to provide 
comparable information about public sector staff across the nafion. I have used this Census 
data to explore the possibility that the personal characteristics as recorded in the demographic 
profiles of Queensland public sector staff vary from the profiles of their colleagues in other 
jurisdictions. 
The first task in making the Census data useful was to delimit who could be included in a 
definifion of public sector employee which would be both useful and pracfical. Various 
methods were employed in refining the definition. Significant exclusions were data on 
teachers, nurses and police officers. These exclusions were necessary because the personal 
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characteristics as measured by educational level and age of these groups were likely to be 
similar across jurisdictions but different from the personal characteristics of general public 
sector staff employed in what is regarded as the core public service. Additionally, these 
groups are so large (30 000 teachers, 20 000 nurses and 10 000 police officers in Queensland) 
that the inclusion of their information within the sample would have confounded the data. 
After some difficulty in idenfifying public sector staff in the Commonwealth sector 
(discussed in more detail in Chapter 1) a combinafion of industry and occupation codes was 
utilized. 
This following analysis of Census data from the 1996 Census considers data for public 
sectors in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and Westem Australia. It focuses 
particularly on comparing data about Commonwealth public sector staff in each state with 
data about State public sector staff in that same state. The variations between the two sectors 
within each state are then compared. This technique means that state condifions can be 
largely discounted as explanafions for any difference in characterisfics as both jurisdicfions 
(commonwealth and state) in any state are subject to the same state conditions. This analysis 
examines the mobility, level of educafional achievement and age of public sector staff in each 
of the eight jurisdicfions in the four states. 
MOBILITY DATA 
Census data provides information about the usual place of residence of all Australian cifizens. 
Specifically, it establishes if a person's usual place of residence one year prior to the census 
date was the same as or different from their usual place of residence at the time of the census 
(1996). It also establishes if a person's usual place of residence five years prior to the census 
date was the same as or different from their usual place of residence at the fime of the census 
(Questions 8 & 9 1996 Census Fonn Appendix 1). This data provides a measure of mobility 
of the Australian population including the mobility of public sector staff Whilst a proportion 
of those who move house will no doubt be moving to a different house in roughly the same 
area, a proportion will be those who move house to a new location and a different job If it 
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was the situation that throughout their careers public sector staff remained in the same 
location, their careers and the way they undertook their work would be likely to be influenced 
by this stability. It might be argued for instance that less mobile staff would be less likely to 
be exposed to a range of ideas and work situations and so would not have as many 
opportunities as those who have wide experience, to achieve a broad understanding of issues 
and a wider world view. Indeed this has been the view of reformers in a large number of 
jurisdicfions and increased job mobility of public sector staff has been an objective of most 
reform programs. So if the mobility rates of public sector staff from one sector were higher 
than the mobility rates of staff in other sectors or if the mobility rates of public sector staff 
from one sector were lower than the mobility rates of staff in other sectors, it could be argued 
that these degrees of mobility may have an impact on public servants' world view and in tum 
their job experience resulting in different ways in which they approach their job. 
A number of influences on the Queensland public sector suggest that staff in that sector may 
be less mobile than their colleagues elsewhere. The political stability of Queensland until the 
change of govemment in 1989 together with what Coaldrake (1992: 5) describes as the 
professional inattention to the Queensland public sector and the consequential absence of any 
major restmcture are conditions that could easily have fostered an environment in which 
Queensland public sector staff moved less frequently from job to job and as a consequence 
moved from location to location less frequenfiy. Wiltshire (1986) observed that public sector 
staff tended to stay within the department they inifially joined. This stability and lack of 
direct encouragement to obtain broad experience could easily create, it could be argued, an 
environment in which staff tended to be more entrenched in their workplaces. 
However ABS Census data does not appear to support this proposition. Indeed it suggests 
another trend altogether. 
Interpreting the Mobility Data 
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This analysis of the mobility data regards staff who have lived at the same address both one 
year and five years prior to the Census date as not mobile and staff in each of the other three 
categories (those who had lived at another address both one year and five years prior to the 
census date, those who had lived at the same address one year prior to the census date but a 
different address five years prior to the census date and those who had lived at a different 
address one year prior to the census date but the same address five years prior to the census 
date) as mobile. 
Forty-eight percent of public sector employees in the Queensland state sector had lived at the 
same address both one year and five years prior (not mobile) to the collection of the census 
data in 1996. This compared with 56% of New South Wales state public sector staff, 57% of 
Victorian public sector staff and 51% of Westem Australian public sector staff who had lived 
at the same address both one year and five years prior to 1996 (See Figure I). 
Figure 1: Staff in State public sectors who lived at the same address both 1 Year and 5 Years 
prior to the census date 
This data indicates that in 1996 Queensland state public sector staff were more mobile than 
staff from the state sector in any of the other states in the study. The state sector that 
compared most closely with Queensland was the Westem Australian state sector. Given that 
both Westem Australia and Queensland are considerably larger in area than New South 
Wales and Victoria it is possible that the similarity in the data between those two states could 
be explained by the geographical size of the state and the resultant disbursement of public 
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sector staff throughout the state. This explanafion does not appear to be valid however as 
although both Westem Australia and Queensland are geographically vast, their populations 
and public sectors are not similarly decentralised. Indeed there is no correlation between the 
geographical size of the state and the location of public sector staff outside the metropolitan 
area (See Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Proportion of State public sector staff located in the city and country 
In the Queensland state public sector, 53% of all staff are located in the Brisbane 
metropolitan area with 47% in other centres across the state (country) whereas 74% of 
Westem Australian public sector staff are located in the Perth metropolitan area with only 
26% located in the country outside the metropolitan area. Westem Australia's pattern of 
decentralisation is more similar to Victoria's than to Queensland's. In Victoria 71% of the 
state sector is located in Melboume and 29% in country areas. New South Wales is more 
decentralised than these two but not as decentralised as Queensland. Sixty-three percent of 
the New South Wales state sector in located in Sydney with 37% in country areas. The 
Queensland State Public Sector is considerably more decentralised than all the other state 
public sectors in this study. So geographic size of the state does not appear to explain the 
variation for Queensland. 
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The mobility rates of Commonwealth public sector staff across each of the states show a 
similar pattem to that of the state sectors (Figures 3 & 4). 
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Figure 3: Staff in Commonwealth public sectors who lived at the same 
address both 1 Year and 5 Years prior to the census date 
Figure 4: Proportion of Commonwealth public sector staff located in the 
city and country 
Forty-three percent of the public sector employees in the Commonwealth sector in 
Queensland had lived at the same address both one year and five years prior to the collection 
of the census data in 1996. Again, the public sector staff in Queensland (this fime 
Commonwealth public sector staff), were more mobile than staff from the same sector in 
other states. In New South Wales 50% of the Commonwealth sector staff had lived at the 
same address both one year and five years prior to 1996. This percentage was 54% for 
Victoria and 45% for Westem Australia. 
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The differences between the profiles of the state and Commonwealth sectors in each of the 
states in relation to this are consistent (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Comparison between proportion of staff in Commonwealth and 
State public sectors in each State who lived at the same address both 1 Year 
and 5 Years prior to the census date 
In each case the percentage of state staff who had lived at the same address both one year and 
five years prior to 1996 was higher than the percentage of commonwealth staff who had done 
the same thing. This indicates that in each state, commonwealth public sector staff were 
more mobile than state public sector staff In addition, in Queensland both Commonwealth 
public sector staff and state public sector staff were more mobile than their colleagues in 
other Commonwealth and State sectors respectively. The order of mobility of 
Commonwealth public sector staff across the states, with Queensland staff being the most 
mobile, followed by those in Westem Australia, then New South Wales and Victoria is 
exactly the same as the order of mobility for state public sector staff It therefore seems most 
likely that the factors that influence the movements of these staff are related to the 
characteristics of the state itself rather than to the features of the individual sector. 
Nevertheless, higher mobility of staff is a genuine feature of the public sectors in Queensland 
and may have some impact on the way in which staff undertake their work. 
So whilst the percentage of state public sector staff in Queensland who did not change their 
address is lower than the equivalent percentage cohort who did not change their address in 
other states, this trend is also evident with Commonwealth public sector staff in Queensland 
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when compared with their interstate colleagues. The percentage of Commonwealth public 
sector staff in Queensland who did not change their address is lower than the percentage of 
Commonwealth public sector staff in other states in the study who did not change their 
address. The fact that this percentage is lower for state public sector staff in Queensland is 
therefore more likely to be explained by differences in Queensland as a state rather than 
differences between the Queensland state public sector and the state public sector in the other 
states in the study. 
The Impact of Country/City Location on Mobility 
Whilst the mobility rates indicate that both Commonwealth and State public sector staff in 
Queensland are more mobile than their colleagues in other states, also of interest is the extent 
to which mobility rates vary in relation to locafion, i.e., country or metropolitan. For 
analysis, the stafistical division based on the capital city of each state was regarded as city 
and the remainder of the statistical divisions across the state were considered together as 
country. The general trend across all states in both the Commonwealth and State sectors is 
that staff in the country are more mobile than staff in the metropolitan area (see Table 4). 
The proportion of public sector staff in both sectors and across all states who had the same 
usual place of residence both five years and one year prior to the census date is higher in the 
metropolitan area than in the country area. 
Table 4 Proportion of public sector staff in the city and country in both sectors in each State who have 
lived at the same address both 1 years and 5 years prior to the census date 
City 
Country 
Queensland 
Comm 
47% 
37% 
State 
48% 
48% 
New South Wales 
Comm 
52% 
45% 
State 
57% 
55% 
Victoria 
Comm 
55% 
50% 
State 
57% 
57% 
Western Australia 
Comm 
47% 
35% 
State 
52% 
47% 
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Another general trend across all of the states and both of the sectors is that staff who work for 
the Commonwealth sector are significantly and consistently more mobile than those who 
work for the state sector in that state when mobility is regarded as the characteristic of those 
who had not lived at the same address both one year and five years prior to the Census date in 
1996. Furthermore, Commonwealth country staff are consistently more mobile than 
Commonwealth staff in the cifies (Table 4). The difference between the mobility rates of 
Commonwealth public sector staff in the metropolitan areas and the country areas are up to 
ten percentage points greater than the difference between the mobility rates of the staff in the 
metropolitan and country areas in the State sector in the corresponding state (Table 5). 
Table 5 Table of differences in percentage points between the proportion of those in the City who had 
lived at the same address both 1 year and 5 years prior to the Census date in 1996 and that of those in the 
Country who had lived at the same address both 1 year and 5 years prior to the Census date in 1996 in 
each of the sectors in each of the States. 
Difference in % points 
between those in City & 
those in the Country 
Difference between 
Comm & State Difference 
Queensland 
Comm 
10 
State 
0 
10 
New South 
Wales 
Comm 
7 
State 
2 
5 
Victoria 
Comm 
5 
State 
0 
5 
Western 
Australia 
Comm 
12 
State 
5 
7 
In Queensland and Victoria there is no difference between the mobility rates of state public 
sector employees in Brisbane and Melboume and the mobility rates of the state public sector 
employees in corresponding country areas. In other words, at the 1996 census date, state 
public sector staff in Queensland and Victoria who lived in the metropolitan area were just as 
likely to have had the same usual place of residence one year and five years ago as their 
colleagues who worked in the sector in the country (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Proportion of State sector staff in the city and country who had 
lived at the same address both 1 and 5 years prior to census 
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This contrasts with staff in the Commonwealth sector in Queensland. Commonwealth public 
sector staff in the Brisbane metropolitan area were 10 percentage points less likely than their 
Commonwealth colleagues who work in the country in Queensland to have had the same 
usual place of residence both one year and five years ago (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Proportion of Commonwealth sector staff in the city and country who 
had lived at the same address both 1 year and 5 years prior to census 
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Differences in mobility rates could be influenced by a number of factors. It could be that 
variations in mobility rates across the states are a result of factors or influences other than 
those that are related to the particular public sector. In other words, variations could be 
related to issues about the state itself rather than the particular employment sector. These sort 
of state variations are likely to be identified by examining the differences between the 
Commonwealth and State sectors in each of the states. All employment sectors, including the 
Commonwealth and State public sectors, who employ staff in a particular location would be 
likely to be influenced by factors that are specific to that locafion. So that if house prices or 
house availability is a factor that influences mobility rates in, say, Sydney or Mt Isa, it is 
likely to similarly impact upon both the Commonwealth and State sectors in those locations. 
It follows then that the difference between the mobility rates of staff in the Commonwealth 
and State sectors in like locafions is significant. 
In New South Wales the proportion of Commonwealth public sector staff in the country who 
had the same usual place of residence one year and five years prior to Census day in 1996 is 
45%, while the proportion of Commonwealth public sector staff in the city who had the same 
usual place of residence one year and five years prior to Census day in 1996 is 52%. The 
difference between these proportions is 7 percentage points. This difference can then be 
contrasted with the State public sector in New South Wales where 55% of the State public 
sector staff in the country had the same usual place of residence one year and five years prior 
to Census day in 1996 and 57% of State public sector staff in the country had the same usual 
place of residence one year and five years prior to Census day in 1996. The difference 
between these proportions is 2 percentage points. So whilst there is a 7 percentage point 
difference in the rates between the Commonwealth public sector staff in the city and country 
in NSW who had the same usual place of residence both one and five years prior to Census 
day in 1996, there is only a 2 percentage point difference between the State public sector staff 
in NSW in the same residential situation. (Figure 8) 
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Figure 8: Difference in percentage points between those in the Commonwealth 
sector and those in the State sector who lived at the same address both 1 year 
and 5 years prior to the census date in each of the States 
The difference between the percentage point variation between city and country staff in the 
Commonwealth and State sectors in Queensland is 10 while the difference in Victoria is 5, in 
Westem Australia is 7 and in New South Wales is 5 (Figure 8). In each state there is a 
greater variation between the mobility rates of the Commonwealth city and country staff than 
between the mobility rates of State city and country staff In all of the states. Commonwealth 
sector staff were more mobile than their colleagues in the State public sector. Another 
consistency evident in both the Commonwealth and State sectors in all states is that country 
staff were more mobile than city staff The data in Queensland however does appear to 
reveal some peculiarifies. Queensland Commonwealth country staff were considerably more 
mobile than their city colleagues. In addition the difference between the mobility rates of the 
city and country staff in the two sectors in Queensland was greatest - 10 percentage points. 
This contrasted with the differences in the rates in other states of 7, 5 and 5 (Figure 9). So 
Commonwealth public sector country staff in Queensland were considerably more mobile 
than State public sector country staff That is, when country staff were compared with city 
staff in the two different sectors in Queensland, Queensland State public sector staff in the 
country were considerably less mobile than Queensland Commonwealth public sector staff in 
the country. This suggests that Queensland state public sector staff located in the country are 
more likely than expected by state conditions to remain in the same place of usual residence. 
Page 114 
The Queensland Public Sector: Assessing the Goss Government Reforms 
Figure 9: Differences in percentage points difference between city and 
country staff in the Commonwealth and State sectors in each of the States 
EDUCATION LEVEL DATA 
Questions 22 to 26 on the 1996 Census Form (Appendix 1) seek information about the 
education level of Australians. The resulting Census data provides information about the 
highest educafional level that a person has achieved. Achievement is divided into five 
categories: 
• those who have obtained a degree or higher qualification; 
• those who have obtained a diploma; 
• those who have obtained a trade qualification certificate 
• those who have some other qualification; and 
• those who have obtained no qualificafion after leaving primary or secondary 
school. 
Whilst there is no research that I am aware of that suggests any direct link between the 
educational achievement of employees and the overall performance of an organisation, a 
major variation between the educational achievements of public sector employees in different 
jurisdictions would be of interest. Predicting whether there is likely to be a variation between 
the qualificafions of Queensland state public sector staff and their Commonwealth sector 
colleagues in the state is not a simple matter. There were two competing trends that it could 
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be reasonably assumed would have influenced the relative educational achievements of 
Queensland public sector staff in the state and the commonwealth sectors. On the one hand 
the state public sector had a practice for many years of recmiting students directly from high 
school on the basis of school results. There was no use of a selecfion test unfil the early 
1990s. This pracfice enshrined the nofion of educational achievement as the legifimate basis 
for employment. In other words it accepted educational achievement at high school as a 
direct predictor of future workplace competence. By contrast, in the Commonwealth sector 
recmitment was based on performance at a selection test designed to test the ability of the 
person to perform the tasks required of a public servant. The Commonwealth system 
enshrined the notion that the ability to do the job at hand was the most important criterion for 
success and placed emphasis on this. This emphasis has a dynamic dimension to it, focused 
as it is on the immediate job suitability of the person. The state system did not have this 
dynamic dimension in that it focused on past educational achievement for initial appointment. 
The state sector's approach to career advancement also had a comparatively static dimension 
to it. Although the stated policy for career advancement had been merit except in cases of 
equal merit when seniority was to be the criterion, as discussed previously, seniority or 
waiting for one's time, was the accepted basis on which advancement was determined. State 
public sector staff believed that they needed to wait their tum to get the next senior job. In a 
system like this there are few intrinsic motivators to improve one's career prospects by 
improving one's skills and therefore relative merit for a particular job. The comparatively 
dynamic nature of the Commonwealth system was reinforced by its long-term commitment to 
merit selection. In one sense, the only issue of importance to one's career in the 
Commonwealth sector was one's merit to undertake the job in question. So, whilst further 
study and wider experience could be helpfiil in improving one's skills, ulfimately one's 
ability to do the job was of most importance. It could be argued that this difference would be 
likely to result in greater incentive for Commonwealth public sector staff to increase their 
skills, as enhanced skills could translate to promotion. One way to increase skills would be 
through increased educational achievement. 
However, stafic as the state system was for the majority, it did appear to provide mofivation 
for a small but significant group of state public sector staff to increase their educational 
achievement. Some long term state public sector staff undertook higher degree qualifications 
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in an attempt to enhance their seniority (Interviews undertaken as part of this research and 
personal knowledge). For those keen to advance their careers and restless in waiting for their 
seniority to provide the answer, obtaining further academic qualifications provided an 
opportunity to draw attention to oneself and therefore advance one's claims to promotion on 
the grounds of superior merit. Higher academic qualifications provided an opportunity to 
skip up the seniority ladder. The state system was based on an acceptance that educational 
achievement per se resulted in enhanced merit for a particular job. There was no doubt an 
addifional motivator for state public sector staff to obtain higher educafional qualifications. 
The process of studying for a higher qualification would have brought state public sector staff 
into contact with a peer group that could provide the professional support and attention that it 
was likely were missing from their day to day working lives existing as they did in the 
"professionally unattended" sector (Coaldrake, 1992: 5). So, while on the one hand, for state 
public sector staff, the continuing influence of seniority provided little incenfive to obtain 
further educational qualifications, on the other hand its continued influence motivated those 
impafient for career advancement to obtain flirther educafional qualificafions in the hope that 
this would provide the key to unlocking the seniority barrier for them. 
On balance it seems a more likely proposifion that the educational achievement of state 
public sector staff would not be as great as the educational achievements of their 
commonwealth sector colleagues. 
Interpreting the Education Achievement Data 
A number of overall trends are evident in the 1996 Census data relating to educational 
achievement (Figures 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14). In each of the states a higher proportion of 
Commonwealth public sector staff have a degree or higher qualification than do their state 
public sector colleagues in that state. In Queensland 23% of Commonwealth public sector staff 
have a degree or higher qualificafion compared with 17% of their State public sector colleagues. 
In New South Wales, 27% of Commonwealth public sector staff have degrees or higher 
qualifications while 19% of their State public sector colleagues are similarly qualified. In 
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Victoria 28% of Commonwealth public sector staff compared with 24% of State public sector 
staff have degrees or higher qualifications, while in Westem Australia 27% of Commonwealth 
public sector staff compared with 18% of state public sector staff have degrees or higher 
qualifications. (Figure 10) 
Figure 10: Proportion of public sector staff with degrees or higher 
qualifications 
Figure 11: Proportion of public sector staff with diplomas 
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Figure 12: Proportion of public sector staff with trade qualifications 
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Figure 13: Proportion of public sector staff with other qualifications 
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Figure 14: Proportion of public sector staff with no formal qualifications 
Paradoxically, in each of the states except Westem Australia, a higher proportion of 
Commonwealth public sector staff also have no formal qualification when compared with 
their State sector colleagues in the same educational achievement category (Figure 14). In 
Queensland 56% of Commonwealth public sector staff have no formal qualifications while 
54% of State public sector staff fall into the same educafional achievement category. In New 
South Wales 46% of Commonwealth public sector staff compared with 44% of State public 
sector staff have no formal qualifications, while in Victoria 52% of Commonwealth public 
sector staff fall into this category compared with 46% of State public sector staff In Westem 
Australia the proportion of staff in the Commonwealth and State sectors who do not have 
formal qualifications is the same, 50% of Commonwealth public sector staff and 50% of 
State public sector staff do not have formal qualificafions. 
So, in each of the states, while the Commonwealth sector has a higher proportion of staff 
with degrees or a higher qualificafion, it also has (in all states except Westem Australia) a 
higher proportion of staff without any formal qualificafions. This difference may be 
explained by the nature of the work in the two sectors. The larger proportion of "trade" type 
work that is undertaken at the state level may resuh in the smaller proportion of staff in the 
state sectors being employed in areas that have traditionally been staffed by University 
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graduates. The consistency of the trend suggests that the explanafion for the difference lies in 
the nattire of work in the sectors. The data indicates, that consistently across the four states 
in the study, a higher proportion of state sector staff hold trade qualifications than do their 
commonwealth sector colleagues in the same state (Figure 12). 
Differences between the Commonwealth and State sectors, whilst being generally consistent, 
do vary a little in Victoria (Table 6). 
Table 6 Table of difference in percentage points between staff in each of the qualifications categories in 
the Commonwealth and State sectors in each State. 
(LE. % of Commonwealth staff with degrees- % of State staff with degrees) 
Degrees or Higher 
Qualifications 
Diplomas 
Trade Qualifications 
Other Qualifications 
No Formal Qualifications 
Queensland 
6 
0 
-7 
0 
2 
New South 
Wales 
8 
2 
-8 
-3 
2 
Victoria 
4 
-1 
-6 
-2 
6 
Western 
Australia 
9 
0 
-6 
.2 
0 
AVERAGE 
6.75 
0.25 
-6.75 
-1.75 
2.5 
In that state there is a difference of only four percentage points between those in the 
Commonwealth sector who hold degrees or higher qualificafions (28%) and those in the state 
sector who hold degrees or higher qualifications (24%). In New South Wales the difference 
is eight percentage points, in Westem Australia nine percentage points and in Queensland six 
percentage points. In addifion, in Victoria there is a greater than expected difference - based 
on the differences in the other states - between the proportion of staff in the Commonwealth 
and the proportion of staff in the State sector who have no formal qualifications. In 
Queensland the difference is two percentage points (56% in the Commonwealth and 54% in 
the State sector), in New South Wales the difference is two percentage points (46% in the 
Commonwealth and 44% in the State sector) and in Westem Australia the difference is zero 
percentage points with 50% of both the Commonwealth and State sector staff having no 
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formal qualificafions. In Victoria there is a six percentage point difference with 52% of the 
Commonwealth public sector compared with 46% of the state public sector without formal 
qualificafions. 
The noteworthy differences in comparisons in Victoria are not evident in Queensland data. 
The whole of state data on qualifications does not indicate that there are any differences in 
the comparisons between the Commonwealth sector data and State sector data in Queensland 
which would indicate that the profile of the Queensland State sector varies in any unexpected 
or significant ways from the profile of other state sectors when the Commonwealth sector in 
each state is regarded as the benchmark (Figures 15, 16, 17, 18 & 19). 
Figure 15: Percentage point difference in proportion of Commonwealth 
public sector staff and State public sector staff in each State with degrees 
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Figure 16: Percentage point difference between proportion of Commonwealth 
public sector staff and State public sector staff in each State with diplomas 
Figure 17: Percentage point difference between proportion of Commonwealth 
public sector staff and State public sector staff in each State with trade 
quaUfications 
Figure 17: Percentage Point Difference between Proportion of 
Commonwealth Public Sector Staff and State Public Sector Staffin 
each State with Trade Qualifications 
Page 123 
The Queensland Public Sector: Assessing the Goss Government Reforms 
Figure 18: Percentage point difference between proportion of 
Commonwealth public sector staff and State public sector staffin each 
State with other qualifications 
Figure 19: Percentage point difference between proportion of 
Commonwealth public sector staff and State public sector staffin each 
State with no formal qualifications 
There is however a feature that is evident in both the Commonwealth and State sectors in 
Queensland which suggests a Queensland state difference rather than a sector difference. 
When compared with the other Commonwealth and State sectors in the sttidy, and as 
illustrated in Figures 10 &14, both the Commonwealth and the State sectors in Queensland 
have the highest proportion of staff who have no academic qualifications and the lowest 
proportion of staff who have a degree or higher qualificafion. That is, in the public sectors in 
Queensland there are proportionally more people without any formal qualifications and 
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proportionally fewer people who have a degree or higher qualification than there are in the 
public sectors in the other states in this sttidy. This may be simply a reflecfion of the 
Queensland population as a whole in which there are fewer people with degrees & higher 
qualifications and more people with no formal academic qualifications. Altematively. it may 
be the resuU of a difference in the demographic profile of the populafion of people who opt to 
join public sectors in Queensland. Either way the feature is evident in both sectors and is 
therefore not peculiar to the state public sector alone. 
The Impact of Country/City Location on Educational Qualification 
When the data relafing to the educafional qualificafion levels of staff in the city in each of the 
states is isolated from and compared with the data relating to the educational qualification 
levels of staff in country areas in each of the states, a Queensland difference is revealed. The 
data from all of the states in the study show a consistent trend in both the sectors when the 
country/city breakdown is examined. 
Figure 20: Proportion of staff in sector in both city and country areas with degrees 
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Figure 21: Proportion of staff in sector in both city and country areas with diplomas 
Figure 22: Proportion of staff in sector in both city and country areas with trade 
qualifications 
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Figure 23: Proportion of staff in sector in both city and country areas with other 
aualifications 
Figure 24: Proportion of staff in sector in both city and country areas with no formal 
qualifications 
A higher proportion of city staffin all of the states and both of the sectors have a degree or 
higher qualification and a lower proportion of the country staffin all of the states and both of 
the sectors have no formal post-school qualifications (Figures 20, 21, 22, 23 & 24). In New 
South Wales, 30% of Commonwealth staffin Sydney have a degree or higher qualificafion 
compared with 21% of Commonwealth staffin country NSW. Similarly 23% of State public 
sector staff located in Sydney have a degree or higher qualification compared with 13% of 
State public sector staff located in country NSW. In Victoria 31% of Commonwealth public 
sector staff located in Melboume have a degree or higher qualificafion compared with 16% of 
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Commonwealth public sector staff located in country Victoria who have a degree or higher 
qualificafion. In the State sector in Victoria 28% of State public sector staff located in 
Melboume have a degree or higher qualification compared with 14% of State public sector 
staff located in country Victoria who have a degree or higher qualification. In Queensland 
24% of State public sector staff located in the city have degrees or higher qualifications 
compared with 10% of State public sector staff located in the country who have degrees or 
higher qualificafions. In the Commonwealth sector in Queensland 27% of staff located in the 
city have degrees or higher qualifications compared with 18% of the public sector staff 
located in the country who have degrees or higher qualifications. 
Whilst conditions that result in the achievement of different educafional outcomes vary from 
state to state, both the Commonwealth and State sectors in each state are subject to essentially 
the same state conditions in any one location. As noted earlier, both the Commonwealth and 
State public sectors in Queensland are characterised by fewer than expected staff with 
degrees or higher qualifications and a greater than expected number of staff with no formal 
qualifications. An even distribution of those staff between country and city would have been 
expected. A variation in the difference would be an unexpected result. Table 7 sets out the 
difference between the proportion of staff in each of the educational categories in each of the 
sectors in the city and in the country. 
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Table 7 Difference in percentage points between proportion of staff in the city and proportion of staff in 
the country in each educational category in both sectors in each State 
(% In City minus% in Country). 
Location 
Queensland 
Commonwealth 
Queensland 
State 
New South Wales 
Commonwealth 
New South Wales 
State 
Victoria 
Commonwealth 
Victoria 
State 
Westem Australia 
Commonwealth 
Westem Australia 
State 
Degree 
9% 
14% 
7% 
10% 
15% 
14% 
15% 
12% 
Diploma 
- 2 % 
0% 
0% 
0% 
- 2 % 
-1 % 
- 2 % 
4 % 
Trade 
- 2 % 
- 2 % 
- 2 % 
- 3 % 
- 2 % 
- 3 % 
- 3 % 
- 2 % 
Other 
- 2 % 
- 2 % 
- 4 % 
-2% 
- 2 % 
-1 % 
-2% 
0% 
No formal 
Qualifications 
- 3 % 
-10% 
- 5 % 
- 4 % 
-10% 
-12% 
-11 % 
-14% 
Table 8 sets out the variation in the percentage point differences between proportions of staff 
in the city and proportions of staff in the country in each educafional category in both sectors 
in each of the states. Figure 25 represents the variation between the percentage point 
differences between city and country staff across states and sectors for those who have 
degrees or higher qualifications and those who have no formal qualifications. 
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Table 8 Variation between percentage point differences between proportion of staff in the city and 
proportion of staff in the country in each educational category in both sectors in each State. 
(% in State minus % in Commonwealth) 
Location 
Queensland 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Western Australia 
Degree 
5 
3 
-1 
-3 
Diploma 
2 
0 
1 
6 
Trade 
0 
-1 
1 
-1 
Other 
0 
2 
-1 
-2 
No Formal 
Qualifications 
7 
-1 
2 
3 
Table 8 and Figure 25 indicate that the variation between the Commonwealth and State 
sectors in Brisbane and in country Queensland is greater than the variation between the 
Commonwealth and State sectors in the metropolitan and country areas in other states and 
greater than expected in relation to both those with degrees and higher qualifications and 
those with no formal post-school qualifications. 
Figure 25: Variation between percentage point differences between city 
and country staff across States and sectors for degrees and higher 
qualifications and no formal qualifications 
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Whilst 27% of Commonwealth public sector staffin Brisbane have degrees or higher 
qualifications, 18% of Commonwealth public sector staffin country Queensland have 
degrees or higher qualificafions - a difference of 9 percentage points - 24% of State public 
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sector staffin Brisbane have degrees or higher qualificafions, compared with 10% of State 
public sector staffin country Queensland who have degrees or higher qualificafions. This is 
a difference of 14 percentage points. The variation between the percentage point differences 
of the commonwealth and state sectors is therefore 5. This compares with an average 
percentage point difference between the commonwealth and state jurisdictions in the other 
states of 1 (3,-1 and -3 in the other states). This means that the Queensland state public 
sector has a higher than expected clustering of staff with degrees or higher qualifications in 
Brisbane and a lower than expected distribution of staff with degrees or higher qualificafions 
in country Queensland. A similar variation between country and city is evident when the 
distribufion of Queensland State Public sector staff without formal post school qualificafions 
is examined across the city and country. There is a 7 percentage point variation in the 
difference between the distribution of staff without formal post-school qualificafions in 
Brisbane and country Queensland compared with an average percentage point difference 
between the distribution of similarly classified staff in the city and country of the other states 
of 3.25 (-1, 2 and 3 percentage point difference in the other states) (See Tables 4 & 5). This 
suggests that there are more staff without formal post-school qualificafions than would be 
expected in country areas in the Queensland state public sector and fewer staff without 
formal post school qualifications than would be expected in the metropolitan area in the 
Queensland State public sector. 
This data indicates a notable difference between the profile of city and country staffin the 
Queensland state public sector which is greater than the one that would be expected based on 
other state sectors in this study. Staff without formal post-school qualifications are over-
represented and staff with degrees or higher qualifications are under-represented in the 
Queensland State public sector outside Brisbane. This means that the educational profile of 
State public sector staff who work in country Queensland is considerablv different from the 
profile of State public sector staff who work in the Brisbane area. This difference between 
country and city staffin the state sector varies considerably from the difference between 
county and city staff who work for the Commonwealth public sector in Queensland and from 
the difference between county and city staff who work for both Commonwealth and State 
Govemments in the other states in this study - New South Wales, Victoria and Western 
Australia. 
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AGE DATA 
Quesfion 4 on the 1996 Populafion Census form (Appendix 1) seeks informafion about a 
person's age at their last birthday. The age data obtained for this sUidy from the 1996 
Populafion Census groups the population into four age categories: 
• 15-24 Year Olds; 
• 2 5 - 4 4 Year Olds; 
• 4 5 - 5 4 Year Olds and 
• 55 Years and Over. 
The history of the QPS does not provide any real pointers to trends that might be evident 
when the age profile of QPS staff is compared with the age profile of staff in other sectors. 
Whilst, on the one hand, the lengthy period of conservative Govemment combined with a 
professional neglect of the public sector suggests stability and perhaps as a consequence an 
age profile that reveals a disproportionately higher number of older workers, on the other 
hand, the state sector always maintained a robust recmitment program for school leavers who 
were recmited on the basis of their school results. This constant stream of young recmits 
would have been likely to keep the age profile more balanced. Furthermore the data used in 
this study was collected in 1996 - following six years of Goss govemment. During that six 
year period the longstanding age profile may have changed as a consequence of the reforms 
and new programs. There was certainly a percepfion within the sector at the time of the Goss 
change of govemment that "longstanding" and "established" whether these adjectives be 
applied to policies or people were no longer given the value they had once been. These 
complicating and contradictory factors do not provide a clear basis on which to predict any 
age profile differences between the Queensland state public sector and other state 
jurisdictions. 
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Interpreting the Age Data 
A comparison of the age profiles of the different jurisdicfions reveals strong similarities. The 
age profiles of the Commonwealth sectors in the states in the study show very strong 
similarifies. Whilst the State sectors also show strong similarities, there is more variation 
between the State sector profiles than between the Commonwealth profiles (Table 9). 
Table 9 Percentage of staff in each sector in each of the age categories. 
State 
Queensland State 
Queensland Commonwealth 
New South Wales State 
New South Wales Commonwealth 
Victoria State 
Victoria Commonwealth 
Western Australia State 
Western Australia Commonwealth 
15-24 Years 
10.40% 
7.60% 
8.30% 
7.50% 
9.10% 
7.10% 
8.00% 
7.20% 
25-44 Years 
56.10% 
57.30% 
53.90% 
61.10% 
57.30%, 
62.80% 
53.10% 
58.80% 
45-54 Years 
24.20% 
25.70% 
27.10% 
22.40% 
25.20% 
21.80% 
28.60% 
24.60% 
55 Years & 
Over 
9.30% 
9.40% 
10.70% 
9.00% 
8.40% 
8.30% 
10.30% 
9.40% 
In the Commonwealth sector the most significant variafions between the proportions of staff 
in each of the age categories across all the states occurs in the 25 - 44 age group and the 45 -
54 year old group. In the 25 - 44 age group there is a variafion of 3.8 percentage points 
between staffin the Commonwealth sector in Queensland with 57.3% of staff in this category 
and staffin the Commonwealth sector in Victoria with 62.8% of staff in the age category. In 
the 45 - 54 age group there is a variation of 3.9 percentage points between Victoria with 
21.8% and Queensland with 25.7% in the age group. The other variafions within the 
Commonwealth sectors across the states are 0.5 percentage points in the 15 - 24 age group 
and 1.4 percentage points between the proportions in the 55 and over group. So the 
Commonwealth public sector in Queensland has fewer staffin the 25 - 44 age group and 
more staffin the 45 - 54 year age group than Commonwealth sectors in other states (Figure 
26). 
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Figure 26: Proportion of staff from Commonwealth sector in each of the States in 
each of the age categories 
Comparing the state sectors (Figure 27), the percentage point variations between each of the 
age groups are higher than those of the Commonwealth sector. 
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Figure 27: Proportion of staff from State sector in each of the States in each of the age 
categories 
The most notable variations are again in the 25 - 44 year age group with a 4.2 percentage 
point variation and the 45 - 54 year age group with a 4.4 percentage point variation. Of 
interest in the Queensland state sector is that it has the lowest proportion of staff in the 45 -
54 year age group. In other words, a lower proportion of staff in the Queensland State Sector 
are in the 45 - 54 age group than are in that age group in all of the other State sectors in the 
study. The variation between the state sectors in the 15 - 24 year and the 55 years and over 
age groups are more pronounced than those in the Commonwealth with a variation of 2.4 
percentage points in the 15 - 24 year age group (0.5 percentage points in the Commonwealth 
sector) and 2.3 percentage points in the 55 years and over age group (1.4 percentage points in 
the Commonwealth sector). Notwithstanding these variations there are very strong 
similarifies between all of the Commonwealth sectors and strong similarifies between all of 
the state sectors. 
In each of the states the Commonwealth public sector has a higher proportion of staff in the 
25 -44 Year age category than the local state sector. In New South Wales 61.1% of the 
Commonwealth sector falls within this age group compared with 53.9% of the State sector. 
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In Queensland 57.3% of the Commonwealth sector are in the 25 - 44 Year age category 
while 56.1% of the State sector are within that age category. Sixty-two point eight percent 
(62.8%) of the Commonwealth public sector in Victoria is aged between 24 and 44 years 
while 57.3% of the State public sector is in the same age category. In Westem Australia, 
58.8% of the Commonwealth sector is in the 25 - 44 age group compared with 53.1% of the 
State sector who are in the same age group (Table 9). 
However state public sectors in each of the states in the study have a higher proportion of 
their staffin the 15 - 24 year age group. In Queensland 10.4% of the state sector is aged 15 -
24 years while 7.6% of the Commonwealth sector is in the same age category. This 
represents a 2.8 percentage point difference. In New South Wales 8.3% of the state sector 
compared with 7.5% of the Commonwealth sector (a 0.8 percentage point difference); in 
Victoria 9.1% of the state sector compared with 7.1% of the Commonwealth sector (a 2.0 
percentage point difference) and in Westem Australia 8% of the state sector compared with 
7.2% of the Commonwealth sector (a 0.8 percentage point difference) are in the 15 - 24 year 
old age group (Table 10). In each of the states being considered in this study, the state public 
sector has a higher proportion of young staff than does the Commonwealth sector in that 
state. This difference is most pronounced in Queensland. 
Table 10 Percentage point difference in proportion of staff in each of the age categories between the 
Commonwealth and State sectors in each State 
(% State Sector minus % Commonwealth Sector) 
State 
Queensland 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Westem Australia 
Average 
15-24 
Years 
2.80 
0.80 
2.00 
0.80 
1.60 
25-44 Years 
1.20 
-7.20 
-5.50 
-5.70 
-4.90 
45-54 Years 
1.50 
4.70 
3.40 
4.00 
2.65 
55 Years & 
Over 
0.10 
1.70 
0.10 
0.90 
0.65 
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In addition, in all states except Queensland the State public sector has a higher proportion of 
staffin the 45 - 54 year age group than does the Commonwealth sector in that state (Table 10 
and Figure 28). 
Figure 28: Percentage point difference in proportion of staff in each of the age 
categories between the Commonwealth and State sectors in each State 
(% State sector minus % Commonwealth sector) 
In Queensland the variations in the 45 - 54 year age group noted earlier results in a higher 
proportion of staff of the Commonwealth public sector being in the 45 - 54 age group when 
compared with their state colleagues. Twenty-five point seven percent (25.7%) of the 
Commonwealth public sector staffin Queensland are in the 45 - 54 age group while 24.2% 
of the State public sector are in the same age category. In the other states the proportion of 
State public sector staff in this age category is 4 to 5 percentage points more than the 
proportion of staff in this age category in the Commonwealth sector. Based on the other 
states in the study, staff in the 45 - 54 vear age group are underrepresented in the Queensland 
State public sector. 
In summary, the pattem of difference between the proportions of staff in each of the age 
categories in the Commonwealth and the State sectors in each of the states is consistent 
except for Queensland. In Queensland the State public sector has more staffin both the 15 -
24 and 25 - 44 age categories than would be expected and fewer staffin the 45 - 54 and 55 & 
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above age categories than would be expected. This means that using the comparison between 
the Commonwealth and State sectors in New South Wales, Victoria and Westem Australia as 
the benchmark, staff of the Queensland public sector are considerablv vounger than expected. 
In the states other than Queensland the proportion of State public sector staff in the 15 - 44 
age group (combining the 15 - 24 and the 25 - 44 age groups) is 10, 6 and 4 percentage 
points respecfively lower than the proportion of Commonwealth public sector staffin that 
state in those age groups. If the age profile of Queensland public sector staff was similar to 
that of the other states, the proportion of the staffin the 15 - 44 age groups would be between 
55% and 62%. However the actual proportion of the Queensland public sector in these age 
groups is 66%. Consistent with this pattem, the Queensland State public sector has fewer 
staffin the age groups 45 - 55 vears and 55years and above. The proportion of staff in the 
Queensland public sector in these two older age groups is 33.5% while the predicted 
proportion of the sector in this group is between 45% and 38%. 
In summarv, staffin the 15-44 age groups in the QPS are over represented and staffin the 
45 and older age groups are under represented when compared with other public sectors in 
the study. 
The Impact of County/City Location on Age Data 
When the distribution of staff between the city and country is also considered, there appears 
to be another dimension to the over representation of the younger age groupings and under 
representafion of the older age groupings in the Queensland Public Sector. In the Queensland 
state sector the oldest (55 years old and over) age group is over represented in the country 
and the youngest (15 - 24 years old) age group is under represented in the country. This 
pattem is not repeated in any other public sector in the study. 
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Table 11 Distribution of staff in city and country in all sectors in all states 
Sector 
Qld State City 
Qld State Country 
Qld Commonwealth City 
Qld Commonwealth Country 
NSW State City 
NSW State Country 
NSW Commonwealth City 
NSW Commonwealth Country 
Vic State City 
Vic State Country 
Vic Commonwealth City 
Vic Commonwealth Country 
WA State City 
WA State Country 
WA Commonwealth City 
WA Commonwealth Country 
Total 
52.60% 
47.40% 
60.80% 
39.20% 
63.30% 
36.70% 
65.10% 
34.90% 
71.70% 
28.30% 
79.80% 
20.20% 
74.40% 
25.60% 
84.80% 
15.20% 
15-24 Years 
57.00% 
43.00% 
59.70% 
40.30% 
65.70% 
34.30% 
62.20% 
37.80% 
74.70% 
25.30% 
77.80% 
22.20% 
73.90% 
26.10% 
84.10% 
15.90",, 
25-44 Years 
52.40% 
47.60% 
60.70% 
39.30% 
62.30% 
37.70% 
64.90% 
35.10% 
71.50% 
28.50% 
80.70% 
19.30% 
73.30% 
26,70% 
84.70"« 
15.30% 
45-54 Years 
52.50% 
47.50% 
64.10% 
35.90% 
63.10% 
36.90% 
66.80% 
33.20% 
70.20% 
29.80% 
79.80% 
20.20% 
76.40"o 
23.60% 
86.50% 
13.50% 
55 Years & 
Over 
48.90% 
51.10% 
53.60% 
46.40% 
66.70% 
33.30% 
64.30% 
35.70% 
74.30% 
25.20% 
74.30% 
25.70% 
74.50% 
25.50% 
80.90% 
19.10% 
In the Queensland Public Sector 52.6% of staff are located in the city (Table 11). However 
the proportion of the 55 years old age group located in the city is 48.9% - 3.9 percentage 
points lower than the overall proportion of staff located in the city and lower than the 
expected distribution of this age group in the city. The 48.9% of the 55 years old and older 
group is also lower than the proportion of any of the other age groups located in the city 
(57.0% of 15 - 24 year olds, 52.4% of 25 - 44 year olds and 52.5% of the 45 - 54 year olds). 
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Given the already established overall under-representation of the older age groupings in the 
Queensland Public Sector, this addifional trend with older workers being more likely than 
expected to be in the country suggests an even more substantial under representation of older 
workers in the city. Older workers are in general and almost by definition more experienced 
and are generally well represented in the pool of people from which the most senior positions 
are filled, so the under-representation of older workers in the city constitutes an under-
representafion of more experienced workers in the pool of people from which the more senior 
positions are usually filled. 
To determine whether this Queensland Public Sector difference is a result of a feature of the 
Queensland Public Sector alone or whether it is as a result of a state variafion, it is necessary 
to also examine data from the Commonwealth sector in Queensland. Even though the 
Commonwealth public sector in Queensland is not as decentralised as the State Sector 
(47.4% of the State Sector is located in the country compared with 39.2% of the 
Commonwealth Sector) it is still more decentralised than any other public sector (both 
Commonwealth and State) in this study (Table 11). An examination of the data of the 
Commonwealth sector shows that the 55 years and older age group is also over-represented 
in the country. Forty-six point four percent (46.4%) of all Commonwealth public sector staff 
in Queensland in the 55 years and older age group are located in the country compared with 
the overall average of only 39.2% of Commonwealth public sector staffin Queensland who 
are located in the country - a 7.2 percentage point difference. So the Commonwealth public 
sector in Queensland has an even higher over representation of the 55 years and older age 
group in the country than does the State public sector. This suggests that the over 
representation is the result of a characterisfic of the state. 
One possible explanafion for this Queensland phenomenon is that a higher proporfion of the 
Queensland population who are 55 years and older live in country Queensland than live in 
the Brisbane area. Another possible explanafion is that the decentralisafion of Queensland, 
including public sectors in Queensland, resuhs in a higher proportion of more senior jobs 
being located in the country. 
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Consideration of the youngest age group in the Queensland Public Sector also reveals an 
interesting trend. Forty-three percent (43.0%) of the 15-24 year old group are located in the 
country while the expected proportion of 15 - 24 year olds in the country is 47.4% (the 
proportion of staff overall located in the country). So this youngest group of Queensland 
public sector staff are under-represented by 4.4 percentage points in the country. In the case 
of this group a comparison with the youngest age group in the Commonwealth sector in 
Queensland reveals that the same trend is not evident. Forty point three percent (40.3%) of 
Commonwealth Public Sector staffin the 15 - 24 year old age group are located in the 
country compared with an expected proportion of 39.2%. This represents a I.l percentage 
point difference making it not as substanfial as the 4.4 percentage point difference in the state 
sector. On this basis, the higher proportion of younger staffin the city in the State Sector in 
Queensland and the correspondingly lower proportion of younger staffin the country in the 
State Sector in Queensland does not appear to be the result of specific state or Queensland 
conditions but rather a characteristic of the Queensland State Public Sector. 
Could it, however, be the result of a difference between a state sector and a commonwealth 
sector? It may be possible that the nature of work in state sectors results in a higher 
proportion of jobs generally undertaken by the younger age groups being located in the city. 
If this was the case the data relating to this age group from the other sectors in this study 
would be likely to show a similar trend. However the data does not show this as a consistent 
trend. It also shows that the over-representation of workers in the youngest age group in the 
city is more substantial in Queensland than in any other state (Table 12). 
Table 12 Proportion of State public sector staffin the 15-24 age group located in the country. 
State 
Queensland 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Westem Australia 
Expected Proportion 
47.40% 
36.70% 
28.30% 
25.60% 
Actual Proportion 
43% 
34.30% 
25.30% 
26.10% 
Difference in 
Percentage Points 
4.40% 
2.40% 
3.00% 
-0.50% 
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In the New South Wales public sector 34.3% of 15 - 24 year olds are located in the country 
compared with 36.7% of all staff who are located in the country. This represents a 2.4 
percentage point under-representation in the country. In the Victorian State public sector 
25.3% of the 15-24 year old age group are located in the country compared with 28.3% of 
all Victorian public sector staff who are located in the country. In Victoria there is a 3.0 
percentage point difference between the actual number of staff in the youngest age group 
who are located in the country and the expected representation of this group in the country. 
In Westem Australia the trend is reversed and there are more of this age group in the country 
than the overall total would suggest there might be. Twenty-six point one percent (26.1%) of 
the 15 - 24 year olds in the state sector are located in the country compared with 25.6% of 
the public sector overall (Figures 29 &30). This is a 0.5 percentage point difference. The 
mean percentage point difference between the actual and the expected proportion of the 15 -
24 year old age group within state public sectors who are located in the country is 2.3. The 
variation of Queensland from the mean is 2.1 - a considerable variafion which suggests that 
under-representation of the youngest age group in the country represents a real difference in 
the Queensland public sector. 
Figure 29: Proportion of State public sector staff in the 15 - 24 year age group 
located in the city and country 
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Figure 30: Percentage point difference between actual and expected proportion of 
State public sector staff in the 15-24 year age group located in the city and 
country 
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So the youngest aRe group - the 15-24 vear old group - which it has been established is 
over-represented in the Queensland Public Sector, is not equally over-represented in the 
county and the city. The over-representation is concentrated in the city. So despite the fact 
that the Queensland Public Sector does well in employing the youngest age group, it does 
significantly less well in the country than it does in the city. 
CONCLUSION 
ABS data provides a basis on which some key demographic characteristics of staff of the 
Queensland Public Sector can be examined and compared with the same key demographic 
characteristics of staff in other public sector jurisdictions in order to idenfify if there are 
differences between the personal characteristics of Queensland public sector staff and the 
personal characteristics of staff in other jurisdictions. While the data does reveal some 
interesfing differences, the demographic similarifies between QPS staff and staffin other 
jurisdicfions are more significant than the demographic differences. It therefore seems 
unlikely that differences in the outcomes of reform programs in the Queensland public sector 
can be adequately explained by differences in the personal characteristics of Queensland 
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public sector employees. Nonetheless this study has revealed a number of disfinguishing 
features of the Queensland public sector including: 
• The Queensland public sector is markedly more decentralised than any other public 
sector in the study; and 
• While staff from both the Commonwealth and State public sectors in Queensland are 
more mobile than their colleagues in other states, Queensland state public sector staff 
who work in country areas are less mobile than their city colleagues in that sector and 
are more likely than expected by state conditions to remain in their same place of 
residence; and 
• While in both the Commonwealth and State sectors in Queensland staff are more 
likely to have no formal academic qualifications and less likely to have a degree or 
higher formal qualification than staffin other public sectors, Queensland state public 
sector staff who work in the country are less likely than their colleagues in the city to 
have a degree or formal academic qualificafion and more likely to have no formal 
academic qualifications; and 
• While staff of the Queensland public sector are younger than expected when 
compared with their colleagues in other sectors, with an over-representafion of the 15 
- 24 year old age, this youngest group of staff are not evenly distributed across the 
sector and are under-represented in the country. 
In the Queensland public sector, country staff are: 
• less mobile; 
• more likely to have no formal qualifications and less likely to have a degree or higher 
formal qualification; and 
• more likely to be older than their city colleagues. 
These characteristics do distinguish Queensland public sector staff from the staff of other 
jurisdictions in the study and taking the distinguishing features into account when planning 
and implementing reform programs would undoubtedly be helpful in assisfing those reform 
programs have maximum impact. Nonetheless, while they are unlikely to account in any 
significant way for the limited success of the QPS refonn programs discussed in this study. 
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they are likely to have contributed to the development of the unique situation of the 
Queensland public sector. 
The profile of Queensland public sector country staff suggests that this group may be less 
used to change in that they are likely to have experienced fewer workplaces than their city 
colleagues. It also suggests that they may approach change differently in that they are older 
and may respond to information in a different way given their different educational 
achievement profile. It certainly suggests that account should be taken of the difference 
when developing techniques to engage the whole sector with change. 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that considerafion of this difference occurred in the 
implementafion of the Goss Govemment reforms. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 5, there is 
little evidence to suggest that careful consideration of the process for introducing change 
occurred. Given the substanfial number of country QPS staff- almost half (47.4%) of staff 
in the QPS - the vastness of Queensland and the resultant remoteness of country staff from 
the central policy makers and the apparent failure to pay close enough attention to the use of 
robust communicafion strategies, it is possible that the different demographic profiles of the 
State public sector staff has influenced the manner in which implementafion of change has 
proceeded. Given the tendency for policy fianctions to be concentrated in central offices and 
service delivery funcfions to be concentrated in regional or country areas, it is possible that 
the impact has been most profound in service delivery areas. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The features which characterise the Queensland Public Sector today are, as they must be, the 
result of its history. This study has considered a number of those features in an attempt to 
understand why the Goss Govemment reforms had limited impact. It has examined the 
history of reform of the QPS prior to the implementafion of the Goss reforms of the early 
1990's and suggested that this history had included limited reflecfion or systemic reform. 
The QPS has not had periodic opportunities to take stock and refocus as have been afforded 
to other public sectors in this country by the significant Inquiries, Reviews and Commissions 
that have been undertaken. This study argues that the contributions of the Savage Review to 
reforming the QPS were narrow in their focus and limited in their rigour and contends that 
the sector was not the subject of significant and systemafic reform prior to the introduction of 
the Goss reforms. The study contends that the Savage Review failed to address a number of 
fundamental public sector management issues. It acknowledges the success of the Fitzgerald 
Commission of Inquiry in exposing and addressing institutional corruption in the state and in 
highlighfing areas of concem in relation to public sector management, but argues that in spite 
of these successes the Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry did not provide, nor intend to 
provide, a blueprint for public sector management reform. 
As a consequence of what is assessed to be a dearth of comprehensive reform activity, this 
study shows that a number of significant inadequacies have persisted in the QPS. These are 
idenfified in the study and include that the Queensland Public Sector: retains some outdated 
policies and pracfices; is inexperienced in systematic reform and has a consequenfial lack of 
expertise in this field at both an organisational and individual level; and is characterised by 
the absence of any clear articulation of the proper relationships between Parliament, the 
Judiciary and Executive Govemment. This study documents that such an articulation is 
likely to occur routinely as part of a comprehensive review and argues that had the 
Queensland public sector been fortunate enough to undergo such a review it would have been 
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likely to acquire such an articulation as well as a clarification of roles, responsibilities and 
expectations for staff. 
In the course of undertaking this analysis of the Queensland public sector pre-Goss, this 
study examined the details of public sector reform acfivity in jurisdictions across Australia. 
It identified strong similarities between the reform activities of other jurisdictions, including 
the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Westem Australia and 
highlights the significant difference between the experiences of these jurisdictions and the 
Queensland public sector experience. 
The sUidy next undertook a comprehensive analysis of the Goss reforms. It concluded that 
despite the ambitious and long overdue nature of these reforms, a number of fundamental 
areas were not addressed. It concluded that the Goss reforms included a large number of 
widely accepted contemporary public sector reform initiatives which had been components of 
the earlier reform agendas of other jurisdicfions. However, significantly, it contends that the 
Goss reform program failed to directly address and reform the authoritarian management 
style and culture that existed in the sector. The study notes that the Goss reform program 
also failed to successfully articulate its vision, compounding the already significant problem 
of the lack of philosophical direction of the sector. 
In order to assess the Goss reforms, the study searched for suitable evaluative frameworks. It 
examined the exisfing frameworks offered by Self (1978), Halligan & Power (1992) and 
Wilenski (1986) and concludes that the available frameworks primarily examine inputs into 
reform programs and evaluate at the theoretical level rather than critically assessing the 
effectiveness of outcomes of reform at a pracfical level. It concludes that these frameworks 
are inadequate for making a comprehensive assessment of the long-term change secured by a 
reform program and consequently constmcts a more effective framework. My constmcted 
framework extends existing evaluafive frameworks and facilitates examination of both the 
products (or content) of a reform program and the processes utilised in implementing that 
content. 
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My framework ufilizes two dimensions to assess these feafiires. In the first dimension 
assessment of the content of reform programs across three arenas, polifical/institutional, 
social/responsiveness and efficient/administrafive, can be undertaken. The second dimension 
enables assessment of the processes used in implementing the contents or products of the 
reform program. Assessment in the second dimension is undertaken by determining the 
extent to which the processes used in implementafion exhibit the characteristics identified by 
researchers (Dunphy & Dick, 1981 and Wilenski, 1986) as necessary components of 
successful change programs. 
The framework thus contributes an effective tool for more thorough and practical 
assessments of reform programs. It ufilizes the nofion that the success of reform is only 
gauged through an assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of both the content of 
the reform program and the process by which it is implemented. It should assist not only 
reformers in designing a reform program and in determining what needs to follow in terms of 
a thoughtfully and deliberately designed implementafion plan, but also evaluators in 
monitoring the effectiveness of those implementation plans and ultimately in assessing the 
overall effectiveness of reform programs. 
This study then used the constmcted framework to assess the Goss reforms. The assessment 
demonstrates that although the reforms were wide ranging and ambitious, they failed in terms 
of both their products and processes to be optimally effecfive. It finds that the products of 
the reforms were deficient in that they lacked an effectively articulated vision of reform and a 
plan for achieving that vision. The ultimate absence of the planned employee participation 
initiafives was a serious deficiency. The study flirther documents that this lack of direct 
challenge to the existing authoritarian management style undermined achievement of a new 
management culture and that the need to achieve this new management culture was 
fundamental to the achievement of a new order. More specifically the study argues that an 
assessment of the products of the reform package against the three arenas of the First 
Dimension of the constmcted framework (polifical/institufional, social/responsiveness and 
efficient/administrative) reveals them to be less than optimal in all these arenas. It reasons 
that because the traditional ways of decision making and achieving an outcome were not 
direcfiy challenged and a picture of the desirable end state with which public sector staff 
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could engage was not effectively sketched, the products of the reform program were 
deficient. 
When the reforms are assessed against the Second Dimension of the framework, the study 
demonstrates that the processes employed to effect the reforms were also not appropriate. It 
examines each of the reforms' processes and argues that while some of those the Second 
Dimension recipe required were present, a number were not. Although the political will to 
achieve the change appears to have been present, the processes employed in implementing 
the products of reform failed to win the support of key stakeholders including, significantly, 
the major public sector union. The study further contends that staff were not adequately 
engaged in the reform program and that the program did not include the genuine participation 
and involvement of those affected. In addition it argues that the timing was not ideal in that 
the heightened community expectation of change as a result of the Fitzgerald Commission of 
Inquiry meant that it became more difficult for the reformers to take the time necessary to 
"clear the path" for change. 
In short the study concludes that the Goss reforms were less well deliberately planned and 
implemented than they needed to be for maximum impact. The processes used in 
implementing the changes reinforced rather than challenged the existing management 
pracfices and failed to ufilize the opportunity to model new ways of managing. Ultimately 
this had an enormous negative impact on the overall achievement of change. The study 
identifies that initiatives included in the reform package that would have contributed in this 
area, including formal employee participative and consultafive processes, were silently 
ignored and not implemented. Neither the products of the Goss Reform package nor the 
processes engaged to implement those reforms fijlly complied with the ideal model as 
idenfified in the constmcted framework for evaluating the effectiveness of reform. 
The study also examined personal characteristics of Queensland public sector staff to identify 
whether the talents and abilities of staff in the Queensland public sector differed in any 
significant ways from the talents and abilities of public sector staffin other jurisdicfions. If 
differences in personal characteristics existed, it might be possible to attribute different 
outcomes in public sector reform to these differences. Analysis of the demographic profiles 
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as idenfified through ABS Census data has shown that the similarities between staffin a 
number of jurisdicfions are more significant than the differences and although the 
demographic profile of Queensland public sector staff does vary from the profile typical of 
Australian jurisdictions, the variation does not provide adequate explanation of differing 
outcomes. Nevertheless analysis has shown that there are unexpected differences between 
the demographic profile of Queensland Public Sector city staff and Queensland Public Sector 
country staff that, it suggests, were not considered in implementing the Goss reforms. The 
study shows that QPS staffin the country are less mobile than their city colleagues, are more 
likely to have no formal qualifications and less likely to have a degree or higher qualificafion, 
and are more likely to be older than their city colleagues. The study argues that this 
difference, not present in other state jurisdictions, may have contributed in a small way to the 
less than successful implementafion of the Goss reform program particularly in relafion to 
service delivery, which is the primary focus of country public sector offices. 
The study notes that the more recent (Bradley & Parker, 2000; Parker & Bradley 2000; 
Bradley & Parker 2006) research supports the proposition that the expected fiindamental 
change in management practice in the Queensland public sector has not occurred. It suggests 
that the research which shows the culture of the Queensland public sector in 2000 to be 
predominantly authoritarian and to exhibit the characteristics of a traditional bureaucracy, 
rather than the flexible and outward focused characteristics of a modem bureaucracy, 
confirms that no major cultural change, such as might have been expected as a result of the 
reform program, has occurred in Queensland. 
This has profound implications. Not only is it likely that the public sector is less than 
optimally responsive to the policies of the govemment of the day, and therefore less effective 
in implemenfing the govemment's agenda, but it is also likely that the quality of the service 
provided to the Queensland community by the public sector is less than the best. Most 
profound, however, are the implications for the way in which any elected Queensland 
Govemment might approach reform of the public sector in the future. 
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RECOMMENDATIOINS FOR FUTURE REFORM INITIATIVES 
The findings of this research suggest some avenues for future action. Most importantly they 
suggest that Queensland public sector reform programs must be cognisant of the distinctive 
features of the sector. That is, they should not assume that the elements of reform programs 
successfiiUy adopted and implemented in other Australian jurisdictions will necessarily 
become elements of successful reform programs in Queensland. Reformers must make 
honest assessments of the Queensland public sector and design reform programs that take 
account of those assessments. The persisting traditional authoritarian bureaucratic pracfices 
and culture must be deliberately and systematically addressed. Reformers must remember 
and be prepared to leam from the unsuccessful attempts at reform to avoid similar failures. 
The content or products of the reform programs must reflect an honest and frank assessment 
of what is required and the process or implementation strategy must exemplify the kind of 
practice that is being advocated. At the same time the content or products of the reform 
program must both take account of the distinctive features of the sector and counteract the 
perceived deficits in the process of implementafion of the reform. Most significantly the 
process by which the reforms are implemented must be the focus of greater attenfion. 
Careful planning and methodical implementation must be features of reform programs in the 
Queensland public sector in the fufiire. It is essential that reform programs include a well 
planned implementation strategy which is consistently, deliberately and methodically 
implemented in order to maintain the effort over time and in order for the reform program to 
move from being a superficial, halfhearted stab at change to being the vehicle of genuine 
change. 
In the fime since the Goss govemment lost office neither of the two subsequent govemments 
has deliberately addressed management practice in the public sector. Rather, govemments 
have relied on their chosen stmctural changes to influence management pracfice. This 
approach appears to be based on the assumpfion that stmctural changes will inevitably result 
in altered behaviour, including improved management practices. The approach has not been 
effective. The Borbidge govemment did not undertake reform measures to address the 
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fundamental management issues, though it did implement other contemporary public sector 
change initiafives. The present Beattie govemment has similarly not undertaken reforms that 
address the 'pracfice of management', though initiatives implemented by it have included 
machinery of govemment changes designed to move some public sector services (including, 
for example, portions of the electricity industry) more clearly into private sector inspired 
economic frameworks in the quest to realise efficiencies. That both these govemments, 
representing as they do opposite polifical poles, appear to have made the same disfinctions 
between the achievable and the unachievable suggests that the perceived electoral influence 
of public sector staff has also played a role in influencing public sector reform in Queensland. 
The view at the fime of the election of the Goss govemment was that public sector staff had 
voted for change. The public sector unions certainly warmly welcomed the elecfion of the 
first Goss govemment. The percepfion of many commentators at the fime of the defeat of the 
Goss govemment was that the disaffection of public sector staff was a deciding factor. The 
incoming Borbidge govemment seemed to be of this view and so took what was assessed as 
being a conciliatory, uncontroversial approach to public sector changes. This also was the 
approach of the first Beattie Govemment, with promises of recognising the concems of 
public sector staff; e.g., soon after taking office the Beatfie Govemment placed a ban on 
outsourcing of tasks, a move warmly welcomed by staff. Moreover both the Borbidge and 
Beattie govemments appeared keen to keep the Queensland public sector on side by 
promising employment security and by recognising the stress of reform programs on staff 
These timid approaches to reform that by any reasonable measure must be assessed as urgent 
suggest that political parties in Queensland believe that the vote of public sector staff is 
cmcial to their political survival and therefore the safest approach electorally is to eschew the 
kind of reform program that may cause short term discomfort for public sector staff. 
If this is the case (and further research in this field on the voting pattems of public sector staff 
is necessary), it suggests strongly that future public sector management reform in Queensland 
would be most effectively achieved with bi-partisan support. One way to endeavour to 
secure this would be to undertake future reform under the guidance or oversight of a bi-
partisan ParUamentary Committee which could focus on the reform of the public sector as a 
strategic activity to secure the long-term viability of the state. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
There is a pressing need to understand more about the issues relating to change in the 
Queensland public sector. Indeed, recent inquiries into the state's health sector higWight the 
critical importance of appropriate managerial and administrative arrangements to effective 
service delivery and draw attention to the ongoing need for the 'pracfice of management' in 
the QPS to change and improve. Whilst some research has been undertaken in different 
areas, much of this is not coordinated and the results not integrated. It is in the interests of 
the Queensland Govemment to review, bring together and critically assess existing research 
and knowledge about the Queensland public sector and in particular the areas of success and 
failure of past reform initiafives. There is little evidence that the manner in which change 
inifiatives are implemented in the QPS is informed by the results of the available research. 
This situation must be reversed. Collation and integration of existing research is necessary. 
Additionally there are a number of specific areas in which further research would assist in 
more clearly identifying the ongoing issues of concem for reformers of and managers in the 
Queensland public sector. Honest and comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of reform 
inifiatives (such as the Shared Service Providers) must be undertaken. Ongoing analysis of 
census data would permit tracking any differences in personal characteristics of QPS staff 
and enable appropriate targeting of change initiatives. 
Research that examined any qualitative data produced by the intemal polling of political 
parties conceming the preferences and likely voting intentions of Queensland public sector 
staff, particularly prior to elecfions, would be informative and add a rich dimension to the 
available information. Confinued periodic measurement of Queensland public service culture 
would also be useful to track any alteration to the traditional bureaucratic mode within the 
sector. A thorough understanding of the culture into which reform is to be introduced is 
critical to the success of a reform program. 
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The confinued long-term prosperity of the state depends on an opfimally effecfive public 
sector. Queensland is the most decentralised state in Australia and its populafion continues to 
grow at a rapid pace. Developing the infrastmcture necessary to sustain the geographically 
dispersed and increasing populafion is primarily the responsibility of the public service. So 
too is the provision of appropriate policies, programs and services to the increasingly diverse 
community. All of this is dependent on a well fiincfioning public sector. Queensland needs 
to take deliberate steps now to achieve such a public sector and this can only be secured by 
undertaking some fundamental management reforms. 
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QUESTIONS FOR INTERYIEWEES 
1. When you first joined the QPS, what did you see as the most significant difference 
between it and the sector you had come from? 
2. Where there other differences that you thought had a significant effect on the way you 
operated in your job? 
3. Did you deliberately operate differently in the QPS and if so how? 
4. Now that you have been in the sector for a number of years, do you still think that any 
of those differences are real? 
5. If you were to recruit a new manager from your old sector now, several years later^ 
what ad\'ice would you give that person about how to most effectively make the 
transition to the QPS'.^  
6. What do you find to be the most frustrating thing about working in the QPS and how 
would yoii change it if you could? 
7. In you fime in the QPS what reforrn inifiative do you think has been most successfully 
introduced? 
8. Which has been least successfully introduced? 
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Australian 
Bureau of 
Statistics 
CENSUS 
1996 r" 
6 August 1996 
Why a Census? 
The Census is the only 
pracfical way to get 
information on how many 
people there are in each 
part of Australia, what 
they do and how they 
Uve. 
Collection authority 
The information asked for 
is collected under the 
authority of the Census 
and Statistics Act. Your 
co-operation is sought in 
complefing this form and 
retuming it to your 
Census Collector 
Confidentiality 
Your completed form 
remains confidential to 
the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics as requested by 
the Census and Statistics 
Act. No information will 
be released in a way that 
would enable an 
individual or household 
to be identified. 
Help available 
If you have any difficulty 
filling out this form, please 
ask your Collector for help, 
or telephone the Census 
Hotline on 
131 608. 
RecNo.(RNO) 
Household Form 
What you need to do 
• Use this form to record details of all people (including visitors) who 
spend the night in your household on Census Night, Tuesday, 
6 August 1996. 
• Your Collector will return between 7 August and 14 August to collect 
your form. 
• On one form you can record details of six people. Your Census 
Collector will give you enough forms for the number of people you 
expect to reside in your household on Census Night. If you find later 
that you needed more forms, or there is more than one household, ask 
your Census Collector or telephone the Census Hotline on 131 608. 
• If any person in your household prefers a separate form for privacy 
reasons, ask your Collector or telephone the Census Hotline for a 
Personal Form and a Privacy Envelope. You may also ask for a Privacy 
Envelope if you do not want your Collector to see your completed form. 
How to answer 
• Please use a black or blue pen. 
• Do not use ficks. Most questions only need 
to be answered by marking a box like this. 
— Yes 
No 
• Please answer all the quesfions for every person, unless the form asks 
you not to. 
• If you do not know an answer, give the best answer you can. 
• Please take your time to complete the form 
• Please do not fold or bend this form. 
1 At what address did this household spend Census Night, 
Tuesday, 6 August 19961 
Street number and name 
Suburb, rural locality or town 
State/Territory Postcode 
Mark one box for each person, like this —, 
2 Name of each person including visitors who 
spent the night oflYiesday, 6 August 1996 
in this household: 
• Record details for all adults, children, babies and visitors. 
• Include any person who returned on Wednesday, 
7 August 1996, without having been counted elsewhere. 
3 Is the person male or female? 
• Mark one box for each person, for example —. 
4 Mark the person *s age last birthday. 
• If age is less than one year, mark box • as — . 
• Mark one box for each person. For example, for a 
person aged 19 years: 
Years 
JPerson 1 Person 2 
Enter the householder or any adult household member as 
'Person 1 * and, if present, the spouse or partner as 'Person 2' 
First or given name 
Surname or family name 
Male 
Female 
Years: 
First or given name 
Surnaine or family name 
Male 
Female 
Years: 
99 years or more 
99 years or more-
please specify : 
years 
99 years or more— 
please specify 
years 
5 What is the person's reiationsfaip to 
Person l/Person 2? 
• Examples of other relationships: 
son-in-law, granddaughter, uncle, boarder. No answer 
required 
for Person 1 
Husband or wife of Person 1 
De facto partner of Person 1 
Child of Person 1 
Stepchild of Person 1 
Brother or sister of Person 1 
Unrelated flatmate or 
co-tenant of Person 1 
Other relationship to 
Person 1 - please specify 
6 What is the person's present marital 
status? 
7 What is the person's usual address? 
• 'Usual' address is that address at which the person has 
lived or intends to live for a total of 6 months or more in 
1996, 
• For persons who now have no usual address, write 'no 
usual address'. 
• For boarders at boarding school or college, give address 
at boarding school or college. 
Never married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated but not divorced 
Married 
The address shown on the 
front of this form 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Never married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated but not divorced 
Married 
Same as for Person 1 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Suburb, rural locality or town Suburb, rural locality or town 
State/Territory Postcode 
Other country 
State/Territory Postcode 
Other country 
D 
For a househotd witti more than 6 persons, please contact the Census Collector. 
Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Person 6 
First or given name 
Surname or family name 
Male 
Female 
Years: 
First or giver name 
Surname or family name 
Male 
Female 
Years: 
First or given name 
Surname or family name 
Male 
Female 
First or given name 
Surname or family name 
Years: 
Male 
Female 
99 years or more-
please specify 
years 
99 years or more-
please specify 
years 
99 years or more-
please specify 
years 
onl)99 years or more-
please specify 
years 
Child of both Person 1 
and Person 2 
Child of Person 1 
Child of Person 2 only 
Brother or sister of Person 1 
tMjelated flatmate or 
co-tenant of Person 1 
Other relationship to 
Person 1 - please specify 
Never married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated but not divorced 
Married 
Child of both Person I 
and Person 2 
Child of Person 1 
Child of Person 2 only 
Brother or si ster of Person 1 
only Unrelated flatmate or 
co-tenant of Person 1 
Other relationship to 
Person 1 - please specify 
Never married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated but not divorced 
Married 
Child of both Person 1 
and Person 2 
Child of Person 1 
Child of Person 2 only 
Brother or sister of Person 
Unrelated flatmate or 
co-tenant of Person 1 
only Other relationship to 
Person 1 - please specify 
Never married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated but not divorced 
Married 
Child of both Person 1 
and Person 2 
Child of Person 1 
Child of Person 2 only 
Brother or sister of Person 1 
Unrelated flatmate or 
co-tenant of Person 1 
Other relationship to 
Person I - please specify 
Never married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated but not divorced 
Married 
Same as for Person 1 Same as for Person 1 Same as for Person 1 Same as for Person 
Elsewhere in Australia-
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Suburb, ruraliocaUty^rjown Siiburb, ruraUocaUty or town Suburb, rural locality or town Suburb^jurai locahtyor town 
Stete/Territory Postcode 
Other country 
State/Territory Postcode 
Other country 
StateAFerritory Postcode State/Territor\ Postcode 
Other country Other country 
D 
Mark one box for each person, like this —. 
8 What was the person's usual address one 
year ago (at 6 August 1995)? 
• If the person is less than one year old, leave blank. 
• For persons who had no usual address on 6 August 
199.5, give the address at which they were then 
living. 
Person 1 
Same as in question 7 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Suburb, rural locality or town 
Person 2 
Same as for Person I 
Elsewhere in Australia 
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Suburb, rural locality or town 
State/Territory jPostcode State/Territory Postcode 
What was the person's usual address five 
years ago (at 6 August 1991)? 
• If the person is less than five years old, leave blank. 
• For persons who had no usual address on 6 August 
1991, give the address at which they were then 
living. 
1 0 What is the person's religious denomination^ 
• Answering this question is OFllONAL. 
• If no relilgion, mark last box. 
Other country 
Bonikt (a£ fin^aedOion 7 
Same as in question 8 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Other country 
Same as for Person 1 
Same as in question 8 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Suburb, rural locality or town Suburb, rural locality or (own 
State/Territory Postcode State/Territory Postcode 
Other country 
Catholic 
Anglican (C 
Uniting Church 
Presbyterian 
Greek Orthodox 
Baptist 
Lutheran 
Other - please specify 
Other country 
Catholic 
Anglican (C 
Uniting Church 
Presbyterian 
Greek Orthodox 
hurcfeii^tftlgland) 
Lutheran 
Other - please specify 
No religion No religion 
1 1 Is the person an Australian citizen? Yes, Australian citizen 
No 
Yes, Australian citizen 
No 
J 2 ^ which country was the person born? Australia • Go to 14 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
Viet Nam 
Other - please specify 
Australia • Go to 14 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
Viet Nam 
Other - please specify 
1 3 In what year did the person first arrive 
in Australia to live here for one year or 
Before 
1981 -
1986 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Will be 
_ 
IQSl 
1985 
here less than one year 
Before 1981 
1981 - 1985 
1986 - 1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Will be here less than one year 
n 
Person 3 
Same as for Person I 
Elsewhere in Austraha -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Suburb, rural locality or town 
State/Territory Postcode 
Odier country 
Same as for Person 1 
Same as in question 8 
Elsewhere in Austraha -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Person 4 
Same as for Person 1 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Person 5 
Same as for Person I 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Person 6 
Same as for Person I 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Suburb, toiral locality or tqwii Suburb, riiral locality or town Suburb, rural locality or town 
State/Territory Postcode 
Other country 
Same as for Person 1 
Same as in question 8 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
StateAFerritory Postcode 
n 
Other country 
Banib a£ Bn^^sid^n I 
Same as in question 8 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
State/Territory Postcode 
Other country 
Same as for Person 1 
Same as in question 8 
Elsewhere in Australia -
please specify address 
Street number and name 
Suburb, rural locality or town Suburb, rural locality or town Suburb, rural locality or town Suburb, rural locality or town 
State/Territory Postcode State/Territory Postcode Staterierruory Postcode State/Territory Postcode 
Other country 
Catholic 
Anglican (C 
Uniting Church 
Presbyterian 
Greek Orthodox 
hurcfeilij^ tftjgland) 
Lutheran 
Other - please specify 
Other country 
Catholic 
Anglican (C 
Uniting Church 
Presbyterian 
Greek Orthodox 
hurcfe^tftlgland) 
Lutheran 
Other - please specify 
Other country 
Catholic 
Anglican (C 
Uniting Church 
Presbyterian 
Greek Orthodox 
Baptist 
Lutheran 
Other - please specify 
Other country 
Catholic 
Anglican (C 
Uniting Church 
Presbyterian 
Greek Orthodox 
hurci^tftlgland) 
Lutheran 
Other - please specify 
No religion No religion No religion No religion 
Yes, Australian citizen 
No 
Yes, Australian citizen 
No 
Yes, Australian citizen 
No 
Yes, Australian citizen 
No 
Australia • Go to 14 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
Viet Nam 
Other - please specify 
Before 1981 
1981 - 1985 
1986 - 1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Will be here less than one year 
Australia • Go to 14 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
Viet Nam 
Other - please specify 
Before 1981 
1981 - 1985 
1986 - 1990 
I99I 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Will be here less than one year 
Australia • Go to 14 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
Viet Nam 
Other - please specify 
Before 
1981 -
1986-
1981 
1985 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Will be h ;re less than one year 
Australia • Go to 14 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
Viet Nam 
Other - please specify 
Before 1981 
1981 - 1985 
1986 - 1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Will be here less than one year 
D 
Mark one box for each person, like this —. 
1 4 Is the person of Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander origin? 
• For persons of both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
origin, mark both 'Yes' boxes. 
1 5 In which country was the person's 
father born? 
Person 1 
No 
Yes, Aboriginal 
Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
Australia 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netherlands 
Other - please specify 
Person 2 
No 
Yes, Aboriginal 
Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
Australia 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netheriands 
Other - please specify 
1 6 In which country was the person's 
mother bom? 
Australia 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netherlands 
Other - please specify 
Australia 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netherlands 
Other - please specify 
1 7 Does the person speak a language 
other than English at home'! 
• If more than one language, indicate the one that is 
spoken most often. 
1 8 How well does the person speak 
English'! 
1 " Is the person attending a school or 
any other educational institution? 
• Include external or correspondence students. 
2 0 What type of educational instin.tion 
is the person attending? 
• Include external or correspondence students. 
No, English only • Go to 19 
Yes, Italian 
Yes, Greek 
Yes, Cantonese 
Yes, Mandarin 
Yes, Arabic 
Yes, German 
Yes, other - please specify 
Very well 
Well 
Not well 
Not at all 
No • Go to 21 
Yes, full-time student 
Yes, part-time student 
Pre-school 
Infant.s/Primary school 
Government 
Catholic 
Other non-government 
Secondary school 
Govemment 
Catholic 
Other non-government 
Tertiary institution 
Technical or further 
educational institution 
(including TAFE Colleges) 
University or other higher 
educational institution 
Other educational institution 
No, English only • Go to 19 
Yes, Italian 
Yes, Greek 
Yes, Cantonese 
Yes, Mandarin 
Yes, Arabic 
Yes, German 
Yes, other - please specify 
Very well 
Well 
Not well 
Not at all 
No • Go to 21 
Yes, full-time student 
Yes, part-time student 
Pre-school 
Infants/Primary school 
Government 
Catholic 
Other non-government 
Secondary school 
Government 
Catholic 
Other non-government 
Tertiary institution 
Technical or further 
educational institution 
(including TAFE Colleges) 
University or other higher 
educational institution 
Other educational in.stitution 
D 
Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Person 6 
No 
Yes, Aboriginal 
Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
No 
Yes, Aboriginal 
Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
No 
Yes, Aboriginal 
Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
No 
Yes, Aboriginal 
Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
Australia 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netherlands 
Other - please specify 
Australia 
England 
Scotland 
haly 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netherlands 
Other - please specify 
No, English only • Go to 19 
Yes, Italian 
Yes, Greek 
Yes, Cantonese 
Yes, Mandarin 
Yes, Arabic 
Yes, German 
Yes, other - please sjjecify 
Very well 
Well 
Not well 
Not at all 
Australia 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netherlands 
Other - please specify 
Austraha 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netherlands 
Other - please specify 
No, EngUsh only • Go to 19 
Yes, Italian 
Yes, Greek 
Yes, Cantonese 
Yes, Mandarin 
Yes, Arabic 
Yes, German 
Yes, other - please sjjecify 
Very well 
Well 
Not well 
Not at all 
Australia 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netherlands 
Other - please specify 
Australia 
England 
Scodand 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netherlands 
Other - please specify 
No, English only 
Yes, Greek 
Yes, Mandarin 
\ / A l_* 
Yes, Araoic 
Yes, other - please 
• Goto 
; specif; 
19 
y 
Very well 
Well 
Not well 
Not at all 
Australia 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netheriands 
Other - please specify 
Australia 
England 
Scotland 
Italy 
Greece 
New Zealand 
The Netherlands 
Other - please specify 
No, English only • 
Yes, Italian 
Yes, Greek 
-^  Yes, Cantonese 
Yes, Mandarin 
\7 A T_' 
Yes, Arabic 
Yes, German 
Go to 19 
Yes, other - please specify 
Very well 
Well 
Not well 
Not at all 
No • Go to 21 
Yes, full-time student 
Yes, part-time student 
No • Go to 21 
Yes, full-time student 
Yes, part-time student 
No • Go to 21 
Yes, full-time student 
Yes, part-time student 
No • Go to 21 
Yes, full-time student 
Yes, part-time student 
Pre-school 
Infants/Primary school 
Government 
Catholic 
Other non-government 
Secondary school 
Govemment 
Catholic 
Other non-govemment 
Tertiary institution 
Technical or further 
educational institution 
(including TAFE Colleges) 
University or other higher 
educational institution 
Other educadonai institution 
Pre-school 
Infants/Primary school 
Govemment 
Catholic 
Other non-govemment 
Secondary school 
Govemment 
Catholic 
Other non-govemment 
Tertiary institution 
Technical or further 
educational institution 
(including TAFE Colleges) 
University or other higher 
educational institution 
Other educational institution 
Pre-school 
Infants/Primary school 
Government 
Catholic 
Other non-govemment 
Secondary school 
Government 
Catholic 
Other non-govemment 
Tertiary institution 
Technical or further 
educational institution 
(including TAFE Colleges) 
University or other higher 
educational institution 
Other educational institution 
Pre-school 
Infants/Primary school 
Govemment 
Catholic 
Other non-govemment 
Secondary school 
Govemment 
Catholic 
Other non-govemment 
Tertiary institution 
Technical or further 
educational institution 
(including TAFE Colleges) 
University or other higher 
educational institution 
Other educational institution 
D 
Mark one box for each person, like this —. Person 1 
2 1 Only continue for persons aged 15 years or more 
2 2 How old was the person when he or she left 
primary or secondary school? 
• For f)crsons who returned after a break to complete their 
schooling, mark the age at which they last left school. 
Still at primary or 
secondary school 
Did not go to school 
14 years or younger 
15 years 
16 years 
17 years 
18 years 
19 years or older 
Person 2 
Still at primary or 
secondary school 
Did not go to school 
14 years or younger 
15 years 
16 years 
17 years 
18 years 
19 years or older 
2 3 Has the person completed a trade certificate 
or any other educational qualification since 
leaving school? 
No • Go to 28 
No, still studying for first 
qualification • Go to 28 
Yes, trade certificate/ 
apprenticeship 
Yes, other qualification 
No • Go to 28 
No, still studying for first 
qualification • Go to 28 
Yes, trade certificate/ 
apprenticeship 
Yes, other qualification 
2 4 What is the highest qualification the person 
has completed since leaving school? 
• For example, trade certificate, bachelor degree, associate 
diploma, doctorate. 
Full name of qualification Full name of qualification 
2 5 What is the main field of study for the person's 
highest qualification completed'! 
• For example, history, plumbing, primary school teaching. 
2 6 At which institution was the person's 
highest qualification completed'! 
• If completed overseas, also state which country. 
Field of study 
Name of institution 
Field of study 
Name c f i nstitution 
2 7 I" which year did the person complete 
their highest qualification? 
Before 1971 
1971 - 1980 
1981 - 1985 
1986 - 1990 
1991 - 1992 
1993 - 1994 
1995 - 1996 
Before 1971 
1971 - 1980 
1981 - 1985 
1986- 1990 
I99I - 1992 
1993 - 1994 
1995 - 1996 
I 2 8 For each female, how many babies has 
i she ever had? 
pi 
i: • Include only live births. 
None 
One 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six or 1 nore 
None 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six or more 
D 
Persons Person 4 Person 5 Person 6 
Only continue for persons aged 15 years or more 
Still at primary or Still at primary or Still at primary or Still at primary or 
secondary school secondary school secondary school secondary school 
Did not go to school Did not go to school Did not go to school Did not go to school 
14 years or younger 14 years or younger 14 years or younger 14 years or younger 
15 years 15 years • 15 years 15 years 
16 years 16 years 16 years 16 years 
17 years 17 years 17 years 17 years 
18 years 18 years 18 years 18 years 
19 years or older 19 years or older 19 years or older 19 years or older 
No • Goto28 No • Goto28 No • Goto28 No • Goto28 
No, still studying for first No, still studying for first No, still studying for first No, sfill studying for first 
qualification • Go to 28 qualification • Go to 28 qualificafion • Go to 28 qualification • Go to 28 
Yes. trade certificate/ Yes, trade certificate/ Yes, trade certificate/ Yes, trade certificate/ 
apprenticeship apprenticeship apprenficeship apprenticeship 
Yes, other qualification Yes, other qualification Yes, other qualificafion Yes, other qualification 
Full name of qualification Full name of qualification Full name of qualification Full name of qualification 
Before 1971 
1971 -
1981 -
1986-
1991 -
1993 -
1995 -
None 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1992 
1994 
1996 
Six or more 
Field of study Field of study Field of study Field of study 
Name of institution Name of institution Name of institution Name of institution 
Before 1971 Before 1971 Before 1971 
1971 - 1980 1971 - 1980 1971 - 1980 
1981 - 1985 1981 - 1985 1981 - 1985 
1986-1990 1986-1990 1986-1990 
1991 - 1992 1991 - 1992 1991 - 1992 
1993 - 1994 1993 - 1994 1993 - 1994 
1995 - 1996 1995 - 1996 1995 - 1996 
None 
One 
Two 
Three 
Five 
Six or more 
One 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six or n lore 
None 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six or mc re 
D 
Mark one box for each person, like this —. 
2 9 What is the gross income (including pensions 
and allowances) that the person usually 
receives each week from all sources? 
30 
• Do nof deduct: 
tax 
superannuation 
health insurance 
• Mark one box only. 
• Count all income for each 
person including: 
family payment 
additional family payment 
rental assistance 
unemployment benefits 
pensions 
student allowance 
maintenance 
(child support) 
workers' compensation 
superannuation 
wages 
salary 
overtime 
commissions and bonuses 
interest received 
dividends 
rents received 
(less expenses of operation) 
business or farm income 
(less expenses of operation) 
Last week, did the person have a full-time or 
part-time job of any kind? 
• Mark one box only. 
• A 'job' means any type of work including casual or 
temporary work or part-time work, if it was for one 
hour or more. 
3 1 In the main job held tes< weeA: was the 
person: 
• Mark one box only. 
• If the person had more than one job last week then 'main 
job' refers to the job in which the person usually works the 
most hours. 
3 2 I" the main job held last week, what was the 
person's occupation? 
• Give full title. 
• For example, Childcare Aide, Maths Teacher, Pastrycook, 
Tanning Machine Operator, Apprentice Toolmaker. 
• For public servants, state official designation and 
occupation. For armed services personnel, stale rank and 
occupation. 
3 3 What are the main tasks that the person 
himself/hers elf usually performs in that 
occupation? 
•Give full details. 
• For example, looking after children at a day care 
centre, teaching secondary school students, making 
cakes and pastries, operating leather tanning machine, 
learning to make and repair tools and dies. 
• For managers, state main activities managed. 
Person 1 
$1,500 or more per week 
($78,000 or more per year) 
$1,000-$1,499 per week 
($52,000 - $77,999 per year) 
$800 - $999 per week 
($41,600 - $51,999 per year) 
$700 - $799 per week 
($36,400 - $41,599 per year) 
$600 - $699 per week 
($31,200 - $36,399 per year) 
$500 - $599 per week 
($26,000-$31,199 per year) 
$400 - $499 per week 
($20,800 - $25,999 per year) 
$300 - $399 per week 
($15,600 - $20,799 per year) 
$200 - $299 per week 
($ 10,400 - $15,599 per year) 
$160-$199 per week 
($8,320-$10,.399 per year) 
$120-$159 per week 
($6,240-$8,319 per year) 
$80-$119 per week 
($4,160-$6,239 per year) 
$40 - $79 per week 
($2,080-$4,159 per year) 
$1-$.39 per week 
($1 - $2,079 per year) 
Nil income 
Negative income 
Yes, worked for payment or 
profit 
Yes, but absent on holidays, 
on paid leave, on strike or 
temporarily stood down 
Yes, unpaid work in a 
family business 
Yes, other unpaid work 
• Go to 39 
No, did not have a job 
• Go to 39 
A wage or salary earner? 
A helper not receiving wages? 
Conducting own business in a 
limited liability compny 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Conducting own business which is 
not a limited liability company 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Occupation 
Person 2 
$1,500 or more per we 
($78,000 or more per year) 
: $1,000-$1,499 per week 
($52,000-$77,999 per year) 
$800 - $999 per week 
($41,600-$51,999 per year) 
$700 - $799 per week 
($36,400-$41,.599 per year) 
$600 - $699 per week 
($31,200 - $36,399 per yciir) 
$500 - $599 per week 
($26,000-$31,199 per year) 
$400 - $499 per week 
($20,800 - $25,999 per year) 
$300 - $399 per week 
($15,600-$20,799 per year) 
$200 - $299 per week 
($ 10,400 - $ 15,599 per year) 
$160-$199 per week 
($8,320-$10,399 per year) 
$120-$159 per week 
($6,240-$8,319 per year) 
$80-$119 per week 
($4,160-$6,239 per year) 
$40 - $79 per week 
($2,080-$4,159 per year) 
$1-$39 per week 
($1 - $2,079 per year) 
Nil income 
Negative income 
Yes, worked for payment or 
profit 
• Yes, but absent on holidays, 
on paid leave, on strike or 
temporarily stood down 
Yes, unpaid work in a 
family business 
Yes, other unpaid work 
• Go to 39 
No, did not have a job 
• Go to 39 
A wage or salary earner? 
A helper not receiving wages? 
Conducting own business in a 
limited liability compny 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Conducting own business which is 
not a limit^ liability company 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Occupation 
Tasks or duties Tasks or duties 
D 
Person 3 
$1,500 or more per week 
($78,000 or more per year) 
$1,000-$1,499 per week 
($52,000 - $77,999 per year) 
$800 - $999 per week 
($41,600-$51,999 per year) 
$700 - $799 per week 
($36,400 - $41,599 per year) 
$600 - $699 per week 
($31,200 - $36,399 per year) 
$500 - $599 per week 
($26,000-$31,199 per year) 
• $400 - $499 per week 
($20,800 - $25,999 per year) 
$300 - $399 per week 
($15,600-$20,799 per year) 
$200 - $299 per week 
($10,400 - $1.5,599 per year) 
$160-$199 per week 
($8,320-S10„399 per year) 
$120-$159 per week 
($6,240-$8,319 per year) 
$80-$119 per week 
($4,160-$6,239 per year) 
$40 - $79 per week 
($2,080-K159 per year) 
$1-$39 per week 
($1-$2,079 per year) 
Nil income 
Negative income 
Yes, worked for payment or 
profit 
Yes, but absent on holidays, 
on paid leave, on strike or 
temporarily stood down 
Yes, unpaid work in a 
family business 
Yes, other unpaid work 
• Go to 39 
No, did not have a job 
• Go to 39 
A wage or salary earner? 
A helper not receiving wages? 
Conducting own business in a 
limited liability compny 
With employees? 
• Without employees? 
Conducting own business whidi is 
not a limited liability company 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Occupation 
i Person 4 Person 5 
$1,500 or more per week 
($78,000 or more per year) 
$1,000-$1,499 per week 
($52,000 - $77,999 per year) 
$800 - $999 per week 
($41,600-$51,999 per year) 
$700 - $799 per week 
($36,400-$41,.599 per year) 
$600 - $699 per week 
($31,200-$36,399 per year) 
$500 - $599 per week 
($26,000-$31,199 per year) 
$400 - $499 per week 
($20,800 - $25,999 per year) 
$300 - $399 per week 
($15,600-$20,799 per year) 
$200 - $299 per week 
($10,400-$15,599 per year) 
$160-$199 per week 
($8,320-$10,399 per year) 
$120-$159 per week 
($6,240-$8,319 per year) 
$80-$119 per week 
($4,160-$6,239 per year) 
$40 - $79 per week 
($2,080-$4,159 per year) 
$1-$39 per week 
($1 - $2,079 per year) 
Nil income 
Negative income 
Yes, worked for payment or 
profit 
Yes, but absent on holidays, 
on paid leave, on strike or 
temporarily stood down 
Yes, unpaid work in a 
family business 
Yes, other unpaid work 
• Go to 39 
No, did not have a job 
• Go to 39 
A wage or salary earner? 
A helper not receiving wages? 
Conducting own business in a 
limited liability compny 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Conducting own buaness which is 
not a limited liability company 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Occupation 
$1,500 or more per week 
($78,000 or more per year) 
$1,000-$1,499 per week 
($52,000 - $77,999 per year) 
$800 - $999 per week 
($41,600-$51,999 per year) 
$700 - $799 per week 
($36,400 - $41,599 per year) 
$600 - $699 per week 
($31,200-$36,399 per year) 
$500 - $599 per week 
($26,000-$31,199 per year) 
$400 - $499 per week 
($20,800 - $25,999 per year) 
$300 - $399 per week 
($15,600-$20,799 per year) 
$200 - $299 per week 
($10,400 - $15,599 per year) 
$160-$199 per week 
($8,320-$10,399 per year) 
$120-$159 per week 
($6,240-$8,319 per year) 
$80-$119 per week 
($4,160-$6,239 per year) 
$40 - $79 per week 
($2,080-$4,159 per year) 
$1 -$39 per week 
($1 -$2,079 per year) 
Nil income 
Negative income 
Yes, worked for payment or 
profit 
Yes, but ab.sent on hohdays, 
on paid leave, on strike or 
temporarily stood down 
Yes, unpaid work in a 
family business 
Yes, other unpaid work 
• Go to 39 
No, did not have a job 
• Go to 39 
A wage or salary earner? 
A helper not receiving wages? 
Conducting own business in a 
limited liability compny 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Conducting own business which k 
not a limited liability company 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Occupation 
Person 6 
$1,500 or more per week 
($78,000 or more per year) 
$1,000-$1,499 per week 
($52,000 - $77,999 per year) 
$800 - $999 per week 
($41,600-$51,999 per year) 
$700 - $799 per week 
($36,400 - $41,599 per year) 
$600 - $699 per week 
($31,200 - $36,399 per year) 
$500 - $599 per week 
($26,000-$31,199 per year) 
$400 - $499 per week 
($20,800 - $25,999 per year) 
$300 - $399 per week 
($15,600 - $20,799 per year) 
$200 - $299 per week 
($10,400 - $15,599 per year) 
$160-$199 per week 
($8,320-$10,399 per year) 
$120-$159 per week 
($6,240-$8,319 per year) 
$80-$119 per week 
($4,160-$6,239 per year) 
, $40 - $79 per week 
($2,080-$4,159 per year) 
$1 -$39 per week 
($1 - $2,079 per year) 
Nil income 
Negative income 
Yes, worked for payment or 
profit 
Yes, but absent on holidays, 
on paid leave, on strike or 
temporarily stood down 
Yes, unpaid work in a 
family business 
Yes, other unpaid work 
• Go to 39 
No, did not have a job 
• Go to 39 
A wage or salary earner? 
A helper not receiving wages? 
Conducting own business in a 
limited liability compny 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Conducting own business which is 
not a limited liability company 
With employees? 
Without employees? 
Occupation 
Tasks or duties Tasks or duties Tasks or duties Tasks or duties 
D 
Mark one box for each person, like this —. 
3 4 For the main job held last week, what was the 
employer's business name? 
• For self-employed persons, print name of business. 
• For teachers, print name of school. 
Person 1 
Business name 
Person 2 
Business name 
I 3 5 For the main job held last week, what was the 
I employer's workplace address? 
|i i • For persons with no fixed place of work (e.g. taxi driver, 
|; pilot, courier) write 'no fixed address'. 
ll: • This information is used to acciu-ately code the number 
II: of people employed in different industries. 
Su-eet number and name Street number and name 
Suburb, rural locality or town Suburb, rural locality or town 
State/Territory Postcode State/Territory Postcode 
3 6 What kind of industry, business or service is 
carried out by the employer at that address? 
• Describe as fully as possible, using two words or more, 
for example, dairy farming, footware manufacturing. 
Industry, business or service of Industry, business or service of 
employer employer 
3 7 Last week, how many hours did the person 
work in all jobs? 
• Subtract any time off, add any overtime or extra time 
worked. 
None 
1-15 hours 
16 - 24 hours 
25 - 34 hours 
35 - 39 hours 
40 hours 
41 -48 hours 
49 hours or more 
None 
1-15 hours 
16 - 24 hours 
25 - 34 hours 
35 - 39 hours 
40 hours 
41-48 hours 
49 hours or more 
OO How did the person get to work on Tuesday, 
6 August 1996? 
* If the person used more than one method of travel to 
work, mark all relevant boxes. 
Train 
Bus 
Ferry or tram 
Taxi 
Car - as driver 
Car - as passenger 
Motorbike or motor scooter 
Bicycle 
Walked only 
Worked at home 
Other 
Did not go to work 
Train 
Bus 
Ferry or tram 
Taxi 
Car - as driver 
Car - as passenger 
Motorbike or motor scooter 
Bicycle 
Walked only 
Worked at home 
Other 
Did not go to work 
3 9 Did the person actively look for work at any 
time in the last four weeks'! 
• Examples of actively looking fi)r work include; 
being registered with the Commonwealth Employment 
Service; checking or registering with any other 
employment agency; writing, telephoning or applying in 
person to an employer for work; or advertising for work. 
No, did not look for work 
• Go to 41 
Yes, looked for full-time work 
Yes, kxjked for part-time work 
No, did not look for work 
• Go to 41 
Yes, looked for full-time work 
Yes, looked for part-time work 
4 0 If the person had found a job, could the 
person have started work last week"! 
Yes, could have started work 
last week 
No, already had a job to go to 
No, temporarily ill or injured 
No, other reason 
Yes. could have started work 
last week 
No, already had a job to go to 
No, temporarily ill or injured 
No, other reason 
D 
Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Person 6 
Business name Business name Business name Business name 
f Street number and name Street number and name Street number and name Street number and name | | 
' •_ ; i | 
Suburb, rural locality or town Suburb, rural locality or town Suburb, rural locality or town Suburb, rural locality or town | 
State/Territory Postcode State/Territory Postcode State/Territory Postcode State/Territory Postcode | 
Industry, business or service of Industry, business or service of Industry, business or service of Industry, business or service of | 
employer employer employer employer i| 
None 
1-15 hours 
16 - 24 hours 
25 - 34 hours 
35 - 39 hours 
40 hours 
41-48 hours 
49 hours or more 
Train 
Bus 
Ferry or tram 
Taxi 
Car - as driver 
Car - as passenger 
Motorbike or motor scooter 
Bicycle 
Walked only 
Worked at home 
Other 
Did not go to work 
None 
1-15 hours 
16 - 24 hours 
2 5 - 3 4 hours 
35 -39 hours 
40 hours 
4 1 - 4 8 hours 
49 hours or more 
Train 
Bus 
Ferry or tram 
Taxi 
Car - as driver 
Car - as passenger 
Motorbike or motor scooter 
Bicycle 
Walked only 
Worked at home 
Other 
Did not go to work 
None 
1-15 hours 
16-24 hours 
25 - 34 hours 
35 - 39 hours 
At\\. 
4tJ hours 
41 - 48 hours 
Train 
Bus 
Ferry or tram 
Taxi 
Car - as driver 
Car - as passenger 
Motorbike or motor scooter 
Bicycle 
Walked only 
Worked at home 
Odier 
Did not go to work 
None 
1-15 
16-
25 -
3 5 -
hours 
24 hours 
34 hours 
39 hours 
40 hours 
41 - 48 hours 
49 hours or more 
Train 
Bus 
Ferry or tram 
Taxi 
Car - as driver 
Car - as passenger 
Motorbike or motor scooter 
Bicycle 
Walked only 
Worked at home 
Other 
Did not go to work 
No, did not look for work 
• Go to 41 
Yes, looked for full-time work 
Yes, looked for part-time work 
No, did not look for work 
• Goto41 
Yes, looked for full-time work 
Yes, looked for part-time work 
No, did not look for work 
• Go to 41 
Yes, looked for full-time work 
Yes, looked for part-time work 
No, did not look for work I 
• Go to 41 I 
Yes, looked for full-time work | 
Yes, looked for part-time work | 
Yes, could have started work 
last week 
No, already had a job to go to 
No, temporarily ill or injured 
No, other reason 
Yes, could have started work 
last week 
No, already had a job to go to 
No, temporarily ill or injured 
No, other reason 
Yes, could have started work 
last week 
No, already had a job to go to 
No, temporarily ill or injured 
No, other reason 
Yes, could have started work 
last week 
No, already had a job to go to 
No, temporarily ill or injured 
No, other reason 
D 
Please answer the following questions for this dwelling 
4 1 Are there any persons who usually live in this household who 
were absent on the night of Tuesday, 6 August 1996? 
No • Go to 42 
Yes • Please complete one separate column for each person absent 
Name of each person who usually 
lives in this household but was not 
here on the night of Tuesday, 
6 August 1996. 
First or given name First or given name First or given name 
Surname or family name Surname or fzumlyiiame Surname or family name 
Is the person male or female? 
• Mark one box for each person absent. 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
Age last birthday 
0 - 1 4 years 
15-24 years 
25 years or more 
0 - 1 4 years 
15 - 24 years 
25 years or more 
0 - 1 4 years 
15 - 24 years 
25 years or more 
Is the person a full-time 
student? 
No 
Yes, full-time student 
Yes, part-time student 
No 
Yes, hill-time student 
Yes, part-time student 
No 
Yes, full-rime student 
Yes, part-time student 
What is the person's relationship 
to Person 1/Person 2? 
• Examples of oUier relationships: 
son-in-law, granddaughter, 
uncle, boarder. 
What is the person's present 
marital status? 
Husband or wife of 
Person 1 
De facto partner of 
Person 1 
Child of both Person 
1 and Person 2 
Child of Person 1 
only 
Child of Person 2 
only 
Unrelated fiatmate or 
co-tenant of Person I 
Other relarionship to 
Person 1 - please 
specify 
Never married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated but not 
divorced 
Married 
Husband or wife of 
Person 1 
De facto partner of 
Person I 
Child of both Person 
1 and Person 2 
Child of Person I 
only 
Child of Person 2 
only 
Unrelated flatmate or 
ct>tenant of Per,son I 
Other relati 
Person 1 -
onshi| 
jlease 
)tt ) 
Never married 
.... , , Widowecl 
Separated 
divorced 
but not 
Husband or wife of 
Person 1 
De facto partner of 
Person 1 
Child of bodi Person 
1 and Person 2 
Child of Person I 
only 
Child of Person 2 
only 
Unrelated flatmate or 
co-tenant of Person 1 
Other relationship to 
Person 1 - please 
specify 
Never married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated but not 
divorced 
Married 
4 2 How many registered motor vehicles owned or used by members of this 
household were garaged or parked at or near this dwelling on the night 
of Tuesday, 6 August 1996? 
• Exclude motorbikes, motor scooters, tractors. 
• Include company vehicles kept at home. 
None 
1 motor vehicle 
2 motor vehicles 
3 motor vehicles 
4 motor vehicles or 
more 
Please answer the following questions for this dwelling 
4 3 How many bedrooms are there in this dwelling!^  None (includes Bedsitter) 
1 bedroom 
2 bedrooms 
3 bedrooms 
4 bedrooms 
5 bedrooms or more 
44 How much does your household pay for this 
dwelling? 
• Include rent and mortgage repayments and site fees if caravan or 
manufactured home in caravan park or manufactured home estate. 
• Exclude water rates, council rates, repairs, maintenance and other 
fees. 
• If no payments, please mark 'NIL' box. 
45 Mark the box which best describes this dweUing. 
• Owners include owners of caravans, manufactured homes or 
houseboats regardless of whether or not the site is owned. 
4 6 If this dwelling is being rented, who is it 
rented from? 
47 If this dwelling is being rented, was it 
furnished by the landlord? 
OR 
OR 
t ) AJ i per week 
(J (J per fortnight 
\J (J per month 
NIL 
Fully owned • Go to 48 
Being purchased • Go to 48 
Being purchased under a rent/buy scheme 
Being rented 
Being occupied rent free 
Being occupied under a life tenure scheme • Go to 48 
Other 
Private landlord not in the same household 
Real estate agent 
Department of Housing 
Community or co-operative housing group 
Employer - Govemment 
Employer - other 
Other 
Yes, fully furnished 
Yes, partly furnished 
No, unfurnished 
48 Finished? 
Please check you have not missed any 
pages or questions and sign here. 
Signature Date 
Thank you for completing this form. Australian Statistician 
D 
Collector's Use Only 
CD Number 
State NSW 
FMA 
FGA 
CD 
Record 
No. (RNO) 
Males 
Total 
Females 
Dwelling Structure 
Separate house 
Semi-detached, row or terrace 
house, townhouse etc. 
1 storey 
2 or more storeys 
Flat, unit or apartment 
In a 1 or 2 storey block 
In a 3 storey block 
In a 4 or more storey block 
Attached to a house 
Caravan, cabin, houseboat 
Improvised home, tent, 
sleepers out 
House or flat attached to a 
shop, office etc. 
Other Dwelling Identifiers 
(Caravan Parks, IWIHE's, 
Marinas and Accommodation 
for the Retired or Aged - Self 
Care Only) 
Summary 
Form No. 
(SFNO) 
Household 
No. (ODNO) 
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R 
MB 
U 
Office Use Only 
MF TF 
Wrfmmmmmmmmmmmim 
D 
^. 
.S.' 
